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Editor’s Note
Fall 2019
Happily, it appears from recent data published and distributed to the journal that the
Comparative Civilizations Review is being widely read. But exactly how many people
worldwide are reading the journal? It’s not easy to arrive at a single answer.
Every two months we get a report called “Readership Snapshot.” It is sent to us from
Digital Commons, a service of bepress. From the reports, we can see that for three
months earlier this calendar year (February, April and June) we had 13,727 full textdownloads. Extrapolating, that tells us that we have about 55,000 to 60,000 full-text
downloads for the year. Plus, we need to add our regular membership readers via the
print copies.
Our paper copy readers typically obtain their copies as members of the International
Society for the Comparative Study of Civilizations. But how do our electronic readers
get to us? We learn from a recent report that during the period that ran from the end of
July 22, 2014 to August 14, 2019 the journal has had 4,406 different “Referrers.”
The top ten of these Referrers over a little more than five years have included, in
decreasing numbers, the following, (all over one thousand downloads each):











www.google.com;
www.google.co.uk;
www.google.ca;
www.google.co.in;
scholar.google.com;
scholarsarchive.byu.edu/do/search;
www.google.com.au;
com.google.android.googlequicksearchbox;
scholarsarchive.byu.edu/ccr/; and
www.google.com.ph.

In just the month of July 2019, there were 357 Referrers. Surprisingly perhaps, a
Referrer named Duckduckgo, plus the better-known YouTube, and en.wikipedia were
among the top ten, along with many of the Referrers listed above.
A map shows us that for about five years, ending in August 2019, we have been used
by 6,880 institutions, most of which are educational in nature.
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Thus:


The top ten downloaders for July are, in order from top down: Stanford, Lanka
Education and Research Network, Central Intelligence Agency, Sichuan
University, University of Johannesburg, Tenet, Used on the IT Network,
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, essensys.Ltd., and University of Cambridge.



All institutions (not just educational), however, for June of this year have
included the following top ten downloaders: Senado Federal (Brazil),
Halliburton Company, Changchengkuandai Sy LN, Bilkent University,
Missouri University of Science and Technology, NSW Department of
Education, University of California San Diego, Oxford University, University
of Oregon, and Victoria University of Wellington.



Finally, for the period from the end of July 2014 to August 2019, the top ten
universities undertaking full-text downloads of our journal were, in declining
order: Michigan State University, Brigham Young University; The George
Brown College of Applied Arts and Technology; University of Toronto; Oxford
University; University of California Los Angeles; Bilkent University;
Binghamton University; University of Cambridge; and the University of
Warwick.

What about the countries of the downloaders? In a July report, we see that the order
for that month was: the United States, first, and then: China, India, the United Kingdom,
Nigeria, the Philippines, Canada, Germany, Australia and Italy. These were the top ten
out of a total of 126 countries.
Overall, since July of 2014, there were 209 countries, led by the United States, and
then, in descending order, the United Kingdom, India, Canada, Germany, Australia,
China, Philippines, France, and the Russian Federation.
So, can we determine how many individual readers we reach?
It is hard to know. But if we go to a map provided by bepress, and then write in on the
left-hand bar (entitled Showing) “Comparative Civilizations Review” and right below
it, (after Works) “All Works” and if on the right-hand side we click the link that
includes “Jul 22, 2014 – Aug 14, 2019,” a set of numbers, by countries or regions,
appear.
On the accompanying map, I have counted roughly 125,000 readers over those five
years.
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The numbers which can be retrieved are not easy to square. After all, if you type in
Comparative Civilizations Review on Google, you’ll get 2,800,000 hits as of this
writing. It’s clearly over one million readers for the lifetime of the journal. The
evidence shows that we have acquired hundreds of thousands of downloaders and many
readers since this journal went electronic (in its earliest form, in 2008).
The conclusion: Our founders and the first editors of the journal would be amazed, I
think. The editors at the commencement of this journal were Vytautus Kavolis and
Edward Leites, and they were co-editors through the spring of 1990.
Here is a link which should take a reader to information on our readership.
https://dashboard.bepress.com/?.authP=authdash%2Cuserid%2C.authTX&authdash=
1&userid=2416190&.authTX=1578610036&.authT=8TqhCDi6kEfQ%2F3lEwNtzkT
I1RFDHCA&period=prevMonth&utm_source=Admins&utm_medium=Email&utm_
campaign=AdminMonthlyReport-2019-07-15#/
At the annual meeting of the International Society for the Comparative Study of
Civilization, held in July at El Retiro San Iñigo, The Jesuit Retreat Center, Los Altos,
California, many wonderful presentations were given. The title was “Comparison of
Civilizations: Ancient and Modern” and the subtitle was “Theories of Civilizational
Studies.” All applause must go to the President, Lynn Rhodes, and the Vice President,
Michael Andregg, for the organization of the conference.
Next year’s conference is shaping up to be very exciting, as well. It’s the 50th
anniversary conference and will be held at the Dimitrie Cantemir Christian University
in Bucharest, Romania, June 25 to 28, 2020.
This is a very attractive venue, as can be seen in the terrific pictures placed on the
ISCSC website; go to www.iscsc.org.
Dimitrie Cantemir Christian University is one of the largest private universities in
Romania, in the heart of Europe. As the website reports: “Professor Momcilo Luburici
PhD., and Professor Corina Dumitrescu, PhD., the founders of Dimitrie Cantemir
Christian University, have steadily, financially, and energetically supported this private
academic entity so as to be included among the most elite higher education institutions
in the world. They also chose to name this university after Dimitrie Cantemir, the 18th
century prince and philosopher, a representative scholar of the Enlightenment and
member of Berlin Academy of Sciences.”
The university has its main headquarters in Bucharest and hosts branches in ClujNapoca and Timisoara for faculties dedicated to law and economic studies. There are
eight faculties in Bucharest, and they offer undergraduate and graduate programs:
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The Faculty of Legal and Administrative Sciences; the Faculty of Tourism and
Commercial Management; the Faculty of International Economic Relations; the
Faculty of Finance, Banking and Accountancy; the Faculty of Marketing; the Faculty
of Education Sciences; the Faculty of Communication Sciences; and the Faculty of
Foreign Languages and Literatures (programs for 10 foreign languages: English,
French, German, Italian, Spanish, Turkish, Japanese, Russian, Chinese, Arabic, plus
Korean (as an optional language).
In addition, the university supports the following technical facilities: twelve modern
amphitheaters (with 200 seats) equipped with a range of multimedia facilities: video
projector, screen, sound system, Wi-Fi access, sockets for portable equipment; five
Information Technology laboratories equipped with computers, interactive SMART
boards and educational software; portable video projectors, laptops that can be used by
the teaching staff and students; a reading room equipped with computers with access
to the library databases; Microsoft Office 365 free access for teachers and students; an
integrated audio-video conference system, a web platform that offers the possibility of
live webcasting for events within the university; an internal television station that was
launched as a channel allowing teachers, students and university visitors to be aware of
the latest educational, cultural, or artistic events within the university as well as for
broadcasting live events to monitors throughout the university; Internet access with a
100MB guaranteed band; Wi-Fi coverage of the campus; and a relaxation area with
Wi-Fi access.
Overall, there are 2,742 seats in amphitheaters and laboratories.
Among the many attractions being prepared for the 50th anniversary meeting will be
original theater productions prepared by the Astra Dance Theater of Los Angeles. The
theater creates original music to go with the dance and drama. Among the key
organizers of the theatre production will be Prof. David Wilkinson, Ms. Sasha Travis,
and Ms. Regan Remy, all affiliated with the ISCSC. I hope that we will be putting
online a link to wonderful music produced by this company via our website,
www.iscsc.org.
The price for accommodations—according to those involved in working out the final
details—is going to be extremely reasonable, and many of those attending in California
have already indicated that they are anticipating attendance next year in Bucharest.
Also, a joint conference was held in Mongolia in September. The conference was
sponsored by the Asia Politics and History Association and the International Society
for the Comparative Study of Civilizations, along with Clarewood University (located
in Reston, Virginia), the Blue Banner Foundation, and the Mongolia Society.
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The topic was Challenges Confronting Asia Today: Nuclear Proliferation,
Environment, Economic, Civilizational. On board from the ISCSC, and reading their
papers were President Lynn Rhodes; Prof. Michael Andregg, our Vice President; and
myself.
Here’s looking forward to seeing all readers perhaps if not in Mongolia in September
then for sure in Bucharest next June.
Joseph Drew, PhD.
Editor
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The Comparative Study of Civilizations and its Relation to China
David Wilkinson
dow@ucla.edu
Chinese scholars have recently expressed much interest in the comparative study of
civilizations, lately carried on mostly in the West, but long open to, and increasingly of
interest to, diverse perspectives. This essay is intended to suggest a road toward the
development of comparative-civilizational studies centered on some questions of both
historical and contemporary significance, with particular attention to one question
concerning which the initial presuppositions of Western and Chinese scholars, in
particular, may be at variance, but where there may be room for the development of
agreed empirical-theoretical conclusions.
Arnold J. Toynbee (1889-1975), the leading civilizationist of the 20th century, and one
of the founders of the International Society for the Comparative Study of Civilizations
(ISCSC), developed a theory of human history and applied it to the comparative study
of civilizations, which he defined as an intellectual enterprise.
A major theme in Toynbee’s work was comparison between the West and China.
Toynbee’s key work was A Study of History, published over a generation, from 1934 to
1954, revised in 1961, and finally revised in 1972.
As stated in the Encyclopaedia Britannica Online Academic Edition (s.v. “Arnold
Toynbee”), Toynbee “...examined the rise and fall of 26 civilizations in the course of
human history, and … concluded that they rose by responding successfully to
challenges under the leadership of creative minorities composed of elite leaders” and
fell when their leaders, intoxicated by their successes, failed to create new responses to
the new challenges which inevitably arose in consequence of their very successes.
Toynbee first studied what he labeled the “Hellenic” civilization of classical Greece and
Rome, and then what he styled the “Western” civilization of Europe. But after these he
gave special attention to what he first labeled the “Sinic” civilization of ancient China
and the successor “Far Eastern” civilization of medieval and modern China. (These two
he later came to see as better understood as two phases of a single “Sinic” civilization.)
Toynbee’s civilizational theory was developed in three phases, each embodied in book
publication. I discuss these phases below. Here I cite only his final conclusions, from
the 1972 edition of A Study of History.
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“The Hellenic Civilization provides the evidence for a model of continuous
development… Chinese history, by contrast, is marked by a pattern of alternating cycles
of unity and disunity, order and disorder, progress and decline… The historian’s task
is to combine the significant features of these Hellenic and Chinese patterns, creating a
realistic model that can be applied to the history of other civilizations” (23).
The Hellenic model defines the transition from local states to a universal state; the
Chinese model defines the alternating rhythms of a universal state’s successive lapses
and rallies (69). Toynbee’s composite Helleno-Sinic model (64) encompasses both.
In the 1972 edition, Toynbee provided a list of 34 “civilizations of the world, 3500 BC
to AD 2000, illustrating the successive phases of their growth.” The “phases” were
either “phases of political plurality” or a “universal state phase.” To cite only the best
known: Western civilization was always politically plural, and therefore conformed to
the Hellenic model; Sinic and Indic civilizations began plural (Hellenic model) but
entered a universal state phase and remained there; Egyptiac and Orthodox Christian
civilizations were in a universal state phase throughout; and Islamic civilization began
in a universal state phase but entered and remained in a plural phase.
There is plenty of food for thought here; I’ll narrow the menu somewhat, to a central
item, stated as a question. Is Toynbee correct in contending that, until the era of Qin
Shi Huang, the history of Sinic civilization is better understood by applying the Hellenic
model than the Sinic model?
Toynbee’s argument that this is so can be found in Chapter 7 of the 1972 edition,
“Hellenic and Chinese models,” pp. 55-64, and in more detail in Chapters VI 3-5, of the
1961 volume Reconsiderations, pp. 170-209.
And if Toynbee is correct in contending that Chinese history underwent a change of
model, or of “stable state,” what accounts for the “change of model,” from the Hellenic
to the Sinic, from the norm of plurality to the norm of unity, in Chinese history? And
what accounts for the apparent durability of that Sinic model’s pattern of normal-unity
in Chinese history since the Qin?
Bibliographic references to Toynbee’s argument are provided below.
I hope that the next ISCSC meeting that may occur in a Chinese venue will inspire some
scholars, Western, Chinese, or other, to pursue this inquiry — and then to ask, as a
followup: Which model holds more promise for the future of our current global
civilization — the Hellenic norm of plurality, or the Sinic norm of unity?
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Bibliographic References: The Three Stages of Toynbee’s Theory Development
1. The first stage comprises the first ten volumes of A Study of History, about 7000
pages in all, published from 1934 to 1954.
Toynbee, Arnold J. A Study of History. London: Oxford University Press,
1954-1961. 12 v. illus.
A two-volume abridgement by D.C. Somervell, in more than 1000 pages, was
published 1946-1957.
Toynbee, Arnold J. A Study of History. abridgement by D.C. Somervell. New
York: Oxford University Press, 1987-, c1946.
Somervell’s abridgement was translated into Chinese by Guo Xiaoling and
published in Shanghai in 2010, as two volumes of 955 pages.
Li shi yan jiu / Anuode Tangyinbi zhu; Samowei'er bian; Guo Xiaoling ... [et al.]
yi.
历史研究 / 阿诺德・汤因比著 ; 萨默维尔编 ; 郭小凌 ... [et al.]译. Di 1 ban. 第
1版. Shanghai: Shanghai ren min chu ban she, 2010. 上海 : 上海人民出版社,
2010. 2 v. (955 p.); 23 cm.
2. The second stage presented Toynbee’s revisions of his theory, made in response to
more than 100 reviews of his work by critics. This was published in 1961 as a 740page volume titled Reconsiderations, as Volum e XII of A Study of History.
3. The third stage was embodied in a single volume: a new edition, revised and
abridged by the author and Jane Caplan of A Study of History. Unlike its
predecessors, this volume was heavily illustrated and designed for a more general
readership, though still amounting to 576 pages.
Toynbee, Arnold J. A Study of History. New ed., rev. and abridged by the
author and Jane Caplan. New York: Weathervane Books: distributed by
Crown Publishers, c1972. 576 p. ill., maps; 30 cm.
See also:
Arnold J. Toynbee
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Arnold_J._Toynbee
A Study of History
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/A_Study_of_History
https://scholarsarchive.byu.edu/ccr/vol81/iss81/14
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The Twisted Mirror of Perception: Social Science in Service of
Political/Ideological Expediency -- The Case of Russian Eurasianism
Dmitry Shlapentokh
dshlapen@iusb.edu
There are many reasons why certain creeds or phenomena from foreign countries
remain unknown in the West. They could be almost totally ignored for decades before
becoming interesting to the scholarly community and general public until, eventually,
works about them become published by the leading presses.
Some explanations are clear, a sort of “self-evident truth”; it takes time before events
in distant and exotic lands can attract the attention of Western observers, and it takes
time before these events become researched and understood, of course, in the context
of Western political culture. One could also say that social scientists need time to
master exotic languages, understand the symbols of foreign cultures, assemble the
materials, write the text, and find a publisher. This could be the case with some
researchers, who spend their entire careers studying the often-convoluted cultural
matrices of foreign lands.
Even foreign-born and educated authors would need time for extensive research,
writing and finding a publisher. Thus, there is an objective reason for delayed
publication. Still, this is not always the case. In some instances, Western researchers
have demonstrated exceptional agility in choosing their subjects and writing books,
even when dealing with foreign subjects and languages.
Thus, the problem is not always the exotic nature of the land, difficult languages or
related matters. Of most importance is to what degree the facts/events correspond to
the political needs of the American, Western public in general, and of course the
Western elite. If the facts do not fit the preconceived “politically correct” theory, they
are often ignored, or marginalized. The fact that the narrative could hardly be related
to reality often does not bother the author, publisher or public.
These specifics of Western historiography can be observed in the approach to
Eurasianism, a peculiar philosophical-political creed. The goal of this article is to
demonstrate how interest in this creed has changed in tune with the evolution of the
political discourse or, to be precise, political/geopolitical needs; and how, in general,
knowledge is produced in the modern West, especially in the USA.
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Eurasianism as Political and Philosophical Creed
Eurasianism emerged among Russian émigrés who fled the Bolshevik Revolution and
the subsequent Civil War. Eurasianism was an idiosyncratic creed, different from those
creeds which had dominated Russia since the early 19th century.
Members of the Russian intelligentsia had split at that time into two major groups. The
first, called Slavophiles, regarded Russia as a part of the Slavic world. The other group,
the Westernizers, assumed that Russia belonged to the West and, plainly, was delayed
in its development. Most, if not all, of the country’s intellectual/political trends had
been related to these two doctrines.
Eurasianism was different from all of them. The major difference was Eurasianism’s
approach to Asia. Neither the Slavophiles nor the Westernizers paid much attention to
the Asiatic part of the Russian empire and non-Slavic peoples of the realm, most of
them Muslim and Turkic from an ethnic point of view. Russian historiography and the
general public’s outlook on Asia were usually quite negative, and Russians, at least the
Russian intellectuals, viewed Asians in a way similar to Europeans. This was even the
case with Slavophiles, who regarded the West as morally “rotten” and primitively onedimensional, and for this very reason, unable to understand the mysterious Russian soul.
Yet, even Slavophiles had mostly condescending views on Asian, non-Orthodox
residents of the empire and from this perspective were not very different from
Europeans, who saw their Asian colonial subjects as savages, regardless of, as some of
them could state, their benign characteristics.
They could teach Europeans to live in harmony with nature and themselves. They could
be courageous and noble and, in fact, have much more moral fiber than Europeans. The
legacy of Asian sages and philosophers, especially those from the distant past, could be
depositories of mysterious wisdom. Still, the vast majority of Asians were “children,”
if one remembers the Kiplingian expression, who must be led by “adults”—Europeans.
This was the attitude of the majority of Russian intellectuals.
Even those who approached Asians positively, with a sort of Rousseau-esque
sentimentality, saw them as beneath Russians in broad civilizational development, or at
least saw them as an alien cultural, ethnic and political force. In their view, Russians
were absolutely alien to them. While venturing into the past, the majority of Russian
historians also saw nothing promising in Russia’s relationship with Asians. The East
was a perennial threat for Russia and competed well with the West as the country’s
major enemy.
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Eurasianists took a critical view of this assumption. To start with, they proclaimed that
Asians inside the Russian empire, and later the USSR, are organically connected with
Slavs; at the same time, not just the Western Europeans but even Slavs outside the
USSR’s borders are actually alien to the Slavs of the Soviet/Russian empire. Finally,
Eurasianists took a fresh look at Russians dealing with Asians in the past, and their view
of the Mongol invasion in the 13th century was clearly different from that of both
Slavophiles and Westernizers. In Russian historiography, as in the historiography of
most other nations, the invasion was a great calamity, possibly the greatest calamity in
Russian history.
Eurasianists took a different look at the event.
They proclaimed that Mongol destructiveness was overestimated. In fact, the Mongols
were a great benefit to Russian society. Mongols had united all the peoples of northern
Eurasia – Slavs and Turkic people first of all – into one state and instilled in them a
sense of belonging to one state and a common “Eurasian” culture. The strong power of
the Mongol Khans instilled all the residents of the empire with an ideocratic feeling,
the sense that each individual lived not just for himself but for a cause, which
transcended his personal life.
One could wonder why such views emerged. The reason could be found in the situation
on the ground. In the beginning of its history, the USSR was a “rogue state” for
practically all the major players, the defeated Germany possibly among the few
exceptions. The country was cut both from Eastern and Western Europe and was truly
isolated as never before in its modern history.
At the same time, minorities had played a considerable role in the regime’s first years.
Jewish commissaires, elite Lettish riflemen, Chinese executioners, and other minorities
of the empire, many of them of Asian origin, were visible elements of the political
landscape. For many minorities, the Bolsheviks were the force which protected them,
and they were anxious to reciprocate. From the very beginning of its existence,
Bolsheviks clearly exhibited “Mongolian” features. They were an egalitarian, brutal
and totalitarian power, compelling citizens to live for the great goal designed by the
state.
And here were the roots of the Eurasian vision of the Mongolian empire as an
“ideocratic” state. Eurasianism was a peculiar manifestation of Sovietism and it was
not accidental that Eurasianists’ critics called them “Orthodox Bolsheviks.”
Eurasianism was practically unknown in Soviet Russia, even among dissident
intellectuals, and for an understandable reason: Soviet authorities prevented receiving,
or at least severely limited receiving, books from abroad, especially by émigré writers.
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Thus, books became practically inaccessible for the majority of Soviets, unless they had
access to “spetskhran,” the special holdings in major Soviet libraries. These were
closed to ordinary readers, and special letters of introduction were required from one’s
university or government office for those who wanted to use them.
There was not much interest in Eurasianism in the West, regardless of the fact that
Eurasianists, as many other émigrés of the so-called “first wave,” were quite productive
and produced many books and periodicals. There were quite a few works in Russian
by those émigrés who criticized the creed. Still, the Western public, with few
exceptions, was mostly oblivious to Eurasianism.
The reason was that in the prevailing mood— at least this was the case in the 1920 and
1930—the USSR’s evolution had been placed in the context of Western or Russian
history. The Western model, which seemed to dominate throughout the 1920s and
1930s, implied that Russia was basically a Western country, and the Western model
was universally applicable. In this context, Bolsheviks were a peculiar modification of
the French Jacobins, and would inevitably experience their “Thermidor.” As a matter
of fact, the dreams about a Russian “Thermidor/Brumaire” would continue through the
1940s, as demonstrated by the success of Nicholas Timasheff’s book.1
Moreover, nationalistic Slavophiles/neo-Slavophiles, while confronting the Western
model, actually had a lot of similarities with it. This model implied that what was going
on in Russia was a peculiar repetition of the Time of Troubles, the chaotic events in the
beginning of the 17th century, marked by uprisings, the spread of banditry, general chaos
and foreign intervention. The country was in turmoil until the Russian people ended it
by willingly electing a new tsar.
Consequently, both Westernizers and Slavophile monarchists often saw Stalin either as
a new Napoleon or a new tsar. Eurasianism does not fit well in any of these paradigms,
and this explains why very few works on it were published in English.2
Lev Gumilev, who is usually known as “the last Eurasianist,” developed Eurasianism,
in his own idiosyncratic form, practically independently from its émigré version. There
were clear similarities and differences between pre-WWII and Gumilevian
Eurasianism. Both regarded the USSR, or at least the biggest part of the country, as the
organic whole. Still, while in pre-WWII Eurasianism all people of the USSR
constituted one quasi-nation, Gumilev regarded Soviet Slavs and Turks as being
essentially different, still living in the condition of benign “symbiosis.”
1

Nicholas Timasheff, The Great Retreat: the growth and decline of communism in Russia. E.P. Dutton
& Company, 1946.
2
Among these few works was a volume authored by Pavel Miliukov, one of the leading Russian liberal
intellectuals and politicians. See P.N. Miliukov, Eurasianism and Europeanism in Russian History,
Bonn, 1930.
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Gumilev, similar to pre-WWII, found the positive aspects of the Soviet regime in
keeping the variety of nations of the USSR together. He accepted the positive side of
the regime despite his own predicament: his father was shot, and he spent many years
in the Gulag. The interest in Eurasianism became increasingly strong in the 1990s and
reached its peak from approximately the late 1990s/early 2000s.
One could indeed state here that Eurasianism became one of the leading creeds and
influenced, to varying degrees, the majority of Russia’s leading politicians and thinkers.
It also became quite well known to the general educated public. It was not surprising
that publications on Eurasianism, mostly in its pre-WWII variation, proliferated in
Russia.
There was implicit interest in Eurasianism and related subjects among Russian
expatriate scholars who lived and worked in the West and continued to maintain a strong
personal relationship with Russia.3
It would be wrong to assert that the creed was absolutely ignored in the West by Western
scholars. Still, it was seen as a rather marginal curiosity, and no major monographs in
English were published, either on the pre-WWII version, the Gumilev version or on the
major protagonists of post-Soviet Eurasianism. The reason was not a lack of
information – major works of pre-WWII Eurasianists were available in the West, and a
huge amount of literature was published in Russia.
The reason for marginalization was clear: Eurasianism did not fit into the Fukuyamian
“end of history,” the triumph of American-type capitalism, which shall be the omega
point of all of humanity, including Russia. Western observers approached Russia from
this perspective. The very facts on the ground did not bother them at all. Gorbachev
and Yeltsin were deeply hated by the majority. Still, in the works of political scientists
and historians, both were seen as heroic liberators, loved by the populace.
The economy collapsed, millions were impoverished, while the few tycoons amassed
enormous fortunes; whereas most American economists, such as one SwedishAmerican professor, Anders Åslund, asserted that privatization was a great benefit in
itself4 and implied that Russian industrial cities should look like Detroit, the not-sopretty ruins of which heralded the advent of an advanced “service economy.”
The ethnic strife and war which erupted in post-Soviet space was also ignored or
marginalized, for the USSR was the last oppressive empire and its collapse should be
hailed regardless of everything.
3

For example, see A.P. Tsygankov, “Mastering space in Eurasia: Russia’s geopolitical thinking after
the Soviet break-up,” Communist & Post-Communist Studies, Vol. 36, Issue 1, March 2003.
4
See, for example, Anders Åslund, How Capitalism Was Built: the Transformation of Central and
Eastern Europe, Russia, and Central Asia. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007.
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Eurasianism, with a tinge of neo-Sovietism, had addressed these problems and interest
in the creed— especially the Eurasianist belief that the USSR was an organic whole
which benefited all of its members—was a peculiar form of Soviet nostalgia. And the
very nature of this nostalgia contradicted the predominant “party line” that the USSR
was a bona fide “evil empire” and most, if not all, of its ethnicities should be happy to
be free from Moscow’s totalitarian grip.
For these reasons, the study of Eurasianism was marginalized in the West, especially
the USA, and the creed was related to “red to brown”—what Communists and
Nationalists had been called by their enemies—and a few crackpots such as Alexander
Dugin. While interest in Eurasianism in Russia had reached its peak by the early 2000s
– and it was related to the peak of nostalgia for the USSR – interest in the creed started
to decline sharply in Russia by approximately Putin’s second term.
The reason for this was manifold. Still, the most important reason was the fading away
of the Soviet legacy of multi-ethnic “symbiosis.” Moreover, increasingly assertive
Russian nationalists led to increasing clashes between ethnic Russians and what they
called “people of the Caucasian nationality,” the term often applied to all residents of
the Caucasus, regardless of their ethnicity, religion or citizenship.
Later, Central Asians were added to the list of undesirable foreigners, and when
members of the Russian elite occasionally used the word “Eurasianism,” it hardly meant
friendly “symbiosis” between Russians and the numerous ethnicities of the former
USSR, but plainly indicated that Russia should control the area of the former USSR as
the 19th century European powers controlled their colonial empires, or commonwealths
of dependents.
It also looked quite similar to the American “Monroe Doctrine,” which made the
Western hemisphere an exclusive sphere of American influence.5 This approach has
hardly anything to do with Eurasianism, either in the classical or Gumilevian reading.
The proponents of Eurasianism also moved away from the original creed. This was the
case with Alexander Dugin, who, in the beginning of Putin’s tenure, emphasized the
idea of multi-ethnic “symbiosis” as the major element of Eurasianism, and this was the
reason why Dugin was especially fond of Nursultan Nazarbaev, Kazakhstan’s
president, whom he regarded as the major initiator of Eurasian “symbiosis”/integration
in the 1990s and early 2000s.6

5

Paul Kubicek, “The evolution of Eurasianism and the ‘Monroeski Doctine’ under Vladimir Putin,”
Conference Papers – International Studies Association, 2004 Annual Meeting, Montreal, Canada,
2004.
6
Aleksandr Dugin, Evraziiskaia missiia Nursultana Nazarbeva, Moscow: Evraziia, 2004.
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Later, Dugin’s interest moved away from the focus on the mighty empire of kindred
Eurasian nations which should confront “Atlantism,” epitomized by the USA, to the
more Russo-centric and rather parochial nationalism, albeit the elements of Eurasianism
continued to be present in his philosophy, together with other creeds.
His emphasis was now on how Russia and the country’s numerous ethnicities could
preserve their unique cultures and return to their true selves, their archaic primordial
core. The same should be the case for all nations on the planet. At the same time,
modern capitalism should be outlawed, and society should return to pre-modern
conditions, when the spiritually noble elite ruled, instead of the cynical and shallow
capitalists and the middle class, who ruled most of the globe now.
It is true that Dugin supported Russia’s invasion of East Ukraine, but plainly because
he became convinced that confrontation with the “Atlanticist” USA and Donald
Rumsfeld’s “old Europe,” which forsook its benign Eurasian essence, would
spiritualize Russia and clean it up from the cultural pollution of the present and recent
past. Still, Putin’s plans were different.
Putin engaged in conflict with Ukraine only because the majority of Russian-speaking
East Ukrainians indeed wanted to be closer to Russia than to Kiev; losing the Black Sea
fleet Crimean ports would have been a strategic blow against Russia’s geopolitical
position. At the same time, there was no desire for further expansion to territories with
non-Russian-speaking people hostile to Moscow. Soon after Crimea’s annexation,
Dugin’s views of Putin and his regime grew darker.
Still, long before Dugin’s final alienation from the present-day regime, Dugin’s view
had little, if any, influence on Russian foreign policy and his connection with the
Kremlin was marginal since the early 2000s.
Dugin’s Rise and Decline in Russia
Dugin indeed was quite close to the Kremlin in the first couple of years of Putin’s first
term. The reason was simple: Dugin’s theory of a grand Eurasian empire and happy
“symbiosis” between various ethnicities harkened back to the Soviet era, and support
of Eurasianism by the Kremlin created the illusion that the USSR was back.
This was quite important for Putin at a time when he was not sure about the stability of
the regime and when nostalgia for the USSR reached its peak. At that time, Dugin
could be helpful in leading the masses away from true restoration of the old socioeconomic arrangements. Indeed, the specter of nationalization was still haunting the
Russian elite, whose interests Putin represented.
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Thus, Putin needed peculiar mimicry, and this was why Dugin enjoyed real favor with
Putin for a short while. Later, Putin, or at least members of his inner circle, apparently
lost interest in Dugin, plainly because the fear of nationalization had subsided, and for
the maturing post-Soviet generation, private property had become axiomatic.
Dugin was not of much use for Putin in the new era. Consequently, he might on
occasion use Dugin for this or that purpose, but only for a limited time. Dugin and
scores of other intellectuals or public figures with similar views could be used on
occasion in the same way that universities could use a part-timer to teach a course or
two, without it meaning that they are part of the permanent staff, and they are usually
dismissed when the job is done.
Indeed, if one would look at the way Putin treats those whom he regards as close to
him, one can understand Dugin’s comparative political marginality, even in the early
2000s. Those whom Putin loves, he provides with positions in the bureaucracy, gives
money to build think tanks with privileges to serve the Kremlin, encourages to be
regularly published in leading newspapers and shown on leading television channels.
Finally, he graces them with his august presence, as was the case with Alexander
Solzhenitsyn, whom Putin not only visited, but made it clear that the public knew about
these visits.
These signs of the Kremlin’s benevolence were indeed clear in the very beginning of
Putin’s term, when the Kremlin provided – either directly or indirectly – funds and
support for Dugin’s Eurasian movement and later Party. Still, soon after, the Kremlin
lost any visible interest in Dugin and his political or quasi-political activity, the Party
quickly collapsed and what replaced it – the International Eurasian Movement – was a
virtual construction, mostly existing as a website with most of the articles penned by
Dugin himself.
The Union of Eurasian Youth, another Dugin project, was actually more of a burlesque
political charade, a peculiar carnival show. It was quite possible that the Movement
received some funds from pro-Putin businessmen. Still, the funding was apparently
quite modest, and the Kremlin played little, if any, role in these financial arrangements.
During the Russo-Georgian War (2008), Dugin was noted for a while. Still, Dugin’s
insistence that the Kremlin should send troops to Tbilisi and occupy Georgia was not
what Putin and Russian elite desired. Consequently, Dugin was once again moved to
the second- or possibly third-tier pool of potential “political adjuncts.” Dugin, however,
continued to support Putin and played some role in Putin’s re-election. Rewards
followed. Dugin became a professor and the chair of a department at Moscow State
University, the leading or at least one of the leading universities in Russia.
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Dugin was the best-known professor, or at least one of the best-known, at the university.
Still, he was clearly at odds with the majority of the faculty, and he could not have been
able to get the job without an approving nod from the Kremlin. Nonetheless, by the
beginning of the Ukrainian crisis, Dugin angered the Kremlin once again by his
passionate plea to deal harshly with enemies of East Ukraine, and actually start a fullfledged war in Ukraine. As in the case with the Georgian crisis, the Kremlin did not
want an escalation, and Dugin, with his pretense that he spoke on behalf of the Kremlin
in his position at a leading university, was dismissed from his job. Undoubtedly, the
Kremlin sent signals to the university administration.
Later, Dugin was employed by the TV channel Tsargrad, funded by a friendly oligarch.
However, the show, with Dugin’s participation, soon became extremely rare, and the
Kremlin provided neither funds nor any other encouragement to make show more
visible. By late 2017, Dugin himself expressed his deep disappointment with the
Kremlin. He stated that for almost 18 years, he had put too much hope in Putin,
believing that he would reverse the course of not just recent Russian history, but actually
all of modern history, following what Dugin called the “Fourth Political Theory,” which
emphasized spiritualization and archaization of society.
Dugin, however, acknowledged that nothing of the sort had happened, and Putin had
plainly used Dugin and similar intellectuals to maintain what was defined by Antonio
Gramsci, Italian Marxist, as Caesarism.
The system, while pretending to be opposed to the liberal capitalist West, actually
followed the “globalism” of modernity and plainly delaying its triumph. Dugin stated
that he now had no hope in Putin. One could, of course, note that Dugin had made
similar critical statements about Putin in the past and resumed his praise, albeit with
reservations, later on. Still, it appeared that Dugin’s disappointment with Putin was
deeper than before, and he noted that he had entertained illusions about Putin in the past
and had behaved as a child, and that now was the time to be an “adult” and face the
unpleasant reality.
Putin’s latest term not only transformed Dugin to an almost political zero (one could
wonder if Putin even remembers his name), but also represented a time of sharp decline
in public interest in Dugin and similar minded folk among Russian intellectuals.
One should be clear here: the Russian educated public has marginalized Dugin and
similar people because they disagreed with Dugin’s critiques of the West. Dugin was
blasted as being “reactionary,” “fascist,” and clearly not a supporter of Western
democracy. Still, these political labels have hardly prevented Dugin from being highly
popular in Russia, and what Russians called the “near abroad,” the republics of the
former USSR, in the 1990s and early 2000s.
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A good part of the Russian population is quite skeptical of the Western democracies, as
a matter of fact, following populist waves in Europe and in the USA.
It is true that now the early fascination with Putin is mostly passé. For the average
Russian, Putin did not follow his implicit promise to be the ruler of the people. The
Oligarchs continue to prosper, whereas the economic conditions of the majority have
hardly improved. For the disenfranchised and economically and socially marginalized
new generation of Russian youth, the alternative is not Western democracy as it is
visualized by the mainstream Democratic Party in the USA,7 but radicals of all stripes,
including ISIS – as the Russian FSB, the descendant of the Soviet KGB, asserted
recently with concern.8
The reason for Dugin’s declining popularity in Russia was not in the Russian
intellectual elite’s embrace of democracy, but for a different reason: Russian society,
including intellectuals, became increasingly Westernized or, to be precise,
Americanized.
They might be skeptical, or even cynical, in regard to democratic institutions and see in
Washington’s proclamation about Moscow’s imperialism just a Freudian desire to
transmit Washington’s intentions to its geopolitical opponents. They could assert that
the West in general and the USA in particular should remember that Russia is a huge,
nuclear state and has a great culture and a long history, and definitely should have the
right to be not just a regional, but a global power, with an appropriate sphere of
influence.

7

One might add here that even here, the liberal elite became increasingly apprehensive about democracy
as the rule of the people, plainly because the people transmogrified into “deplorables” could well make
“bad” authoritarian choices. Yascha Mounk, a contributor to The New Yorker, the quite prestigious
leading liberal publication, published an article with the telling title “Is more democracy always better
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8
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Still, the Russian middle class, and the intellectuals’ existential and related behavioristic
transformation, have become increasingly Western-oriented; mainstream members of
the emerging post-Soviet Russian elite increasingly have grown to resemble their
American counterparts. And the environment became radically different from that
which nurtured Dugin in his formative years in late Soviet Russia. The description of
this milieu, Dugin’s environment and related knowledge production, inevitably leads to
oversimplification, and the author is aware of this. Still, it should be noted to understand
how Dugin and similar intellectuals are perceived in Russia.
Researchers usually ignore the existential and behavioristic aspects of knowledge
production. Still, it is quite important in understanding the internal logic of the
narrative. In our view, the internal logic of knowledge production is deeply connected
with the application of power. The totalitarian rulers, especially of what could be called
Oriental Despotism, such as those in the USSR, China and North Korea, were
absolutely alone as Karl Wittfogel noted in his seminal work on Oriental Despotism
some time ago.
The ruler has no reference beside himself, and what he himself defined as “sacred text,”
e.g. the works of Marx. He does not require election or popular approval, and his work
does not need quotations, references to peers and consequently “peer review.”
Paradoxically enough, totalitarian rule was the role model of intellectuals, especially
dissident intellectuals. The dissident hates power, and at the same time, duplicates
power. Similar to the ruler, he is alone, barring a few trusted friends. His text could
well ignore any professional rules, at least as they are defined in the West. And he would
not care how “peer review” would evaluate his work; for him, institutionalized scholars
were not different from those in power and the hoi polloi; all of them are just concerned
with their material success, formal approval and cushy jobs.
All of them, in the view of Alexander Zinoviev (1922-2006), mathematician and
dissident writer, were animal-type imbeciles, whose views should be ignored.
Zinoviev became known in the West for the publication of his two books, Yawning
Heights and Homo Sovieticus. Both presented Soviet society in which the hoi polloi,
institutionalized intellectuals and authorities are a bunch of primitive zombies who are
“ebantsy” (screwed up), and resemble creatures created by Hieronymus Bosch. There
was no opposition between the state and the masses: they were similar to each other.
The true intellectual, the man with talent and moral fiber, could hardly prosper in this
society.
Zinoviev’s views represent the outlook of many Russian dissidents, and not only them.
Indeed, in their view, the very fact that one’s work is published – past the “peer review”
of officials/institutionalized experts – and that he receives a cushy job plainly indicates
that he either has no real talent or is just prostituting himself.
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The true intellectual should live in poverty, engage in manual, low-paying work, live in
obscurity and never be published. His manuscript – usually a couple of typewritertyped copies, the proverbial “samizdat” – could be shared with a few trusted friends or
possibly no one. This vision of the world and the role of the intellectual in society was
profoundly anti-Social-Darwinist/Calvinist which, in this or that way, permeates the
behavior and creates the existential framework for knowledge production in the West,
especially the USA.
The elements of this old Soviet model had existed during the early Soviet era and
explains why Dugin’s works, published by “on-demand” press, were as popular as those
produced by more established publishers. These “on-demand” published books were
the direct descendants of the Soviet-era “samizdat,” and the very fact that they were not
subject to “peer review” of any type just indicated that the author was absolutely free,
expressing himself.
However, with the development of capitalism in Russia in its peculiar form, all of this
started to change with increasing stress on the Social-Darwinian/Calvinistic model,
which defines the life and model of knowledge production for the majority of Western,
especially American, intellectuals.
The new model started to affect Russian intellectuals. It was not just the increasing
access to and interest in Western scholarship, but also the desire to study in the West
and find a job at American universities. It went along with the desire to publish in
English and an increasing awareness of the ranking of the various presses and journals.
There was also increasing acceptance of “peer review” practices which indicated that
the work is “scholarly,” and therefore quite different in its scholarly value from those
which are not “peer reviewed.” All of this influenced Dugin’s perception in Russia.
For most Russian intellectuals it became clear that Dugin’s influence in the Kremlin
was zero, and Putin most likely did not even know his name. Moreover, it is quite likely
that for some people in the Kremlin, Dugin had emerged as a liability due to his
ideological pranks. Affiliation with Dugin did not entail some cushy job in the Kremlinaffiliated think tanks. He also had no university affiliation, and thus his
recommendation could hardly secure a job in academia in either Russia or the West. As
a matter of fact, it could actually scare off potential employers. And at that point, since
most of Dugin’s publications continued to be published “on demand” they are now
placed in the conventional American context: they are “vanity press” stuff, and could
be dismissed, together with their author.
One shall, of course, be clear: even present-day Russia is not the USA. Moreover, even
Europe is not the USA and, at least in continental Europe, there is still a notion, which
also has long historical roots, that great minds and unorthodox thinkers could emerge
outside the conventional academic box.
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Still, in Russia, the trend toward Americanization is clear; and it marginalized Dugin’s
role in the intellectual discourse of present-day Russia almost to zero. The same could
be said about Eurasianism, the receding light of the dead USSR, based on the
“symbiotic” relationship of various ethnicities; this is also almost on a par with the high
level of xenophobia “especially toward gastarbeiters from Central Asia.”9
Thus, the views of Dugin as the force behind the Kremlin hardly stands the trial of the
facts. Nevertheless, the interest in Dugin and related subjects (Eurasianism) in the West
contrasts with Dugin’s influence in the Russian establishment, and his role in the
country.
Dugin as Rising Political and Intellectual Star
From the beginning of the 1990s, Dugin became increasingly visible in the country’s
intellectual circles as one of the founders of the National Bolshevik Party, and as a man
who was engaged in quasi-political life. As of that time, he was mentioned in the
West.10 By 2001-2002, Dugin’s influence and political clout had reached its peak.
Indeed, by then Dugin had created his own Party, an endeavor hardly possible without
the Kremlin’s direct involvement. His Foundations of Geopolitics became a bestseller,
and has been accepted as a textbook in military colleges. For some Russian observers,
even those who were hardly fascinated with Dugin, he was a rising star. Still, not much
about him was published in English.11 In the West in general, he was seen mostly as a
freakish right-wing curiosity, unable or unwilling to adjust his view to the era of
“transition,” i.e., the transition from totalitarian “abnormality” to democratic
“normality.”12
By 2003 or so, Dugin’s romance with the Kremlin was over. His Party disintegrated
and he soon was marginalized by the Kremlin. Still, it was at that time that Dugin
became increasingly a person of interest in the English-language press, including
scholarly ones.

9
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He was often studied, not just as one of the most interesting and prolific Russian
philosophers and public intellectuals who could be well studied in the context of
Russia’s recent intellectual and political history, but as an increasingly influential
person who implicitly guided and inspired people in the Kremlin.
Some Western authors expended considerable energy in unmasking the reactionary
essence of Dugin’s philosophy and its increasing influence on Kremlin folk. This was,
for example, the case with Andreas Umland, who defended his Ph.D. dissertation at
Cambridge University13 and started to actively publish about Dugin, presenting him as
quite a dangerous chap.14 The same could be said about Anton Shekhovtsov, who often
collaborated with Umland.15
Other Russia-watchers also became interested in Dugin, seeing him as a rising
intellectual and political star in Russia. Dugin’s appointment to Moscow State
University was seen not just as an academic appointment case in Russia – but as an
important and ominous political sign.16 Dugin’s appointment implicitly indicated, in
the view of some Western observers, that right-wing imperialists were on the rise in the
Kremlin, and that their ideas should be studied in earnest.17 Dugin’s importance for
Western readers was underscored by the fact that he started to be published in English.18
Despite Dugin’s work at Moscow State University and his never-ending attempts to
advertise himself as the guiding light for the people in the Kremlin in general and Putin
in particular, Dugin’s influence on Russian politics continued to be miniscule. The
same could be said about his influence on Russia’s intellectual life. Even at Moscow
State University, most of Dugin’s colleagues – as one professor told the article’s author
– looked at Dugin mostly as a peculiar curiosity, out of touch with reality.
13
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extraparliamentary radical right in contemporary Russia,” University of Cambridge, 2008.
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15
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Aleksandr Dugin’s worldview,” Totalitarian Movements & Political Religions, Vol. 9, Issue 4,
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1892, 16 April 2009.
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16, 7 September 2009.
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It is true that by the beginning of the conflict in Ukraine, Dugin and similar individuals
had received a brief blessing from the Kremlin, and this was noted in English-language
publications.19
Dugin himself observed the beginning of what he regarded as a new world order, in
which his expertise and insight would be of great importance. Still, as was already
noted, the Kremlin’s interest in Dugin was brief and then declined sharply and he,
together with similar-minded individuals, was demoted in this or that way. Dugin, as
was already noted, lost his position as a professor at Moscow State University and this
was noted by Western publications.20 Still, the publications which indicated Dugin’s
real position were overshadowed by many more publications, which stressed that Dugin
continued to be a man of influence who in many ways shaped Putin’s policy. Indeed,
Dugin as the man behind Putin would lead Western civilization to catastrophe.
Dugin as the Man of Extreme Danger to the West
The beginning of the Ukrainian crisis appeared to have transformed Dugin into the man
who actually runs Russia. It was his presence which made Putin so dangerous. “Indeed,
Dugin emerged as “Putin’s Rasputin.”21 Here, Dugin was implicitly compared with the
Siberian monk who, some historians believed, totally controlled Nicholas II, the last
tsar of Russia, and who was, in this reading of events, responsible for the collapse of
the dynasty.
It was not surprising that in this interpretation of events, he manipulated Putin almost
completely. This was, for example, the case with Anton Shekhovtsov who, together
with Prof. Umland, continued to spend considerable time in unmasking Duginism and
its dangers for Russia and implicitly mankind,22 and indicated the dangerous spread of
Dugin’s ideas.23
Indeed, for a contributor to the influential Foreign Policy, Dugin’s nefarious influence
could be compared with that of Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, the leader of ISIS.24

19

“Yalta, February 1945: beginning of a new world?” International Affairs: a Russian Journal of
World Politics, Diplomacy & International Relations, Vol. 56, Issue 2, 2010.
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Edition,” Vol. 264, Issue 4, 5 July 2014.
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Robert Zubrin, “Putin’s Rasputin,” Skeptic, Vol. 20, Issue 2, 2015; Mervyn F. Bendle, “Putin’s
Rasputin,” Quadrant Magazine, Vol. 58, Issue 9, September 2014.
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It was not surprising that Dugin’s writings – he is an extremely prolific writer – were
taken seriously. This was the case, for example, with Dugin’s The Fourth Political
Theory. Here, Dugin, who could hardly be accused of excessive modesty, proclaimed
that he had finally revealed the path for all of mankind, which should discard all
previously dominant creeds, at least those which had dominated humanity for the last
200 years or so. Dugin’s claims were taken seriously, and World Affairs, the wellknown liberal American periodical, published a review of them. Curiously enough, it
was authored by Israel Shamir, a Russian Jew who upon emigration to Israel – and as
one could assume, as an ardent Zionist – became an equally ardent anti-Semite and
Holocaust denier.25
Dugin’s philosophical ideas had been continuously discussed with implicit indication
that they had direct implication for Russia’s and possibly the global flow of events.26 It
is not surprising that Dugin’s claims about his paramount role in the Kremlin’s policy
has been taken at face value. Dugin, for example, claimed that the rapprochement
between Russia and Turkey was mostly due to his efforts, and the respected Bloomberg
Businessweek took this claim seriously enough to publish an article about it.27 Dugin’s
direct influence on the Kremlin and related Eurasianism’s influence on the Kremlin was
a subject of scholarly monographs.28
Dugin and Eurasianism and Knowledge as a Case of Political Expediency
How did Dugin and other similar-thinking people seem to become a formidable force
behind Putin and make him appear as an almost insanely reckless imperialist who needs
to be stopped by any means necessary?
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Israel Shamir, “The Fourth Political Theory,” World Affairs, Vol. 18, Issue 1, Spring (JanuaryMarch) 2014. On The Fourth Political Theory, see also R.R. Reno, “The public square,” First Things: a
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To understand this, we need to return to the beginning of our article, when we noted the
interest in Eurasianism in general and Dugin in particular in the early post-Soviet era.
In the 1990s, when Eurasianism and Dugin were quite popular in Russia, they were
marginalized in the USA, plainly because they did not fit into the prevailing model of
the “end of history” – Western capitalist democracy. Russia was weak, almost on the
brink of disintegration, and completely powerless. At that point, Western intellectuals
ignored Eurasianism and similar political creeds as either absolutely irrelevant or as
wishful thinking of marginalized Russians who lamented the end of the empire.
After the 2008 war with Georgia, it was demonstrated that Russia was not a weakling,
nor a failing state, and it could defend its interests. By that time, the interest in
Eurasianism reemerged even though its representatives, such as Dugin, continued to be
seen as crackpots. Yet there were implications that they would be taken seriously, due
to their influence upon Putin. Finally, after the conflict over Crimea and Russia’s
involvement in Ukraine, Eurasianism and Dugin became an inspiration for Putin.
In this narrative, Russia was not just a strong state, but had other features. It was not
just an aggressive but “insane” country. It was engaged or ready to engage in conflicts
which could well lead to global war. The Moscow elite thus does not think about the
long-term results of its actions and is driven by just the wishful thinking of the leaders
or simply by their instincts.
This theory juxtaposed “rational” Washington to “irrational” Moscow, and this was one
reason why Duginism emerged as the Kremlin’s guiding light. Actually, it was, in a
sort of Freudian way, Washington’s desire to attribute and transmit its own geopolitical
behavior, especially in the Middle East, and which ended in spectacular disaster, to its
geopolitical rival. The image of “insane” and intrinsically aggressive Russia was a good
propaganda ploy and has other practical implications. Europeans should accept the
USA’s leadership at a time when the tension between Donald Rumsfeld, Bush’s
Secretary of Defense and “Old Europe,” especially Germany, became especially heated.
Dugin’s importance for U.S. propaganda was also important for other reasons and was
connected with the election of Donald Trump.
Trump’s critics often stated that they could not stand him because of his outrageous
behavior and dictatorial propensities. Some, like Prof. Timothy D. Snyder, from
prestigious Yale University, implicitly compared him to the Roman Caesars or
Mussolini. Some, and this was especially the case during his campaign, compared him
to Hitler and predicted the dark night of despotism if the electorate chose him as the
next president. The elite’s revulsion was overwhelming. Not only Democrats, but even
Republican elites were outraged.
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However, a closer look at Trump’s presidency indicates that he had not done anything
that had not been done by any other Republican president. He cut taxes, mostly for the
rich, from which the economy would hardly benefit in the long run, and engaged in
aggressive foreign policy posturing, if not in action, then at least in verbal expression.
Still, the hatred of Trump is much stronger than even for George W. Bush, who started
a disastrous war in the Middle East. At least there was not serious talk about his
impeachment.
Why was there such dislike of Trump among all segments of the elite? The point here
is that Trump’s original popularity was due to serious economic problems. It was the
decline of the “real” economy; the production of steel, machines, cars and similar
products had reached its peak several decades earlier – and the real income for most
Americans had declined sharply since the 1960s.
The elite was able to control the masses, providing some few pre-selected candidates
who, while proclaiming their differences from each other, were actually quite similar
to each other, for none of them were willing to change the socio-economic arrangements
which made this economic decline possible. Trump was elected against the will of the
elite, and this election indicated that the “uncontrolled” masses whom Hillary Clinton
called “deplorables” could potentially be engaged in socio-economic and political
changes against the will of the elite.
And these changes could be violent. As a matter of fact, the influential magazine The
New Yorker discussed the possibility of a civil war in the USA, a subject absolutely
taboo only a few years earlier. Elaborating on the possibility of civil war in the USA,
Evan Osnos, a contributor to The New Yorker, noted that a visible segment of American
society, mostly rich folk, were taking the possibility of civil war quite seriously, and
engage in concrete actions to protect themselves in the case of cataclysm.29
While the protagonists of Osnos’ article see clear domestic roots of the potential
cataclysm, most members of the American elite hardly think this way. For them, the
reasons for a potential crisis are not internal, but external. And the reason for their
blindness is clear. Unwilling to change the socio-economic make-up of society and
proclaiming it axiomatic—the “end of history” notion—the USA’s elite finds Putin and
his associates to be the major reason for Trump’s victory, and the cause of potential
problems in the future.

29
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Putin, in this reading, became increasingly sophisticated and enjoyed almost
superhuman qualities. And here, Dugin and similar intellectuals had emerged as the
force which made Putin to rule over not just Russia but over the USA, by using Trump
as his puppet, and implicitly all over the world. It was they who could wreck the entire
Western civilization.
Indeed, in this reading, Putin and implicitly Dugin became somewhat demonic
personalities who could almost rule the world in general and the USA in particular, just
by creating a narrative different from that of the mainstream; the generation-long
domination of postmodernism instilled in quite a few members of the Western elite the
idea that socio-economic problems could be bypassed if the elite designed an
appropriate “text” which could “deconstruct” any reality, depending on the elite’s
interests.
In any case, the “discourse” is the power and, due to modern technology, the wrong
“discourse,” one that could be spread from any part of the globe. In this context, Dugin,
as Putin’s agent, could influence either directly or indirectly such influential populist
American intellectuals as Glenn Beck30 and Steve Bannon,31 who could mislead naïve
“deplorables,” leading them to the destruction of democracy and its transformation into
“populism,” with an authoritarian or even totalitarian tinge.
Conclusion
The goal of our study is not an attempt to relativize the intellectual history, social
sciences in general, in postmodernist fashion. Many studies on Eurasianism and its
major representatives, Dugin in our case, indeed tried to present reality “as it is,” if one
would paraphrase Leopold von Ranke’s expression.
Still, if one would assemble what seem to be the disconnected pieces of the puzzle, the
picture becomes clear: the intellectual trends and related picture of reality is often only
tangentially related to the facts on the ground. The constructed reality relates not to
facts, but to what “consumers,” in the broad meaning of the word, e.g. academia,
government, society in general, etc., want to receive from the producers of the narrative.
The case with the image of Eurasianism and its major representative (e.g. Dugin) could
be a good example. Eurasianism and Dugin were clearly very popular in Russia in the
late 1990s and early 2000s when nostalgia for the USSR and, implicitly, Soviet
arrangements, had reached its peak.
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At the same time, Eurasianism and Dugin were still rather marginal players in Russia,
according to the majority of Western observers, mainly because Russia, together with
the rest of the world, were supposed to march toward the Fukuyamian “end of history.”
Europeans, especially Eastern Europeans, were already skeptical of this vision. Still,
their works were regarded as rather marginal in comparison to Anglo-Saxon
scholarship.
By the middle of the 2000s, Eurasian influence in general and Dugin’s influence in
particular started to decline sharply, regardless of the Kremlin’s occasional interest in
him during the 2008 war with Georgia and the 2014 Ukrainian crisis. By that time
Eurasianism in general and Dugin in particular reemerged in English-language
publications as being extremely important from all perspectives. The explanation was
simple: reassertive Russia would emerge as an “insane” state ready for everything to
rebuild their empire and the elite was deeply hostile to the West.
This distortion of reality was not just a Western or, to be precise, American,
phenomenon. It could well be found in authoritarian/totalitarian states. Nevertheless,
one could assume, the ruling elite of these states suffered less from distorted information
than did those in the USA.
The point here is that in authoritarian and totalitarian discourse, there is a clear
difference between public and private information. In the USSR, for example, Party
officials always publicly proclaimed that all ethnicities of the USSR lived in harmony
with each other and all Soviet people felt that they belonged to the same Soviet nation,
regardless of their ethnic membership.
The official propaganda also asserted that the vast majority of Soviets were deeply
attached to the regime. Nonetheless, the Secret Police undoubtedly provided
information to the inner circle of the Soviet rulers that the reality is quite different, and
that the relaxing of the iron grip of the Secret Police and Party could lead to dire
consequences. Soviet rulers had never been brainwashed by their own brainwashing,
and they made a clear difference between public statements and operational philosophy;
at least this was the case until Gorbachev.
The story is different in the West; at least this is the case in the USA. The political
scientists of the early 1990s who publicly preached the “end of history” and the USA
as the paragon of democracy did not change their paradigm in their capacities as
government advisors: they repeated the same vision of the past, present and future as
they presented in their public lectures, articles and books.
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The distortion of reality is here, paradoxically enough, stronger than in
totalitarian/authoritarian states. Consequently, distortion of reality could be seen not
just in visions of foreign countries but also in their own societies. A good example
could be Trump’s election. Until the very last moment, almost 100% of American
pundits were sure that Trump, with his clear authoritarian bent and outlandish behavior,
would never enter the White House.
When this happened, American political scientists failed to find even a single Englishlanguage scholarly monograph published in the last 50-70 years which clearly dealt
with the possibility of an authoritarian or totalitarian transformation of the USA. Thus,
the study of Western perception of Eurasianism tells us not only about the creed, but in
a way, how knowledge is often produced in the West and how Western society works.
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Phoenicians: The Quickening Of Western Civilization
John C. Scott
johncarlscott@aol.com
Editor’s Note: This article builds upon a preliminary version sketched out last
year and published in the journal on Pages 25 to 40, issue No. 78, Spring 2018. It
represents in our view an important addition to scholarship on a significant and
foundational topic, one central to the development of Western Civilization and the
comparative study of civilizations.
A relatively recent field of inquiry, Phoenician and Punic studies covers much the same
time and geographical areas as Archaic, Classical, and Hellenistic Greek and Roman
history.1 Adjacent fields include economic, business, writing, agricultural, nautical, and
biblical history. Scholarship today is moving beyond the Hellenocentric and
Romanocentric viewpoints and the record of Phoenician history is increasingly seen as
critical for understanding European origins.
Scholars generally agree that there are two sources of the Western tradition: JudeoChristian doctrine and ancient Greek intellectualism. There is also recognition that
Western civilization is largely built atop the Near Eastern civilizations of Mesopotamia
and Egypt, which were among the first in the world. The proximity of Europe to the
Near East, hence “near” region, explains cultural interaction. A basic question arises,
however, as to which antique people specifically prepared the way for the West to
develop. While early Aegean cultures are often viewed as the mainspring, assessment
of the growing literature reveals that the maritime city-states of Phoenicia stimulated
(Bronze Age) and fostered (Iron Age) Western civilization.
Phoenicia, a small maritime region, lay on the Eastern Mediterranean coast. The
Phoenicians, who were Semites, emerged as a distinct Canaanite group around 3200
BCE. Hemmed in by the Lebanon Mountains, their first cities were Byblos, Sidon,
Tyre, and Aradus.2
The principal axis of Eastern influence, Phoenicia sent forth pioneering seafarers,
skilled engineers, gifted artists and artisans, and master entrepreneurs of antiquity.

1
2

Xella (2013), 1.
Holst (2008).
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Through a peaceful,3 long-distance exchange network of goods and ideas, they
influenced the trade, communication, and civilizational development of the
Mediterranean basin, notably Greece. The height of Phoenician shipping, mercantile,
and cultural activity was during the early Greek Archaic period, especially, the
Orientalizing phase, c. 750-650 BCE, which appears to have laid the foundations for
fifth century BCE Classical Greece. Phoenician mercantilism prompted European state
formation in the Aegean, Italy, and Spain.
This past century, anthropologist Ralph Linton, in The Tree of Culture, confirmed the
influence of the Phoenician thalassocracy -- rule of the sea -- and explained: “Their
main role in the development of the Greek and other Mediterranean cultures was as
intermediaries between Asia and Europe.”4 Modern Phoenician studies were launched
during the early 1960’s by Sabatino Moscati and the Italian school. During the
seventies, there was a focus on the Phoenician expansion.
The Sea Traders was introduced by archeologist James B. Pritchard: “They became the
first to provide a link between the culture of the ancient Near East and that of the
uncharted world of the West…They went not for conquest as the Babylonians and
Assyrians did, but for trade. Profit rather than plunder was their policy.”5 Hans G.
Niemeyer edited the educative Phönizier im Westen.6
Toward the close of the century, La civilization phenicienne et punique: Manuel de
recherché7 appeared as a landmark collection of articles in Phoenician-Punic studies.
Reviewer Philip C. Schmitz’s concluding comment: “To the general historian, the
volume offers an alternative history of the Mediterranean before Rome, balancing the
Hellenocentric narratives that have so long determined the shape of ‘Western’
civilization.”8
The Bronze Age: Phoenicia and Embryonic Western Civilization
From the Early Bronze through the Iron Age, North Africa and the whole of Europe
were eventually integrated. The world-systems approach emphasizes long-distance
trade (land and sea) and communication, and it includes the traditional concept of
cultural diffusion.
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Niemeyer (2004), 245, notes that the Phoenician expansion does not appear to have had political or
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Diffusion involves ideas, technology, goods, and individuals; nevertheless, aspects of
culture may be modified or even rejected by local elites and their societies.
By the third millennium BCE, there were two core powers, Egypt and Mesopotamia.
“Semi-peripheries” were capitalist polities that linked up and conducted trade between
cores and the undeveloped peripheries. Just to the north of the Phoenicia region was
the small Canaanite kingdom of Ugarit.
Cyrus H. Gordon affirms that “Ugarit was intimately connected with the Phoenicians,
who were spreading Eastern culture wherever possible by sea”;9 it was semi-peripheral
to Mesopotamia.10 Actually, many scholars treat Ugarit as a purely Phoenician city.
Phoenicia proper formed a unique, westward-facing maritime region that served as a
semi-periphery of both cores—thus stimulating the rise of a new civilization in the
West.
Minoan civilization of the Middle Bronze Age (c. 2000-1450 B.C), combined with later
Mycenaean Greek contributions, is duly acknowledged as the forerunner to Classical
Greece, which elevated Western civilization. The intensification of Eastern trade on
the island, observes Stuart W. Manning, coincided with the early state status and palacebuilding activity of cities, notably Knossos. From the start of the second millennium
BCE, “Crete seems to have been significantly oriented toward the Levant and the Near
East, rather than the Aegean.”11
Many archeologists agree that the emerging Minoan elite gradually began to import
Near Eastern exotic, prestige products and technologies, such as advanced sailing
ships.12 Found within the monumental buildings are exotic materials and luxury
products (gold, ivory, and faience); new metalworking techniques are also introduced.
Thus, “the evidence may suggest some kind of state-level relations with the Egyptian
Middle Kingdom, perhaps via the Levantine coast.”13
Architecturally, the palaces are built in the Mesopotamian tradition of organic or
informal design, including central courtyards, orthostatic facades,14 long corridors,
drains, and figural painted frescoes.
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By importing monumental construction techniques, Minoan elites seem to have been
emulating their Near Eastern counterparts.15
L. Vance Watrous points to Near Eastern inspiration for architecture, Cretan
hieroglyphic and Linear A (and, thus, Mycenaean Linear B) syllabic writing, clay
tablets, and sophisticated sealing practices as major elements in the administrative
model.16
Perhaps the leading theory is that the Cretan scripts derive from Old Phoenician.17 The
Cretan number system used in accounting, notes historian of mathematics Georges
Ifrah, has “exactly the same intellectual basis” as in monumental Egyptian notation: the
additive principle in base ten.18 There is probable similarity of room arrangement
between the Minoan-Mycenaean palaces’ archives (libraries) and their counterparts in
the Near East.19
Economist Michael Hudson underscores the fact that accounting, along with writing,
time (in base sixty), prices, and monetary silver, were first standardized in Sumer for
the administration of the commercial sphere.20 Archeologists trace clay tablets, seals,
and “accounting formats moving up the Euphrates to Sumerian outposts such as Asshur
and Mari, and on to Syria, Ugarit, and ultimately Crete and Mycenae.”21
Weights and measures, too, were standardized in these regions.22 Consequently, during
the later Middle Bronze Age (1800-1600 B.C), the Cretans devised their own uniform
system of weights and measures. Equivalences between the Minoan and Levantine
weighing systems were also developed, illustrating the regular nature of transactions
between Crete and the Near East. Minoan regional trade with mainland Greece for
Laurion silver enhanced their Eastern Mediterranean exchanges.23
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The emergence of the later Middle Bronze to early Late Bronze Age elite at Mycenae
took place during the Shaft Graves period. Similar to the Minoan, the Mycenaean elite
favored a shift toward Near Eastern luxury products in their cultural development.24 A.
Bernard Knapp notes that within this Orientalization phenomenon, local rulers in Late
Bronze Age Cyprus and Mycenaean Greece imported prestige objects associated with
Mesopotamian and Egyptian royal ideology.25
Glass, an important luxury product, made its debut in the West on Late Minoan Crete.
The Cretans earlier learned to manufacture another Near Eastern vitreous material,
faience, but there is no evidence that they did glassmaking, only glasswork.26
Although the Romans credited the Phoenicians with originating glass technology, it was
first invented in Mesopotamia c. 2500 BCE. Around 1550 BCE, New Kingdom Egypt
adopted and sponsored primary glass production.27 Henceforth, the Phoenicians acted
as intermediaries to ship both finished merchandise and raw glass on established trade
routes to the Aegean.28
In economic history, Late Bronze Age political stability, which included royal
protections, but also rules, for merchants and traders, spurred commerce. The
Phoenician business model of the Bronze and Iron Ages represents an inheritance from
Mesopotamia: Sumer to Babylonia to Assyria to the Canaanite city-states on the coast.
Thus, mixed enterprise flourished as the crown (public) and merchants (private) each
contributed capital to invest in manufacturing and long-distance trade.29
Byblites of the Late Bronze Age created a remarkable twenty-two letter alphabetic
writing system, known as Phoenician. It was developed out of the Ugaritic script,
which, in turn, had developed out of proto-Canaanite. The second millennium BCE,
proto-Canaanite linear script, the first alphabet in the world, was invented somewhere
in the Levant.30 Aside from its diplomatic and cultural merits, the commercial value of
the Phoenician alphabet aided the region in its rise as a mercantile empire during the
Iron Age. Simultaneously, it aided in the ongoing transfer of high culture from the Near
East to the West.
Sweeping across the Eastern Mediterranean at the close of the period, c. 1200 BCE,
were the invading or displaced Sea Peoples from the Aegean.
24
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The Hittite Empire collapsed, Ugarit was permanently destroyed, and Egypt went into
decline, despite the victory of Ramses III. Fortunately, the Phoenician cities survived
(one theory is that they allied themselves with the Sea Peoples).31 Ill-fated, the
Mycenaean palatial society also fell and, thus, Greece entered its “Dark Age.” Western
culture was devastated and now largely isolated from the cosmopolitan Near East.
Creating a vast, mercantile network—as well as filling the Aegean vacuum—was
Phoenicia. Subsequently, Phoenician civilizational influence spanned (another)
thousand years, traversing the Iron Age and impacting the West.
Iron Age: Exploration, Mercantilism, and Cultural Influence in the West
A full millennium, c. 1200 to 200 BCE, is the time scale for the combined Phoenician
and Carthaginian commercial empires.
The region of Phoenicia,32 part of northern Canaan, held a collection of entrepreneurial
city-states. The major Iron Age cities were Tyre, Sidon, Byblos, Aradus, Beirut, and
Serapta, with the coastal land and ports extending from Aradus south to Dor (in northern
Israel).33 Robert Stieglitz remarks that the “internationalism” of the Late Bronze Age
was soon “replaced by the flowering of the Phoenician renaissance.”34
Conquered by Alexander the Great during the 330s BCE, the Phoenician homeland
cities lost their independence permanently before merging with the Hellenistic world.
The collapse or decline of the Late Bronze Age core empires, observes Philippe
Beaujard, was followed by a restructuring of the world-system at the beginning of the
Iron Age.35 Thus arose the Phoenician trade network in the West. Phoenicia was semiperipheral to both the Egyptian and Assyrian cores. Moreover, Tyre, in southern
Phoenicia, its leading polity, would become the economic core of a new world-system
in the Mediterranean.36
World historian Jerry H. Bentley points out that maritime commerce actuated the
economic, social, and cultural integration of the Mediterranean basin. Initiated by the
Phoenicians, then followed by the Greeks (who reflected the Phoenician pattern) and
Romans, merchants organized networks of exchange and distribution. These networks
encouraged the division of labor and the building of states.37
31

Bell (2006), 25.
The term Phoenicia is defined and particularized by Lembke (2006), 228, as a “cultural unit.”
33
Bell (2016), 92, 95: from at least the Late Bronze Age, the archeological evidence now shows a
common Phoenician material culture inclusive of Dor.
34
Stieglitz (1990), 9.
35
Beaujard (2011), 19.
36
Faust and Weiss (2011), 197-198.
37
Bentley (1999), 215-219.
32

Published by BYU ScholarsArchive, 2019

41

Comparative Civilizations Review, Vol. 81 [2019], No. 81, Art. 14

36

Number 81, Fall 2019

Susan and Andrew Sherratt concur that Phoenician mercantile and cultural activity
prompted European state formation: first in the Aegean, then in Italy and Spain.38
Phoenician influence—economic and mercantile; nautical and long-distance trade
routes; exploration and colonization; art and architecture; mining, metallurgy, and
glass; salt production; large-scale agricultural; and, cultural, including the West’s (and
most of the world’s) alphabet, the book, and literacy—was primarily westerly in
direction.
Viniculture was introduced to Europe.39 In sum, they transferred the beneficial
elements40 of the urbanized Near East to foster Western civilization. At its height, the
Phoenicians’ sea and land mercantile web, which has been described as “hemispheric,”
41
stretched across most of the known world: three continents and two oceans. In fact,
much of it was discovered by the sea traders, themselves, in their penetration of new
markets.
Early in the first millennium BCE, the Phoenicians set up the world’s first maritime
empire: ports, bases, warehouses, and emporia, up to the southern Black Sea and across
the Mediterranean basin and beyond. Initially, trading stations were established at
strategic geographic and economic locations. Massalia (Marseilles) in France was
founded but not permanently settled.42 Territorial colonies were established in Cyprus,
mineral-rich Sardinia and Iberia (Spain and Portugal), the Balearic Islands, Sicily,
Malta, and agriculturally-rich North Africa (first Utica and Carthage). Exploration and
colonization went past the difficult Strait of Gibraltar or Pillars of Hercules. (Hercules
was originally a Phoenician hero.) The Atlantic coasts of Africa and Europe, and,
perhaps, the British Isles, were discovered.
Founded by Tyre, in 814 BCE, the traditional date (close to recent archeological
evidence), Carthage was itself destined to become a commercial juggernaut in the West.
The Phoenicians held both shores of the Pillars, thereby controlling access to the
Atlantic. Despite later Greek, and then Roman, competition in the Western
Mediterranean, Carthaginian economic and naval dominance continued into the Punic
Wars (264-146 BCE).
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Led by Tyre, the mercantile network was headquartered on the eastern shore of the
Mediterranean. High-quality cedar and fir forests on the mountain slopes were ideal
for building ships, as well as for export or tribute. This geographic location was crucial
to the success of the maritime and overland enterprise. Canaan contained excellent
harbors, enabling it to be part of the Fertile Crescent. Through it laid the caravan routes
that connected to Egypt, Arabia (and through it the Indian market), Asia Minor,
Mesopotamia, and, later, to the Silk Road.43
When the Late Bronze Age New Kingdom pharaohs conquered Canaan, they protected
its growing trade activity at the junction of both land and marine highways. Moreover,
under Ramses the Great, at Memphis, the Egyptian administrative capital and site of its
main shipyards, a Phoenician commercial enclave was established.44
The Egyptians, who respected the shipwright and maritime expertise of the Phoenicians,
partnered with them in the Red Sea and Indian Ocean trade routes.45 During the Iron
Age, such relations with Egypt continued.
By 1200 BCE, the Phoenicians were building large merchant ships. In world maritime
history, declares Richard Woodman, they are recognized as “the first true seafarers,
founding the art of pilotage, cabotage, and navigation” and the architects of “the first
true ship, built of planks, capable of carrying a deadweight cargo and being sailed and
steered.”46
Master shipbuilders, during the Bronze Age, laid a keel and ribs (for strength in rough
weather). For sturdy hulls to check wave and hold cargo, pegged mortise-and-tenon
joints were developed on the Levantine coast; this method spread westward, and it
became standard until the Late Roman period.47 The hull was rounded for faster
movement through the water. The brailed rig sail—so vital, because it enabled tacking
against the wind—was likely a Levantine innovation.48 Transport amphorae that
became standardized for volume, in use and imitated for over two thousand years until
Byzantine times, were invented in Phoenicia.49
In stellar navigation, the North Star was discovered, which the later Greeks called the
Phoenician Star; this enabled sailing at night on shorter distance, open-sea routes. The
first evidence of maritime law also appears in the Levant.50
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Iron Age contributions include the art of cartography;51 the first artificial (and selfcleaning or flushing) harbors, such as those in Sidon, Tyre, Atlit, and Acre;52 and, the
revolutionary bireme war galley.
Around 800 BCE, the Phoenicians found it necessary to protect their interests. The
Phoenicians are generally credited with designing a war galley with two banks of oars
for speed and maneuverability in battle, the bireme. This concept would dominate
throughout the Mediterranean for the next two thousand years.
The Greeks perfected the galley as a warship and added a third bank of oars,53 although
many scholars believe that, logically, the Phoenicians actually fashioned the addition,
the trireme.54
Concurrent with their early first millennium BCE, sea trade in the West was a notable
expansion of Phoenician land commerce in Western Asia and Egypt. This transit trade
involved manufactured goods, raw materials, and slaves (skilled and unskilled). In
southeastern Anatolia, the Phoenician influence upon the Cilician cities was both
economic and cultural.55
Industry was another key to the success of the mercantile network. Through the Bronze
Age both luxury and common goods were produced. Iron Age Phoenicia continued to
excel in many industries and decorative arts. The export market in view became the
entire inland sea.56 Additionally, supplying the mercantile network were Phoenician
regional craft production centers in Cyprus, Rhodes, Tharros in Sardinia, Carthage, and
Gades (Cadiz).57 Overall, concerning trade in Phoenician handicrafts, comments Piero
Bartoloni, “for the proto-historical West they represented the gateway to The East” (p.
78).58
The Phoenicians pioneered mass production. Their region, for example, emerged as the
leading producer of glass, which now included transparent glass.
51
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Finished articles, such as flasks and beads, by the thousands, were shipped across the
Mediterranean.59 In Spain, wheel-turned pottery was introduced, and it was then mass
produced.60 The Carthaginians mass produced ships; parts were labeled with the Punic
alphabet.61
Their most famous product, the expensive Tyrian and Sidonian purple dye, was
exported either as powder or as dyed fabric, especially wool. The Greeks ascribed the
ethnic name of Phoenicians (derived from the word phoinos, meaning red) probably
because of their red to violet cloth. The Royal Purple of the ancient monarchies, as in
Rome, became the Western standard of imperial adornment.
The artwork of the Phoenician cities was renowned in ancient times, and it is
increasingly respected by experts today.
Besides fine textiles and glassware, other major productions were woodworking with
mortise-and-tenon seams; ivory work, often inlaid in furniture; metalwork, including
bronze, silver, and gold cups and bowls; and, jewelry. Perfected were the Near Eastern
techniques of filigreeing, granulation,62 repoussé, and gold sheeting (embossing pertains
to bowls).63
By 1000 BCE, iron smelting and ironworking were mastered.64
Manufacturing such a variety of merchandise resulted in the specialization of the
workforce.65 Since Phoenicia was the ancient world’s trading hub, its highly skilled
craftspeople gained knowledge of and worked with all types of materials, techniques,
and artistic styles.
Foreign states often called upon its engineers. Hence, both Solomon’s Temple and his
palace were constructed by imported Phoenician artisans.66 As Byblos and Ugarit had
done before, wealthy Tyre, in southern Phoenicia, became the principal east-west center
of trade in luxury products and metals.67
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As sea merchants in the West, they brought Mesopotamian astronomy and weights and
measures, as well as their own Phoenician alphabet: a phonetic code (not a pictographic
system) to build words.
This simplified writing system did not require professional scribes as in Egypt or
Mesopotamia,68 and it could be written on a variety of media. A long-distance network
of trade involved contracts, correspondence, and record keeping. Transferrable to other
languages, the egalitarian alphabet was (and is) easy to learn—in fixed sequence.69
En route, the Phoenicians displayed their engineering prowess. Major projects were
designed and completed on three continents.
These are illustrated by:









massive fortifications;
Mesopotamian-style urban planning;
an artificial isthmus (Sardinia);70
a causeway (Sicily);71
an artificial channel (Carthage);72
Beirut’s sixth century BCE, earthquake-proof architectural techniques and
complex sewer systems (predating those in the Greek world);73
artificial, self-flushing harbors with precision underwater construction of
walls;74
multi-story buildings;75 and, Egyptian-influenced monumental architecture.

Naval allies of the Persians in their wars against the Greeks (500-449 BCE), the
Phoenicians rendered engineering service. A notable achievement was the one and one
quarter mile canal at Mount Athos for Xerxes’s ships to pass.76
Phoenician colonization in the West began on the copper-rich island of Cyprus, only
ninety-five miles from the Levant. Commercial relations began during the Middle
Bronze Age. Cultural transmission (ex. alphabetical writing) by Phoenician traders
intensified in the late eleventh to early tenth centuries BCE.77
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During the ninth century BCE, when the first colonies were founded, there appeared
black-on-red or Cypro-Phoenician fine ware.78 Along with their pantheon, another
influence was Oriental (or Phoenician) art and architecture.79 Tyre transplanted the
Phoenician business model of international managed trade in the leading colony of
Kition (Citium).80
Crete, rich iron ore, seems to have had permanent Phoenician settlements by the ninth
century BCE.81 Excellent Orientalizing bronze work highlights the craftsmanship there.
The island served as a Phoenician center for Mediterranean trade in metals and luxury
goods (glass, metallic, ivory).82 Eastern products were probably shipped to mainland
Greece cities, such as Delphi and Olympia.83 Crete was also on a major Phoenician line
to western Italy and points west.84
On Rhodes, since the Middle Bronze Age, “a gateway into the Aegean for ships sailing
westwards from the Near East,” permanent Phoenician communities were established
during the eighth century BCE.85 Manufactured for export were trinkets, luxury items
in faience, ceramic unguent flasks,86 and silverwork.87
Preliminary trade with the Euboean Greeks was established during the tenth century
BCE. This traffic introduced Eastern prestige goods, such as gold jewelry and fine
cloth;88 weight standards;89 and Phoenician alphabetical writing,90 perhaps the first in
Greece.
The height of Phoenician shipping in the Aegean was during the eighth and early
seventh centuries BCE. Markoe observes the archeological distribution of finished
goods, including Egyptian and Assyrian wares, and points to a “Phoenician commercial
channel to the Greek mainland.” Direct trade and cultural exchange took place in
coastal cities, such as Eleusis, Argos, and especially Corinth.91
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The title of the synthesis The Orientalizing Revolution: Near Eastern Influence on
Greek Culture in the Early Archaic Age (1992), by Walter Burkert, exhorts Hellascentered Classicists. Its theme: the formative epoch, from c. 750-650 BCE, known as
the Orientalizing period, was decisive.
Under the influence of the high culture of the Semitic East (Assyrian, Phoenician,
Aramean), Greece laid the foundations to create a culture that would eventually
dominate the Mediterranean—Classical civilization. The most important transmission
was the Phoenician alphabetic script (Mycenaean Linear B had died out).92
Along with the concept of the book, Semites contributed traditional Mesopotamian
literary forms, techniques, and motifs—besides the Phoenician pantheon—that find
strong parallels in Hesiod, Homer, and Aesop.93 Mentioned above are the scientific
traditions of nautics, astronomy, and mathematics. Another Eastern, including
Phoenician, tradition was fine music: inherited by the Greeks and handed down to the
European Middle Ages.94 Phoenicia conveyed the religious-sport festival and athletic
stadium (monumental architecture), forerunning the celebration of the Olympic
games.95
So, the editors of Debating Orientalization reaffirm the centrality of the Phoenicians in
the cultural process of Orientalization: defined as the indigenous adoption and
reworking of Eastern goods (luxury and common) and ideas. This practice is first seen
on Cyprus, then in the Greek, Italian, and Iberian regions.96
The prehensile Archaic Greeks modified the Phoenician alphabet in order to
accommodate their vowel-intensive Indo-European tongue, thus forming the basis of
all the West’s (Latin and Cyrillic) alphabets. Phoenician letters also served as the
number system in ancient Greece. Created by the Greeks themselves, their system
employed base ten and the A B C order: numerical values were attributed to letters,
from one to nine, in tens to ninety, then in hundreds, and so on.97
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Decentralized Greece (similar to Phoenicia) exploited the democratic and
“modernizing” potential of the alphabet. Within its emerging city-states, ordinary
merchants, artisans, and others—not just the aristocracy—might keep accounts and
become literate.98
The alphabetical order (like the numerical) system is how societies organize
information. Early examples are the Greek numbering system and the first
alphabetization of books cataloged in the library in Alexandria. Beyond literacy and
organization, the alphabet stimulates both abstract and rational thought through the
phonetic coding and decoding process. As a result, the adoption of Phoenician letters—
especially in Ionia and Athens—created an intellectual environment for the
development of Greek, and, subsequently, Western science.99
In the Greek language, writes Burkert, there is a “marked presence” of Semitic loan
words, thus proving Phoenician cultural influence. These are displayed in the critical
areas of writing, commerce, trade, and craftsmanship. Following are selected examples:
alpha, beta, gamma, and so forth, are letter names; byblos, the word for book (and later,
Bible) since the Greeks imported Egyptian paper from Byblos; mina, the standard unit
of weight and currency; kanon, the standard unit of measurement in architecture or
measuring rod; titanos, lime, gypson, plaster, and plinthos, clay brick, are new
construction terms; gaulos, the word for ship, makellon, market; and, arrabon,
deposit.100
Orientalizing art is principally represented by fine metalworking, ivory carving, jewelry
(gold filigree, granulation, and so on), ceramics, and the first large-scale architecture.
Presumably, communities of resident craftsmen within Greek cities introduced the
leading-edge technical skills, styles, and iconography of the industries of their
Phoenician homeland: a process of indigenous apprenticeship.101
Greece’s first monumental temples and statuary are based on an Eastern prototype, and
they appear during the eighth century BCE.102 Architectural features that were adopted
include the Phoenician Proto-Aeolic capital, forerunner of the Ionic capital, and ashlar
masonry.103 Greek emulation of the great Near Eastern buildings is evident.104 The
Phoenicians also acted as intermediaries to carry Egyptian architectural techniques to
Hellas.
98
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For the interior of buildings, beyond plaster, other materials used were wood (cedar)
paneling, for example, Solomon’s Temple; alabaster slabs; and, stucco (western
Phoenician-Punic world). Originally, Phoenicians of the Bronze Age developed lime
mortar with hydraulic properties from which the Greeks evolved true cement.105
Subsequently, the Romans would produce concrete.
For the genesis of philosophy, the Greeks ascribed Phoenician parentage to both Thales
(by Herodotus),106 the founder of Western philosophy and science, and, next in
importance, Pythagoras (by Neanthes). They lived in sixth century BCE, Ionia, a region
of former Phoenician influence.
Modern historians, though, most often reject such claims, because a Greek tradition
assigned Eastern characteristics to celebrities in admiration of older civilizations.107
Nevertheless, Eric S. Gruen, in Rethinking the Other in Antiquity (2011), determines
that “the repute of the Phoenicians among Greek intellectuals, in fact, was high.”108
Stoicism, the most important post-Aristotelian philosophical school, dominated in the
Hellenistic and Roman periods. Its founder, Zeno of Citium (Kition), lived from c. 335263 BCE. The Phoenician ancestry of Zeno is not in doubt.109 With its doctrines of the
Logos, Providence, and a noble ethic, Stoicism served as a preparation among the
intellectual class for the acceptance of Christianity in the West.110
Zeno of Sidon (c. 150-70 BCE), a prominent Epicurean, taught Cicero in Athens. He
is known for challenging Euclidean geometry in trenchant ways. Likewise, Zeno’s
epistemological dispute with the Stoics anticipated John Stuart Mill’s theory of
induction.111 Thereafter, the Carthaginian philosopher Hasdrubal, in 129 BCE, became
head of the Athenian Academy.112
Historian of science Leonid Zhmud comments on the preliminary data used in the
first—in the world—mathematical proofs by the early Hellenes. “Semitic borrowings
in the Greek related to weights, measures, and practical calculations confirm that this
area was open to Oriental influence.”113
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A fifth century BCE, contribution, the abacus, “probably reached Greece from
Phoenicia.”114 This valuable calculating device was in service in the West until the
French Revolution.115
The democratic and constitutional Athenian city-state—pivotal to the growth of the
Western world—may be another adaptation.
From the Bronze Age onward, observes Markoe, “true city-states” functioned in
Phoenicia.116 These autonomous, monarchical city-states with their councils of elders
and peoples’ assemblies are characterized as proto-democratic. With regard to Greece,
some scholars suggest that early experiments in democratic government took place in
regions with Phoenician influence. Borrowings of democratic ideas may be seen, for
instance, on the island of Kos, and in Ionia, on Chios and Samos. Also, preceding
Athens, Sparta had a constitution. Aristotle, in his analysis of the Spartan and
Carthaginian (Punic) constitutions, points to similarities: councils and popular
assemblies. Thus, Simon Hornblower, Robert Drewes, and others assume that the
Spartan system followed a Phoenician prototype.117
Phoenician models adopted or adapted by Archaic Greece, like the alphabet, were
crucial to its commercial intercourse with leading societies, along with the development
of Western civilization. Generally accepted is that Phoenician standards of weights and
measures were universally employed by the Greeks, passed on to the Etruscans and
Romans, and inherited by medieval Europe.
Hudson makes the convincing case that the financial customs of Classical Greece and
Rome were not indigenous to Indo-European societies as many assumed previously.
Instead, during the Archaic period, largely through Phoenician maritime commerce,
financial innovations were diffused to the Greeks and Etruscans, then transferred to the
Romans:







maritime law,
insurance contracts,
joint financing of business ventures,
banqueting (aristocratic symposium),
deposit (aforementioned arrabon) banking, and
interest-bearing debt.118
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Finally, the example of Phoenicia’s distant voyages and colonization was followed by
the Greeks.119 Starting in the eighth century BCE, the Euboeans and Corinthians led the
colonization movement. Classicist Richard A. Billows affirms this meant learning the
ship construction technology, navigation skills, and the east-west trade routes of the
Phoenicians.120
On mainland Italy, Phoenician contact is evident by the tenth century BCE, and regular
exchange commenced in the ninth century.121 Eighth century BCE, Etruria and
Campania hosted the Levantine merchants. A major goal, concurrent with their mining
transactions in Phoenician Sardinia and Phoenician Iberia, was to acquire silver and
other ores, so abundant in northern Etruria. Mineral rights were perhaps secured
through local diplomatic gift exchange. As in Greece, rather than colonies, resident
workshops were likely established on Italian soil.122
Etruscan mariners learned from the Phoenicians how to navigate by the stars,123 and
were probably stimulated to make their transmarine voyages124 and establish overseas
colonies—thereafter the Romans founded colonies.
The strong Orientalizing tradition (c. 750-580 BCE), touching the whole of Italy,
involved both goods and ideas.125 This period of economic growth, in fact, marks the
beginning of Etruscan civilization.126 Wine, a luxury product, was introduced to the
Etruscans. They, in turn, shipped the beverage in Etruscan amphorae (imitation of
Phoenician amphorae) and domesticated grapevines to southern France. Viniculture
thence spread north into Europe, and eventually, the New World.127
Artistically, advanced techniques, new materials, and styles were presented. Examples
are fine silver and gold jewelry displaying granulation, filigree, and punch work;
engraved and repoussé silver and gold luxury receptacles;128 glass vessels;129 ivory
carvings; and, the first large-scale sculpture (also in Sardinia) and monumental
architecture .130
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Structurally, Orientalization is associated with the emergence of cities, urban
planning,131 masonry houses with tile roofs, and wheeled vehicles. Moreover,
urbanization coincides with the formation of Italian city-states.132
The architectural traditions of Etruria, largely Phoenician and Greek, were later
transferred to Rome.133
Etruscan Orientalizing (as in Spain) is characterized by aristocratic emulation,134
including the model of the Eastern courts’ stately display.135 Phoenician imports or their
imitation include the following:








“early togas and the use of the color purple,”
crown,136
ceremonial axe, scepter,
horse, chariot,
throne,
banqueting equipment, and
seals.

These Eastern symbols of political authority were passed on to the Romans.137
Subsequently, there arrived Greek colonists and merchants. Spreading Hellenic culture,
early in the eighth century BCE, they introduced Greco-Phoenician letters to form the
Etruscan alphabet. In turn, it was transmitted and adapted by the Romans as the basic
Latin alphabet of western Europe.138
By 800 BCE, the intercontinental mercantile network of Phoenicia took shape,
embracing the far west. The scope of commerce was broad. Beyond metals, trade
included slaves, pottery, and high-value foodstuff, like olive oil and wine.139
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The analysis of Moore and Lewis shows that Tyre’s monarchy and private merchants—
a mixed economy with capitalistic features—by 650 BCE, “presided over the most
impressive business organization in antiquity…able to internationalize trade and
production on an axis stretching from the Atlantic shores of Spain to the shores of the
Babylon Euphrates.”140
Additionally, West Africa (gold, ivory) became a direct trading partner, and the British
Isles (tin), an indirect, overland trading partner.141
Gades (Cadiz) in Iberia was founded west of the Strait. The new chronology suggests
Phoenician contact in the tenth century BCE, and settlements already in the late ninth
century in Iberia’s—Spain and Portugal—Atlantic coast mining region.142 Colonies
with an agricultural dimension spread all across the southern Mediterranean
(“Phoenician coast”) littoral of Spain.
There is consensus on the local Late Bronze Age culture; that is, before Phoenician
colonization and the introduction of iron, starting in the eighth century BCE. Iberia was
proto-urban—displaying simple ground plans in some areas.143 Likewise, its tribal
groups were in a transitional phase toward early state formation. The socio-economic
bases were already in place.
Joan Sanmartí, therefore, employs a combined endogenist (internal) and exogenist
(external) theoretical approach to change. He acknowledges that “foreign contact had
an important role in the evolution of the indigenous societies.”144 Phoenician activity is
associated with the technological change, economic intensification, and increased social
differentiation that ushered in Iberian Age centralized polities (states).145
Scholarship thus focuses on the Phoenician period as related to the formation of Iberian
culture and its first cities, beginning around 600 BCE. The Iberian Orientalizing phase
embraced the late eighth and seventh centuries BCE.
Phoenician workshops introduced their repertoire of artistic techniques, materials (glass
was imported), and styles for the production of choice goods.
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Technological transfers were iron, metallurgical techniques, the potter’s wheel,146 and
“carts and chariots are the oldest wheeled vehicles in Iberia.”147 Agriculturally, crop
specialization, metal tools, technologies, and commercial (surplus) cereal production
were spread by the Phoenicians.
Instituted also were viniculture with wine presses148 and the Old-World grape; and,
arboriculture with the domesticated olive and oil presses, plum, walnut, and almond
trees.149 Livestock introductions include the chicken and donkey.150
Architecture and urban planning reproduced a Near Eastern pattern, including
monumental structures151 and civic space.152 Maria Carme Belarte observes that
indigenous peoples adopted certain “new elements, such as a rectangular floor plan,
buildings with a complex ground plan, building materials, such as lime, techniques of
adobe wall construction, and the like;” she examines the “first urbanism on the
Mediterranean coast...the potential role played by the colonial factor—in particular
Phoenician commerce,” concluding that it was an important “accelerator of the
process.”153
Commerce introduced banqueting; transport amphorae; standardized weights,
measures, and seals;154 consistent exchange rates;155 and, writing. Many examples of
Phoenician alphabetical script adapted to the extinct, untranslated, non-Indo-European
Tartessian and Iberian languages have been discovered.156
Phoenician colonization in Iberia faded with the fall of Tyre to the Neo-Babylonians
under Nebuchadnezzar in 573 BCE. Yet, Punic Carthage gradually assumed leadership
of the Phoenician cities, and it founded new colonies. Thence, the center of Phoenician
mercantilism shifted to Carthage. 157
Culturally, the principal legacy of the Phoenicians to the West, including Iberia, is the
alphabet.
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The Romans transmitted to the peninsula the Latin alphabet (and language). For the
world economy, centuries of Phoenician and Carthaginian mercantilism incorporated
Iberia into the trade routes of the Mediterranean.158
Development of the Atlantic Façade of Europe
Beyond the Phoenician-Punic economic, technological, and cultural transformation of
the Mediterranean—long a “Phoenician lake” between Indian and Atlantic Ocean
operations—is another topic.
Receiving less attention is the formative development of the Atlantic façade by a Near
Eastern maritime people. Barry Cunliffe, however, credits Phoenician “entrepreneurs
from the Mediterranean intent on exploring the commercial potential of the ocean
fringe.
In this way, Atlantic Europe, for the first time, confronted Mediterranean
civilization.”159
In a recent volume, Celestino (archeologist) and López (Classicist) collaborate to assert
that the realm of Tartessos, under the stimulation of the colonizing Phoenicians
(Orientalizing Iberia, state development, and alphabetical writing are discussed in the
previous section), emerged as a third civilization in the West, along with Archaic Etruria
and Greece. Moreover, Tartessos, in southwestern Spain and southern Portugal,
became the first literate culture on the Atlantic shore.160
Tyre, during the ninth century BCE, directed far west capital investment and settlement
through its family-linked aristocracy at Gades (Cadiz). It was founded as an island
colony and industrial center with a port(s) upon the Atlantic. Colonies were also planted
well north into Portugal and south about 400 miles to Mogador, profiting from the trade
of West Africa and the sub-Saharan.
Partnering with the Tartessian elite, the merchants of Gades negotiated mineral rights
and the regional trade network. Southwest Iberia held the most abundant silver deposits
known in the ancient world. While there existed protohistoric indigenous mining, the
Phoenicians introduced iron tools—announcing the Iberian Iron Age—to replace stone
tools, advanced smelting techniques and cupellation, and systematic operations,
resulting in a boom of silver production.
158
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Huelva, also a colony and port, had an important foundry. The Gades shipbuilding
industry thrived for seven centuries into Roman times.161
The Gades complex, which would continue to flourish under Carthage and Rome,
linked trade between the Mediterranean and Atlantic systems. Early on, fishing—as an
industry—was established in the rich Atlantic waters.162 The colony as also served as a
regional production center of Eastern luxury objects for export.163
Starting in Punic times, the Gaditanian economy (with its Bay of Cadiz) concentrated
on wine, salted fish (another new industry), and garum or fish sauce, an important
seasoning in the ancient world. Specialized transport amphorae were manufactured for
packing these products.164
For Portugal, Ana Margarida Arruda identifies Orientalizing zones with peaceful
Phoenician colonization, both coastal and inland, as far north as the Mondego River
estuary (Santa Olaia). Specifically, the evidence proves agricultural development and
salt exploitation.165 Ideal for maritime-based commerce, the natural anchorages of
Portugal could accommodate the large Phoenician-Punic ships. Indeed, an artifact
discovery of these vessels, fitted out for the ocean, “would rank among the most
important watercraft in the history of seafaring.”166
Up the Atlantic coast, in the northwest corner of Iberia, early Phoenician trade was
conducted with the Celts of tin-rich Galicia.167 During the fifth century BCE, perhaps
in conjunction with the Carthaginian expeditions to northwest Europe, the Portuguese
colonies were reinvigorated (for example, an artificial harbor was constructed at
Tavira).
Punic trade and exchange with Galicia became regular. Galician society originally
rejected wheel technology for pottery, which was a female task, and the rotary quern
stone, but it adopted Eastern jewelry techniques, sculpture (the strongest tradition in the
Iron Age of Atlantic Europe), and such.168
On the Iberian Atlantic façade, “Phoenician and Punic sailors named several prominent
capes.”
161
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As in the Mediterranean, the Atlantic coastal settlements and harbors (many still in use)
were selected for their advantages relative to long-distance maritime commerce.169
Rome would inherit both the Iberian and northwest African entrepôts and operations on
the Atlantic.
In the Punic Atlantic, skilled Carthaginian sailors may well have discovered the
Azores.170 Seeking to expand its Atlantic markets, Carthage sponsored two recorded
voyages of exploration.171
The fleet of Hanno coasted south, at least to Senegal, and perhaps as far as Cameroon.
Himlico, embarking from Gades, sailed north, at least to northern Britany, and quite
possibly across the Channel to the British Isles.172
The broader Atlantic world, says Cunliffe, by 800 BCE, felt a two-fold Phoenician
influence.
 One, the creation of market for manufactured goods and precious metals that
entered the Atlantic trading networks.
 Secondly, from the port of Gades, the merchant shipbuilding technology of the
Phoenicians was introduced. Knowledge of the sail, in particular, may have
spread into northwest European waters.173
Thus, respecting the emergence of the Atlantic Iron Age, c. 600 BCE, Jon C. Henderson
suggests that “ship technology, perhaps courtesy of the Phoenicians, had suitably
advanced to make long-distance maritime contacts easier and, more importantly,
reliable.”174

169

González-Ruibal (2006), 34, 135, 133.
Cunliffe (2004), 202. Sent out by Pharaoh Necho II, around 600 BCE, Phoenician sailors apparently
completed a clockwise circumnavigation of Africa: ibid., 300. A few scholars, note Moore and Lewis
(1999), contend that the Carthaginians discovered the New World.
171
Moore and Lewis (1999), 214-215.
172
Roller (2006), 27-41. Northern evidence of the Punic language is found in Wales: Holmsted and
Schade (2013), 4.
173
Cunliffe (2004), 560, 561, 70. For example, Atlantic Late Bronze Age culture, extending north to
eastern Britain, incorporated some Phoenician banqueting equipment, such as the roasting spit, into
traditional elite feasting: ibid., 281-283.
174
Henderson (2007), 85-86. During Roman times, in France, Caesar ordered Mediterranean
(originally Phoenician-Punic) style war galleys built for military operations, including an armada for
his second expedition to Britain in 54 BCE: Cunliffe (2004), 71-72.
170

https://scholarsarchive.byu.edu/ccr/vol81/iss81/14

58

et al.: Full Issue

Comparative Civilizations Review

53

Punic Carthage: Further Contributions in the West
Carthage was founded on the fertile coast of central North Africa in the late ninth
century BCE175
Strategically, it stood on the axis of the east-west commercial route between the Levant
and the Atlantic; likewise, it anchored the north-south route to mainland Italy.
Like Gades, in the beginning, a core mercantile elite from Tyre ruled the city-state. The
Phoenician colony’s seventh century BCE, prosperity was based on multidirectional
trade and progressive manufacturing, such as ceramics, purple dye, and metalworking.
Luxury goods were also created and exported.176 Its forges produced surplus wrought
iron and steel.177
After Tyre fell, during the sixth century BCE, Carthage became fully independent.
The city-state led and expanded the western Phoenician colonies, founded new
colonies,178 and acquired the ports of Corsica.179 There emerged a highly diversified
economy: shipbuilding; fishing, also in the Atlantic area; mining investment and trade
(Punic Sardinian, Punic Iberian); slave trade; wholesale export of foreign commodities;
as well as their celebrated agriculture.180 Glasswork and, perhaps, glassmaking were
pursuits.181 The aforementioned British tin trade, also a product of earlier contributions
from Phoenicia, was expanded and caravan routes reached Egypt.182
Punic Carthage (550-146 BCE) was a mercantile and political superpower in the West;
the republic was on a level with the Eastern powers and Greece.183
Indeed, the maritime economy of Carthage—the world’s greatest sea power—was
based upon and regulated by a system of written commercial agreements. Over 250
years of peace with budding Rome involved four treaties. The first was signed in 509
BCE,184 to become Rome’s earliest authentic record.185
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Punic maritime capitalism inherited the Phoenician model of international managed
trade with state-owned and private enterprise. Carthage’s business elite performed the
banking role: major investment, financing bulk trade, insuring distant voyages, and
arranging naval protection of convoys in the form of triremes.186
Governmentally, Punic Carthage is usually described as an aristocratic republic or
oligarchy. The constitution (now lost) reflected the hierarchical and tight-knit business
structure of the city-state.187 Gruen notes that the Greeks held the Carthaginian
constitution in high regard.
Aristotle, in the Politics, delivers praise for the merit-based document. The Classical
philosopher compares it with the respected Spartan constitution (mentioned above,
Sparta’s may be based upon a Phoenician prototype).
How would the Roman Republic’s constitution compare?
For Hellenistic political thinkers, “Carthage, as is clear, supplied the principal criterion
by which to measure success.”188
The peak of Carthage’s power was during the fourth century BCE. Once dependent on
imported food supplies, the metropolis now exported its agricultural surplus, especially
wheat. Consequently, Carthage became an agrarian empire, as well as a maritime
power. Its prosperity is validated by vast reserves of gold and silver.189 Chandler’s
(1987) census for 200 BCE, ranks Carthage and Rome, with populations of around
150,000 each, the largest cities in the West.190
Carthage was likely the richest city on earth: the view of the ancients.191 The
Carthaginian agricultural revolution began during the fifth century BCE.192
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Large-scale and scientific, it embraced the whole range of cereal production;
vegetables; animal husbandry; viniculture; fruit, nut, and olive tree cultivation; and,
beekeeping.193 Irrigation methods from the homeland were employed.194
Mago’s authoritative, twenty-eight volume work on agricultural science and economy
was translated by the Greeks and Romans.195 Mainland Italy adopted such crops as the
olive,196 pomegranate, and the fig. Along with Punic Spain, Italy received from
Carthage advanced (Levantine) agricultural technology: the plostellum Punicum, a
mechanical threshing machine.197
Carthaginian nautical achievements loom large in maritime history. Ship construction
was standardized: prefabricated components were marked with Punic alphabetical
letters, allowing for the rapid assembly of large numbers of craft.198
Ending the reign of the trireme galley, the Carthaginians were the “pacesetters in naval
technological innovation throughout the fourth century BC. They had been first to
develop the quadrireme…” or polyreme. Thereafter, the Greeks of Sicily introduced
the quinupramine; however, the Carthaginians substantially improved upon its oar
housing, strength, and width of deck.199 Polyremes did not exceed the three banks of
oars of the trireme; but, expanded was the number of rowers per oar.200
The giant Imperial Roman round ship for grain appears to derive from the PhoenicianPunic merchant ship.201 The Romans also adopted pegged mortise-and-tenon joints for
their ships (and oil presses), which they called “Phoenician joints.”202 Invented was the
dry dock for ship repair.203 Designed during the Punic Wars as a “system of optical
signaling” were the first true lighthouses.204
Total destruction of Carthage ended the Punic Wars in 146 BCE (the same year that
Corinth was also razed to the ground by the Romans).205
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As a result, the libraries of the city were lost; they held, according to contemporaries,
books on history, agriculture, and religion.206
Henceforth, Rome annexed the Punic territories in the Mediterranean, North Africa, and
Iberia. The future empire gained the vast Phoenician-Punic developed agricultural,
industrial, and mining, as well as Atlantic operations. Furthermore, recent studies
unveil Carthage as a model of imperialism for Rome: apparent transfers include treaty
formulation, military recruitment, tax organization, agricultural exploitation, and naval
technology.207
Roman Carthage: Promoting Latin Christianity
Julius Caesar launched the rebuilding of the vital ports of Corinth and Carthage.208
Roman Carthage grew into a provincial capital and the focal point of the developing
Latin (Western or non-Greek) Church. Earlier, in 64 BCE, Rome annexed Phoenicia.
The Phoenicians would be among the first Gentiles to adopt Christianity.209
In North Africa, Punic elites were among the “most upwardly mobile in the empire”
and well-established in the Roman senate; the able Septimius Severus rose to become
emperor from 193-211 CE,210 and the Severan Dynasty lasted until 235. He likely
founded the famous law school in Beirut.211
Carthage, a center of Classical learning, produced the first outstanding Latin Christian
author, Tertullian (c. 160-230 CE): the original Western Church father. Tertullian is
credited with shaping the theological vocabulary and thought employed in the Latin
language.212 The distinguished theologian St. Cyprian became bishop of Carthage in
248 CE. Cyprian suffered martyrdom, just as Saints Perpetua and Felicitas did for their
orthodoxy.213
Ultimately, the chief architect of Latin Church theology was St. Augustine (354-430
CE), Bishop of Hippo. Having a Christian mother, St. Monica, in Numidia, his
background was Punic; he appreciated the still-spoken language.214
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Augustine was educated and taught in Carthage. Subsequently, St. Ambrose baptized
him in Italy, and Augustine began to publish extensively.
A profound influence upon Western civilization, “in order to understand the currents of
thought in the Middle Ages, a knowledge of Augustinianism is essential.”215
Conclusion: The Quickening of Western Civilization
Phoenicia’s cultural interaction with the Occident spanned two millennia.
Led by Bronze Age Byblos, the region originated the true sailing ship, navigation by
the North Star, maritime law, and so forth. The voyages of the Phoenicians constitute
the “first systematic use of the sea.”216 Flowing out of their commercial activity of the
Bronze and Iron Ages are foundational contributions to the Western world.
As distilled by William H. Hallo, the basic qualities of civilization are cities, capital,
and writing.217 Part of the Fertile Crescent, Phoenicia with its thriving city-states
possessed all three elements. Peaceful, long-distance trade and cultural exchange was
undertaken. Its merchants, artisans, and agents promoted urban growth, made capital
investments, and spread literacy.
All in all, the enduring Phoenician influence—representing the urbanized Near Eastern
heritage—both stimulated and fostered Western civilization.
Bronze Age sea trade brought Phoenician merchants to Minoan Crete before and during
its height (c. 1950-1450 BCE). Consequently, embryonic Western civilization
borrowed important Eastern concepts: monumental building techniques; luxury
products of gold and ivory (later, glass); advanced sailing ships; monetary silver;
weights and measures; and an administrative model, including clay tablets, seals,
accounting methods, and syllabic (perhaps Old Phoenician) writing that became Linear
A. The Late Bronze Age Mycenaean Greeks conquered, but also adopted, the Minoan
civilization. They absorbed further Eastern refinements (Orientalization), before the
downfall of their society, c. 1200 BCE.
The Early Iron Age saw Phoenician expansion in the West. Leadership of the citystates was assumed by Tyre. Tyre’s monarchy (public) and merchants (private)
comprised a mixed economy with capitalistic features.
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During the tenth century BCE, they began to create an intercontinental mercantile
network. Colonies were first planted on Cyprus, then Carthage was founded in 814
BCE; settlements also stretched to the Atlantic coasts of Africa and Europe, which they
discovered.
From Greece to Portugal, the Phoenicians bore the cultures of the core Mesopotamian
and Egyptian civilizations. Manufactured goods (luxury and common), bulk products,
technologies, and information, as well as cultural, architectural, and artistic patterns
were transferred across the Mediterranean.
Well before Classical Greece and Rome, there arose macro-trends associated with
Phoenicia: globalization, capitalism, and multinational corporations.
In The Origins of Globalization, Moore and Lewis observe that the achievement of Tyre
(and Carthage) was to expand world trade and at the same time to shift the center of
finance and high culture westward.218 The Cambridge History of Capitalism is
introduced by Larry Neal. He cites the primacy of Phoenicia’s market-driven capitalism
and long-distance trade reaching the Atlantic.219 Moore and Lewis, in Birth of the
Multinational, hold forth that the merchants of Tyre created the first multinational
business organization on an intercontinental scale.220
These trends originated in Mesopotamia, yet it was the commercial activities of the
Phoenicians that laid the economic and cultural bases of the Western world.
Employing a world-systems approach, the Sherratts delineate the economic growth of
the West. They notice that c. 1000 BCE, Europe and its Mediterranean region were in
essence prehistoric. Granted, “the centers of future growth were already evident [protourban Greece, Italy, and Iberia]; but what articulated them into a single interacting
system was the input of capital from the east.”
In sum, drawing territories together were Phoenicia’s large merchant ships,
monumental harbors, and urban economy:
monetary silver, slavery, and
manufacturing.221 The intercontinental network of the Phoenicians commenced the
development of the Atlantic façade of Europe and laid the foundation for the Roman
Empire’s Mediterranean as one economic, political, and cultural unit.
Between the protohistoric and Classical eras was the decisive transitional epoch known
as the Orientalizing horizon (eighth and seventh centuries BCE).
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Phoenician mercantilism, capital, and routes, along with cultural elements, i.e.
alphabetical script, encouraged European state formation: first, in the eighth century
BCE, Aegean, then in seventh century Italy and Spain.222
Classical historian Burkert identifies the expansion of both maritime commerce and the
alphabet (literacy) by Phoenicia as the determining factors that “caused the center of
civilization to shift westward from the Near East to the Mediterranean.”223 First arose
the civilizations of Carthage and Greece arose, followed by Etruria, and, finally, Rome.
Indeed, from the Phoenicians early Archaic Greece received alphabetical writing—and
the book—forming the basis of the West’s alphabets (Latin and Cyrillic); shipbuilding
technology, navigation skills, and the example of overseas colonization; and,
commercial contracts (also in Italy). Brought to Greece, Italy, and Iberia were weights
and measures, monumental art and architecture, and fine luxury goods as models that
influenced early European art.
The alphabet is considered the preeminent contribution of the Phoenicians for the
establishment of Western civilization.
Clearly, the Greek intellectual achievement would not have been possible, nor could it
have been recorded for future generations of literate Europeans without the egalitarian
script. Similarly, it allowed for both Hebrew and Greek writing of the Christian Bible.
Alphabetical order is used to organize information. Furthermore, the letters are a
phonetic code that stimulate both numbering and rational and abstract thought.
Punic Carthage (550-146 BCE) became a mercantile, political, and military superpower
in the West. Among its introductions were large-scale agricultural methods and
technologies, horticultural specialization, and new crops, as well as nautical
innovations. The city-state set a constitutional standard in the ancient world. Imperial
concepts were also transferred to Rome. The destruction of Tyre (Alexander) and
Carthage (Scipio) included the loss of their records, archives, and libraries.224 These
collections could be substantially older than the Hellenistic library in Alexandria.225
Afterwards, Roman Carthage promoted Latin Christianity. Above all, it produced the
first outstanding, Tertullian, and the most influential, St. Augustine, Western Church
theologians.
The Protestant reformers, too, drew heavily upon Augustine’s
conservative writings.
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To conclude, the Phoenician (Iron Age) specialist, Niemeyer, abstracts how this most
ancient people, in effect, sparked Western civilization.



First, the specific experience of Archaic Greece: the Phoenician transfusion of
Eastern goods, technologies, and ideas that, in turn, became the foundations of
Greco-Roman civilization.
Secondly, the pan-Mediterranean influence: “The eminent role played by the
Phoenician city-states in the dissemination of urban civilization, in the
propagation of technical innovations, in the distribution of new [aristocratic]
lifestyle paradigms and ‘modern’ economics.”226

The above contributions span David Wilkinson’s central civilization/world-system.
Early modern European expansion, followed by Westernization—fittingly with large
ships, capitalism, alphabetical writing, and colonization—spread the legacies of
Phoenicia.
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Chiming the Hours of History: The Historiosophy of Pitirim A. Sorokin
As a Spring of His Integralistic Sociocultural Paradigm
Vlad Alalykin-Izvekov
vlad_ai@yahoo.com

"He goes deeper and ultimately higher."
French pianist Helene Grimaud about Beethoven
“Almost all great sociological systems are a brand of philosophy of history, and …
most of the great philosophies of history are a sort of sociology of cultural change.”
Pitirim A. Sorokin
Keywords: System of sociology, integralism, integralistic historiosophy, integralistic
paradigm of scientific study of structure and dynamics of society, culture, and
personality, cyclical theory of history, linear theory of history, fluctuational theory of
history, sociocultural supersystem, recursiveness, macro-level sociocultural entities,
long-term sociocultural processes, deconstruction of the phenomenon of civilization
Introduction
The purpose here is to present an original rethinking of the genesis, evolution, essence,
role, place, and significance of the philosophical and historical views of the great
Russian and American philosopher, sociologist and educator Pitirim A. Sorokin. In
addition, an attempt will be made to determine their place and role in his scholarly work,
as well as in the world’s treasury of the highest achievements of the human spirit.
For a number of reasons, the scholarly and philosophical heritage of Pitirim A. Sorokin
is sometimes viewed and analyzed not in its integrity, multidimensionality, systemic
complexity, and evolution, but, like an elephant felt by three blind men in the ancient
Indian parable, the trunk of the colossal animal is mistaken for a hose, the legs are
likened to columns, and the tail is thought to be a rope. So here, the historiosophy of
Sorokin is presented in light of its development, in the context of his other sociocultural
theories, and also as the most important part of a fundamental philosophical and
ideological paradigm, which he called integralism.
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Both integralism as a whole and the integral historiosophy of Sorokin, in particular, are
based on sociological, cultural, psycho-neurological and psycho-physiological concepts
and theories, which, as they originate and develop, Sorokin outlines in numerous works
throughout his half-a-century long scholarly career, and which we conditionally call his
system of sociology.
The evolution of Sorokin’s developed historiosophy and the stage of reintegration by
him of his scientific and the ideological worldview within the framework of the
integralistic paradigm is of particular interest. In this process, the features of integralism
are acquired by all his numerous concepts and theories, including his sociology,
philosophy, psychology and, first of all, by historiosophy. The latter not only turns out
to be Sorokin’s area of primary scholarly interest, but it also gradually absorbs many of
his other social concepts and theories.
Based on a thorough analysis of Sorokin’s works, we believe that historiosophy of
Sorokin occupies a much more significant place in his developed integralistic scholarly
and philosophical paradigm than some researchers of his legacy have assigned it. As
the statements of Sorokin himself quite clearly demonstrate, it is inseparably connected
with his system of sociology, and both scientific fields, being parts of the integralistic
paradigm, are in fact one and inseparable and interconnected whole.
System of Sociology
Initially, Pitirim A. Sorokin’s system of sociology was a monumental project to develop
the fundamentals of a science of the structure and development of society. He intended
to present it in a multi-volume work, to be entitled accordingly “The System of
Sociology.” In a sense, this work is the foundation of all his subsequent scientific
sociocultural and philosophical constructions. Sorokin planned to publish ten volumes
of the “System of Sociology,” but for many reasons (revolution, civil war, emigration,
and a number of cardinal revisions of his scholarly worldview) this idea remained
unfulfilled, and as of 1920 only two volumes of the monograph had appeared in print
(Sorokin, 2008).
The first volume of the System is devoted mainly to the analysis of individual social
interactions, while the second one examines the structure and interaction of social
groups of various types and levels. In the early years of his scholarly career, Sorokin
professed a pronounced positivistic and behavioristic approach towards both the social
structure and the sociocultural dynamism of history.
In his early terminology, the first two volumes of the System were devoted to social
analytics.
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The main ideas of his “social mechanics,” i.e., activities of people under the influence
of various environmental factors, as well as their own psycho-neurological and psychophysiological impulses, were intended for publication in the third volume of the System,
which did not appear in print. Nevertheless, he managed to present them in the second
part of the “The Public Textbook of Sociology,” published in the same year of 1920.
(Sorokin, 1994).
The turbulent events of the beginning of the 20th century introduced radical corrections
into the plans of a young, but already widely known scholar. For example, in the years
1921-1922 Russia was gravely threatened by a famine, which reached an unprecedented
scale and claimed several millions of lives. This colossal disaster prompted Sorokin to
expand the second part of the “Public Textbook of Sociology,” now containing an
analysis of the phenomenon of hunger.
He wrote that:
Having published my two volumes of the System of Sociology, I postponed the
writing of the third volume in order to study at first hand phenomena typical of the
Revolution, and to note them in such form as to make their investigation easier in
normal times.
With my students and collaborators, and in close co-operation with the
academicians Pavlov and Bekhtereff, I began an investigation of social changes,
social groupings, and regroupings in our society. Included was the study of timebudgets of our fellow-men, and the comparative force of different factors in
determining human behavior.
The behavior of the people around me was stripped of inhibitions which in normal
circumstances disguise its mechanism and make difficult its determination.
As the principal object of my study, I took the influence of hunger upon human
behavior, social life, and social organization. In the study of this problem, I had had
personal experience, and the benefit of personal contact in my own environment.
The influence of food and acute want of food on human behavior had never before
been seriously investigated. (Sorokin, 1950: 283-284).
In turn, the last chapter of “Hunger as a Factor” became a separate large volume.
Entitled “The Sociology of Revolution,” it was written in 1923, when Sorokin was
already in Czechoslovakia.
The devastating cataclysms of the First World War, the Russian Revolution and the
subsequent Civil War radically changed his scholarly outlook.
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The results of Sorokin’s many years of efforts to reintegrate his views on sociocultural
development within the framework of the new, integralistic paradigm are now known
as the four-volume work Social and Cultural Dynamics (Sorokin, 1991), although its
roots can be traced to the “System of Sociology,” and to such specialized works, as, for
example, “Principles of Rural-Urban Sociology” (1929) and “A Systematic Reading
Book on Rural Sociology” (1930-1932).1
These large-scale works were based on a vast amount of historical material and contain
detailed analyses of both the structure and the dynamics of the development of an
agrarian society, as well as agrarian-urban relations. Being, in essence, a comparative
agrarian-urban philosophy of the history of humanity, they represent a kind of testing
ground where Sorokin developed concepts and theories of such future classical works
as “Social and Cultural Dynamics” and “Society, Culture and Personality.”
And so, in the preface to the first volume of “A Systematic Source Book in Rural
Sociology” the authors state: “Human society throughout its history - in its origins,
forms, activities, processes, growth, and evolution – has been so largely under the
pressure of agricultural and rural forces that up to the present sociology as a science of
society has virtually been the sociology of rural life. (Sorokin, Zimmerman, Galpin,
1965: VII).
The works also introduce such key concepts as the formation of the integralist paradigm,
social stratification, social mobility, and authoritarian, contractual and family-based
types of social relations. Unique in their shocking truthfulness, scientific depth of
content, and transparency of presentation, Sorokin’s works allow us to witness events
of the turbulent beginning of the twentieth century, as well as to look into his creative
laboratory.2
Pavel P. Krotov observes that “In numerous works analyzing the scholarly legacy of
Pitirim Sorokin, his autobiography, as a rule, remains outside the interpretation of a
shift in his philosophical paradigm.”

1

Sorokin, P.A., Zimmerman, C.C. (1929). Principles of Rural-Urban Sociology. New York: Henry
Holt and Company. 652 p.
Sorokin, P.A., Zimmerman, C.C. Galpin, C.J. Ed-s. (1965). A Systematic Source Book in Rural
Sociology. Vol. I. New York: Russell & Russell. 645 p.
Sorokin, P.A., Zimmerman, C.C. Galpin, C.J. Ed-s. (1965). A Systematic Source Book in Rural
Sociology. Vol. II. New York: Russell & Russell. 677 p.
Sorokin, P.A., Zimmerman, C.C. Galpin, C.J. Ed-s. (1932). A Systematic Source Book in Rural
Sociology. Vol. III. Minneapolis New York: The University of Minnesota Press. 752 p.
2
See, for example, Pitirim A. Sorokin. Leaves From a Russian Diary – and Thirty Years Later. Boston:
The Beacon Press. 1950. 346 p.; Pitirim A. Sorokin. A Long Journey: The Autobiography of Pitirim A.
Sorokin.New Haven, Conn.: College and University Press. 327 p.
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“A Long Journey,” published in 1963 in the USA, is perceived by many researchers,
including biographers, only as a classic memoir. Nevertheless, the autobiography
of Pitirim Sorokin can hardly be attributed to historical memoirs, although the list
of historical facts in the text is enormous. In addition, the author was a direct
participant in the crucial events in the national history.
It would also be insufficient to define the “A Long Journey” as a scholarly memoir,
despite the fact that Sorokin here gives a detailed description of almost all of his
works. The autobiography reflected scholarly discussions that largely determined
the development of modern domestic and American sociology.
From my point of view, the interpretation of “A Long Journey” as a scholarly
research, in which Sorokin analyzes the transformation of his worldview and his
personal history, based on the postulates of the late-stage concept of “creative
altruism,” opens up new possibilities for a deeper understanding of the book and
Sorokin - the scholar.3
With publication of such fundamental works as “Society. Culture. Personality,”
“Modern Historical and Social Philosophies,” “Crisis of our Time,” “Pitirim A. Sorokin
in Review,” “The Basic Trends of Our Times,” “Sociocultural Causality, Space, Time”
and, in particular, the last major work of the thinker, “Sociological Theories of Today,”
Pitirim A. Sorokin actively continued his search for the ultimate truth about the
sociocultural universe. In a certain sense, the scholar continued to work on his system
of sociology for the rest of his life. Having incorporated many aspects of a scientific
analysis of the structure and development of society, it became the foundation, a
cornerstone of the colossal edifice of the integralistic paradigm of scientific study of the
structure and dynamics of society, culture and personality.
Since the developed historiosophy of Sorokin is a part of his integralistic philosophical
and scientific paradigm, let us turn to its genesis and evolution.
Integralism
In our previous works (Alalykin-Izvekov, 2017), we have considered both the genesis
and the evolution of the scholarly and the ideological paradigm of Sorokin and offered
the following chronology of its periods:
1) Christian-Ideational (1889-1905).
2) Positivistic-Behavioristic (1905-1920).
3) Transition from Positivism to Integralism (1920-1937).
3

Krotov, P.P. Autobiography as a Reflection of Altruistic Transformation of Pitirim Sorokin (in
Russian Language). Electronic source: http://www.komi.com/IRSI/soroktxt.html
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4) Integralistic (1937-1940s).
5) Visionary (first half of the 1940s).
6) Altruistic (second half of the 40s - 50s.).
7) Generalizing (60s).

From the point of view of the evolution of Sorokin’s developed historiosophy, the stage
of recreation by the thinker of his scholarly and ideological “picture of the world” within
the framework of the integralistic paradigm deserves special attention. This process
coincides in time with a period of work on his fundamental work “Social and Cultural
Dynamics.”
In this process, the features of integralism are acquired by all numerous concepts and
theories of Sorokin, including his sociology, philosophy, psychology and, first of all,
his historiosophy. In fact, his historiosophy not only turns out to be the area of his
primary scholarly interests, but it also gradually absorbs many of his concepts and
theories. According to Nikolai F. Zyuzev, the root of Sorokin's integralism is in his
integralistic theory of truth and cognition. “Pitirim A. Sorokin’s integralistic
epistemology combines all forms of knowledge - empirical, rational and intuitive, and
in it its decisive advantage over any one-sided theory of knowledge.” (Zyuzev, 2004:
150-152).
Sorokin himself postulates his views as follows: “... the integral truth is not identical
with any of the three forms of truth but embraces all of them.
In this three-dimensional aspect of the truth of faith, of reason, and of the senses,
the integral truth is nearer to the absolute truth than any one-sided truth of one of
these three forms.
Likewise, the reality given by the integral three-dimensional truth, with its sources
of intuition, reason and the senses, is a nearer approach to the infinite metalogical
reality of the coincidentia oppositorum than the purely sensory, or purely rational,
or purely intuitional reality, given by one of the systems of truth and reality. The
empirico-sensory aspect of it is given by the truth of the senses; the rational aspect
by the truth of reason; the super-rational aspect by the truth of faith.
The threefold integral system of truth gives us not only a more adequate knowledge
of the reality, but a more valid and less erroneous experience, even within the
specific field of each system of truth.” (Sorokin, 1991: 690-691).
Traditionally the “Bible” of Sorokin’s integralism is considered his four-volume
monograph “Social and Cultural Dynamics: The Study of Change in the Basic Systems
of Art, Truth, Ethics, Law and Social Relations.” Clearly, the key words here are
dynamics and change.
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Thus, the first two volumes of “Dynamics” are devoted to the change in the abovementioned cultural systems, in the third volume the change in social systems is
analyzed, while in the fourth volume Sorokin’s analytical apparatus is being presented.
Sorokin himself testifies: “Volumes One, Two, and Three, taken together, constitute a
preliminary study of cultural and social dynamics. In Volume Four I will present in a
more finished and more fully analytical form, a systematic theory of social and cultural
changes, as well as a formulation of the guiding principles of sociological
methodology.” (Sorokin, 1937, v. III: VI-VII).
Therefore, in “Dynamics” Sorokin presents the sociocultural dynamics of development
of society from the point of view of his integralistic paradigm. Where do we look for
his structure of society in its developed, integralistic representation? As we remember,
Sorokin outlined the structure of society in his “System of Sociology” published in
1920. However, the “System of Sociology” was written from the positivisticbehavioristic point of view.
Apparently, the most comprehensive statement of Sorokin’s integralistic paradigm is
reflected in his monograph “Society, Culture, Personality: Their Structure and
Dynamics. The System of General Sociology” (Sorokin, 1947). Here, he unfolds in
front of the reader a wide panorama of the sociocultural universe, accompanied by the
fundamental and interdisciplinary scientific analysis.
As the title of the book clarifies, the integralistic sociocultural paradigm (and, therefore,
historiosophy) of Sorokin is built on the triadic basis of indivisible (except for the
purposes of scientific analysis) unity of society, culture, and personality.
Next, Sorokin profoundly analyzes the structure and dynamics of development of a
society via the connection of three main components of the sociocultural universe, and
he also presents the most general, universal trends, patterns and laws of social
development derived from this analysis. He always emphasizes in his writings that the
unity of society, its members, and its culture is inseparable and, with necessary
assumptions, is possible only for purposes of scientific analysis.
He, for example, writes in the third volume of “Dynamics” that “Whereas Volumes One
and Two deal mainly with fluctuations in the field of cultural processes, this volume
concentrates on those in the field of social phenomena. Cultural and social are two
aspects of a single, indivisible reality; but for the purposes of analysis they may be
conditionally divorced and studied separately.” (Sorokin, 1937, v. III: V).
All numerous works of Sorokin’s developed period confirm, complement and illustrate
his integralistic paradigm of cognition and analysis of society, its culture and its main
creators and builders - individual persons.
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In front of the reader is a kind of generalizing work that includes all the components of
his integralistic scientific and ideological paradigm, which literally bursts forth from
descriptions and definitions of hundreds of thousands of small and great sociocultural
phenomena and processes. Literally each of them is immediately brought to the level
of universal philosophical and historical conclusions and postulates.
A prominent scholar of Sorokin’s legacy, Barry V. Johnston, also concludes that the
monograph “Society, Culture, Personality” is a generalizing work, one which
synthesizes and reflects the integralistic paradigm of the sociocultural universe in its
entirety, versatility, and consistency.
He observes: “Sorokin takes his next theoretical step in Society, Culture and
Personality: A System of General Sociology. Much of this volume integrates earlier
works. The discussion of society and culture draws heavily on Dynamics, while the
resulting generalizations point to problems described in “Crisis of Our Age.” The
“news” is in the sections on personality, where Sorokin brings the systems together and
focuses on social organization and the development of the self.” (Johnston, 1995: 170).
As part of his integralistic paradigm of scientific study of the structure and dynamics of
development of society, culture, and personality, Sorokin not only comprehensively
analyzes the past, the present and even the future of the sociocultural universe, but he
also offers deeply original and truly effective solutions to existential problems of
rapidly globalizing humanity. That is why his integralistic paradigm represents a
reliable scientific basis for the rapidly developing, now numerous new areas of research
of macro-level sociocultural entities and long-term sociocultural processes.
This includes, for example,










comparative study of civilizations (William McNeill, Carroll Quigley, Andrew
Targowski, David Wilkinson, and others),
noospheric studies (V. Vernadsky, T. Chardin),
culturology (Y. M. Lotman, etc.),
“Big History” ( David Christian, and others),
world history (D. Diamond, F. Fernandez-Armesto, and others),
world-system theory (I. Wallerstein and others),
globalistics (Andrei V. Korotaev et al.,
The School of Russian Cyclism (Yuri V. Yakovets and others), and
Biocosmology - Neo-Aristotelism (Konstantin S. Khrutsky), etc.
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The author of this paper has developed and proposed a number of related concepts,
theories and paradigms, for example, the concept of civilizational science; the concept
of philosophy of civilization; the concept of fluctuational theory of history; the concept
of macro-level sociocultural entities; the concept of long-term sociocultural processes;
the concept of deсonstruction of the phenomenon of civilization, and others. (AlalykinIzvekov, 2017).
Historiosophy
In the preface to the four-volume edition of “Social and Cultural Dynamics,” Sorokin
shares with us his thoughts on his large-scale historiosophical concept:
Of all the semi-historical disciplines that it resembles, it is the closest to what is
often called the philosophy of history. Since almost all the great sociological
systems are part of the philosophy of history, and since most of the great
philosophies of history are a kind of sociology of cultural change, I have no
objection to the use of this name by those who are interested in defining this work.4
At first glance, this phrase is somewhat mysterious in its recursive nature. However,
upon reflection, we can try both to find the key to deciphering it and to determine the
place of Sorokin’s historiosophy in his integralistic paradigm rather accurately. Unlike
the “individualizing” (i.e. descriptive, for example, history) social sciences, Sorokin
considers sociology as “generalizing,” (i.e. exploring the most common patterns of the
phenomena under consideration). (Sorokin, 1992: 543).
Consequently, under “sociology of cultural change,” he has in mind the most general
laws of the cultural development of society, or, as he puts it, the constant and inevitable
change of cultural systems and supersystems. Further, this statement also indicates that,
from the point of view of a scientist, almost all great philosophies of history include a
sociological system, that is, one or another paradigm of the social structure and
development of society.
As a matter of fact, Sorokin himself willingly provides us with the key to a true
understanding of his integralistic historiosophy, and to its place and role in the
integralistic scientific and philosophical paradigm. In private correspondence from the
year 1954, he notes:

4

Sorokin P.A. Social and Cultural Dynamics. Volume I. 1937. p. IX.
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As to the enumeration of my specific contribution to sociology, in brief they are as
follows:
Systematic theory of social mobility, corroborated by an enormous body of
empirical evidence. My monograph on Social Mobility still remains the only
existing monograph in the field.
Logical and empirical consistent system of sociology as science. It is more
systematic in its logical and empirical system than any other sociological system of
the past two or three decades.
Logical and empirical system of social and cultural dynamics, or of philosophy of
history. This system has already entered the annals of History side by side with the
systems of Spengler, Toynbee, and a few others, as possibly the most significant
contribution in this field.
Theory of social class, particularly of agricultural class and rural Sociology
Discovery, formulation, and confirmation of the law of polarization Discovery,
formulation, and confirmation of the law of fluctuation, governmental
regimentation, and control.
Exhaustive study of the vital, moral, mental, religious, artistic, and other fields of
calamities and catastrophes.
A systematic theory of revolution and wars, together with the first empirical
investigation of all wars and of the revolutions from the 6th Century B.C. up to the
present times. My investigation of revolutions and their dynamics and causes
remains still the only existing investigation of all the internal disturbances from the
6th Century B.C. up to the present time.
A thorough-going criticism of the fallacies in the existing sociological,
psychological and other theories.
First attempt at a scientific study of the phenomena of creative love. The enclosed
leaflet gives you an idea about this phase of my work. Then in the volumes of my
work there are formulated, and possibly discovered, several other uniformities in
social and cultural life, but in a short letter these uniformities cannot be
enumerated.5

5

From the letter to: Mother Olowienka, Feb 10, 1954. Electronic source:
http://cliffstreet.org/index.php/theories
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At first glance, including historiosophy in the framework of his purely sociological
research, the sixty-five-year-old scientist takes out of the brackets of such, in fact, its
most important provisions. We, however, believe that in fact Sorokin thus incorporates
both the system of sociology and historiosophy into the general context of its
integralistic paradigm.
Within such an interdisciplinary understanding, his
historiosophy outgrows the seemingly “sociological” framework he has given to it, and
it becomes one of the most important components of his integralistic scientific and
ideological paradigm.
According to Sorokin, the history of any organized group (and societies are a variety of
such) is finite, i.e. in the end, cyclical. Any society, generally speaking, goes through
the stages of its emergence, formation, flourishing, crisis, decay, and, ultimately,
disappearance. On this conceptual basis lie the civilizational theories of Nikolai Y.
Danilevsky, Oswald Spengler, and Arnold Toynbee.
As for cultures, according to Sorokin, they, in a way, plug in one into another, often
inheriting the most resistant and viable elements of their distant predecessors.
Therefore, surviving the societies in which they originated, the truly great cultural
systems can exist for quite a long time. Sorokin thus avoids the one-sided, monistic
approach characteristic of some philosophers of history, and, therefore, his work can be
considered rigorously scientific.
Arnold Toynbee believed that the essence of Sorokin’s philosophy of history could be
grouped under the following five headings:
1) the idea of cultural integration;
2) the theory of social and cultural change;
3) the identification of three cultural supersystems or lifestyles through which or
around which cultures are integrated;
4) the idea of alternating these three lifestyles over time, as well as an analysis of
this process; and
5) his concept of the relationship between types of culture and personality types.
(Zimmerman, 1968: 31-32).
It is obvious, however, that these provisions do not encompass all aspects of Sorokin’s
historiosophy, which includes a colossal number of categories, concepts, and theories
of the structure and evolution of the sociocultural universe. It is easy to see, for
example, that all original and fundamentally substantiated theories of social conflicts
and crises, which include theories of revolution, war, famine, epidemics, disasters and
many other crisis sociocultural phenomena, constitute an organic part of Sorokin’s
philosophy of history.
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Sorokin’s historiosophy undoubtedly includes the discovery by of a principle of limits,
a principle of immanent change in the sociocultural system, a principle of polarization,
a principle of strengthening and weakening of social control, a principle of
convergence, a principle of fluctuations between self-regulation and environmental
modification, a principle of fluctuations in the size and stratification profile of groups,
and many other fundamental propositions and patterns. It certainly ought to include all
of his sociocultural and psychosocial theories, for they constitute the foundation on
which he draws his insightful conclusions, conclusions and diagnoses.
It also ought to include Sorokin’s conclusion that a society going through a period of
severe turmoil is likely to suffer from a crisis of its fundamental values. Another
example is his scientific research of the phenomenon of creative love. Actually, the
research itself was undertaken in order to find and develop a means of solving or
alleviating eternal problems of humankind — wars, revolutions, mass migrations,
epidemics, famine, etc.
Thus, the matter of determining the boundaries of the Sorokin’s historiosophy within
his philosophical and scientific paradigm is resolved both naturally and logically. For
the purpose of its illustration, we would offer an “architectural” analogy, and compare
Sorokin’s integralistic paradigm to the colossal building of a medieval cathedral. As
we have already mentioned, the scientist continued to work on his system of sociology
for the rest of his life.
There are multiple aspects of the scientific analysis of society, the bases or cornerstones
for the entire integral scientific and ideological paradigm of Sorokin. Resting on the
solid foundation of his sociological, cultural, psycho-neurological and psychophysiological concepts and theories, that is, the Sorokin System of Sociology, his
historiosophy represents, metaphorically speaking, the vaults, the walls, the frescoes,
the sculptures, and the stained-glass windows. As for his theory of truth and knowledge,
from such a perspective, it is the the keystone of the main, bearing arch of the colossal
edifice of his integralistic paradigm for the scientific study of the structure and
dynamics of society, culture, and personality.
Conclusion
Throughout his unique half-century scholarly career, Pitirim A. Sorokin developed a
great sociological system consisting of numerous sociological, culturological, psychoneurological, and psycho-physiological concepts and theories, which we conditionally
call his system of sociology. Both integralism as a whole and the integralistic
historiosophy of Sorokin rest on the sound scientific basis of his system of sociology.
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The fundamental integralistic paradigm of the scientific study of the structure and
dynamics of society, culture and personality, developed by Sorokin, represents a solid
foundation for the rapidly developing at the present time field of global studies of the
macro-level socio-cultural formations and long-term socio-cultural processes.
The immense array of principles, concepts, and theories which make up the system of
sociology are inextricably linked with the integralistic historiosophy of Sorokin, and
therefore both are essential parts of his integralistic paradigm for the scientific study of
the structure and dynamics of society, culture and personality.
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The Element-Based Method of Civilization Study
Andrew Targowski
andrew.targowski@wmich.edu
Abstract
The purpose: to define the element-based method of studying civilization with a
meaningful contribution to contemporary life.
The methodology: the transdisciplinary, big-picture view of human development on
Earth based on graphic modeling of civilizational elements, their relations, and
dynamics.
The findings: about 200+ civilizational elements have been recognized within about
500 possible elements of society, culture, and infrastructure.
Practical implications: today, civilization infrastructure challenges society and culture,
which can lead to the fall of the Homo sapiens race and the rise of a human-machine
race. Moreover, one of the options will be the rise of designer babies and the dichotomy
of our race into traditional people and super healthy people; another option may lead to
the labor-free economy and killer robots.
Social implications: to practice sustainable civilization it is necessary to regulate
technological progress which conquers our well-being.
Originality: this approach offers an element-based understanding of civilization which
is essential for developing wise aims and strategies of wise civilization.
Introduction
The study of civilization is about 150+ years old, marked by the contributions of such
pioneers as Nikolay Danilevsky (1822-1885), Fukuzawa Yukichi (1867-1916), Oswald
Spengler (1880-1936), Arnold Toynbee (1889-1975), Feliks Koneczny (1862-1949),
and Fernand Braudel (1902-1985), plus others. They built the foundation for the study
of the concept and role of civilization in the development of the organized humans.
After World War II, the study of civilization became more popular and somehow
separated from the study of history. Civilization was conceived as a living organism
(still showing active signals from the past millennia and centuries) in contrast to history,
which is time passé.
However, a civilization was perceived by many early scholars as a large culture -mostly or especially by Pitirim Sorokin (1889-1968), Alfred Kroeber (1876-1960),
Clyde Kluckhohn (1905-1960), and Lee D. Snyder (1933-2012). On the other hand,
there have been recent scholars like Rushton Coulborn (1901-1968) and Carroll Quigley
(1910-1977) who looked at a big-picture of civilization’s origin and evolution.
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Eventually, the study of culture became widely implemented as the academic program,
but the study of civilization landed on the waiting list in academia. This resulted in an
impressive growth of scholarly research about culture. Since the number of different
cultures is large, and there are at least about 100 dominant cultures one can investigate,
the new knowledge about them is vast, dispersed and very often limited in conclusions
with value for the current societies.
On the other hand, there have been about 26 to 30 (depending on the author) major
civilizations, but today there are only about eight or nine major civilizations, as the term
will be characterized in this study. Furthermore, the impact of these civilizations on
our current lives worldwide is much more aggressive and significant than the impact of
some of those cultures.
The International Society for the Comparative Study of Civilizations, since it was
formed in 1961, has been filling this gap in studies on culture and civilization. This
effort led to the extensive discussion of what is civilization, led by Mathew Melko,
David Wilkinson, Steven Blaha, William McGaughey, Laina Farhat-Holzman, Andrew
Targowski, and others (Targowski 2009b).
At the beginning of the 21st century the idea of “civilization” becomes more popular as
we are facing terrorism, which is de facto a war of civilizations. At the same time a
concept of a “state” changes, when for the sake of globalization some states are ready
to minimize their roles and look for to self-supporting citizens and growing business in
a world without borders. Both of these factors emphasize the growing role of
“civilization” in world affairs. To investigate the current state of affairs successfully a
new approach is offered in academia: Big History, which is still time passé, but perhaps
less polluted with peripheral events and leaders.
Today as we face the deadly clash of civilizations, as defined by Samuel Huntington
(1927-2008), a former member of the ISCSC, even the best definition of civilization (or
Big History’s impact) is not enough to understand why we face that clash while modern
warfare (terrorism-driven and cyberwar) is largely unnoticed by most members of
society. The contemporary study of civilization reminds us of the state of physics
before the Solar Model of the Atom was offered by Rutherford–Bohr in 1913. Their
significant solution was in recognizing the dynamics of such particles as the proton and
the electron. Today, after 100+ years this two-element model is called the Cloud Model,
since it contains about 50 particles and sub-particles, discovered step by step within the
past 100+ years. A similar process is taking place in medicine, when in the 19th century
“plasma” was one solid-state big “brick” of the human organism.
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Today we know that our bio-system is composed of about 19,000-20,000 proteincoding genes1 and 23 chromosome pairs in cell nuclei and each gene has a particular
function determining our well-being.
The reverse process should take place in the study of civilization. Namely, one must
decompose this enormous societal organism, perceived by the majority of researchers
as a solid cloud into many elements and sub-elements, and then investigate their
functions, dynamics, and consequences. This investigation will address the process of
recognizing categories of civilization’s elements and their functions, leading to research
on their dynamics and consequences, for example at the level of the civilization indexes
(Targowski 2004 and 2009a:62-74). In this way, one can better understand what the
set of critical problems of contemporary civilizations is and what can we expect and
how to prevent bad solutions.
The Structure of Civilization
Civilization is an info-material structure developed by humans to cope with themselves,
nature, and their creator effectively. It is a vibrant “interface” which differentiates
humans from animals (Figure 1).
The concept of “civilization” is applied to a wide diversity of particulars: to the level of
religious ideas, to the level of customs, to the level of technology, to the level of
manners, to the level of knowledge, and so forth. It can refer to the type of a city, or a
relationship between men and women in family, tribe, or society. A type of law and its
application reflects civilization also.
The mission of a civilization is to improve human existence. As Toynbee (1995:87)
writes: "The goal of Mankind's continuous and increasing endeavors is still out of sight;
we know, nevertheless, what it is."
What changed our pre-human predecessors into human beings is the attainment of
awareness and problem-solving faculties. The cost of human-independent thinking,
learning, and a quest for freedom is mental and moral relativity. Hence, the goal of
civilization, or in general, of the world civilization, is to minimize "hate" and maximize
"love," two opposite forces driving the pulse of human relativity.
The fundamental role of civilization is shown in Figure 1, which reflects in a graphic
model the system of the Universe.
1

Protein-coding sequences account for only a very small fraction of the genome (approximately 1.5%),
and the rest is associated with non-coding RNA molecules, regulatory DNA sequences, LINEs, SINEs,
introns, and sequences for which as yet no function has been determined (International Human
Genome Sequencing Consortium (Feb 2001). "Initial sequencing and analysis of the human genome"
Nature. 409 (6822): 860–921).
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The universe system is composed of three subsystems: humans, nature
(ecosystem), and civilization.
The creator (God or Big Bang) is the steerer of the universe.
Relationships among these four components are of two types.
The first one contains embedded relationships such as A, B, and D, that are
somewhat beyond civilizational control, with some exception for sects (e.g.,
New Age) that define their Gods (the southern direction of the A relation).
The second type of relationships, such as F, E, and C are controlled by
civilization.

Figure 1. The civilization within the universe system
To understand the control function of a civilization one must open the civilizational
structure and analyze its purpose, components, and their relationships as it is presented
in Figure 2. In civilizational studies, one can recognize so far two approaches to this
task. The English, French, and American Mono Element Model (MEM) of the humans’
interface treats equally “civilization” and “culture.” The German Bi Element Model
(BEM) subordinates “zivilisation” to “kultur.”
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Figure 2. The approaches to defining the structure of civilization
The English-French-American concept of “civilization” contains all aspects of human
life: religious, political, social, economic, and cultural. The German concept of
“zivilisation” is limited to useful things, but only to a value of the second rank. The
value of the first rank is “kultur” which refers to religious, intellectual, and artistic
achievements. The “kultur” controls “zivilization” and develops it as a continuous
motion of material-driven human development. The German concept of “kultur”
emphasizes differences among nations that may share the same “zivilisation.”
There is no doubt that the German model is more elaborate than the English-FrenchAmerican model. However, the German model is still limited, since it does not
recognize human entities that determine the whole civilizing process. A new model is
needed which could integrate the contributions of these two historic models. The
Targowski model recognizes three significant civilization elements:
 Human Entity - organized humans in the pursuit of civilization; it is an
existence-driven community,
 Culture - a value-driven continuous process of developing patterned human
behaviors, feelings, and reactions, based on symbols, learning from it and being
a product of it,
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 Infrastructure - a technology-driven additive process of acquiring and
applying material means.

In the new Tri-Element Model (TEM), the German concept of “zivilization” has been
replaced by a concept of an “infrastructure,” and the German concept of “kultur” has
been kept intact only in reference to the infrastructure, since the English-FrenchAmerican concept of civilization prevails as the developed, holistic, structure of human
existence. The third component— the entity—has been included in the concept of
civilization.
This model is somehow similar to the Greek model called Paideia that unified
civilization, culture, tradition, literature, and education, and has been characterized by
Jaeger (1945). This approach reflects to a certain degree a civilization concept as a set
of wealth, power, and meaning, defined by Arnason (2003).
The 49 empirical components of civilization are categorized and shown in Figure 3.
This list is a static model and is, of course, a product of knowledge that we can apply
now. In the past, this list would be much shorter. A list-hierarchy of entities requires
some explanation. The world civilization began when human individuals organized
themselves in a family, tribe, or ethnos.
These entities created prehistoric, primitive civilization, since every human group
civilizes itself as it has a purpose, responds to challenges, and applies tools. Toynbee
associates the beginning of a civilization with the emergence of a society. We could add
that the emerged society triggers the outburst of autonomous civilization and, sui
generis, the world civilization.
These civilizational components are self-explanatory.
A dynamic model of
relationships among these components is a subject of the farther study for those who
are interested in this subject. Most of these components have been developed or added
along the 6,000 years of civilization history. The most recent components are those
which belong to the Integrational Infrastructure and those which are emerging as postnation entities like the European Union. From the model or ideal type point of view,
the presented model’s infrastructure dimension allows for a more profound evaluation
of the role of technology in civilization.

https://scholarsarchive.byu.edu/ccr/vol81/iss81/14

94

et al.: Full Issue

Comparative Civilizations Review

89

Figure 3. The three fundamental components of civilization and their essential
subcomponents.
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Human Entities and their Dynamics
A human entity is a set of structured relationships among a group of humans that can
be organized under several forms, ranging from less to more flexible ones.
A family – a set of parents and children or relations, living together (or not) as the
members of a household, serving the needs of the family.
A band – a few dozen people who move continuously in the search for food to
survive. They are engaged in a hunting and gathering form of subsistence economy.
Bands have informal leaders who may provide guidance.
A tribe – a group of (especially primitive) families or communities, linked together
by social, economic, religious, or blood ties, and usually having common customs,
dialect, and a recognized, informal leader. A tribe can be considered a segmented
society devoted to horticulture or pastoralism rather than hunting and gathering.
An ethnos – a homogeneous community at an early stage of sharing the same
culture and awareness of togetherness. It strives for further civilizational
development (ex., Incas).
A chiefdom – an autonomous, socio-political unit comprising some villages or
communities under the permanent control of a paramount chief with aristocratic
ethos, but without formal, legal apparatus of forceful repression, and without the
capacity to prevent fission.
A society is an organized group of people on the same territory in order to support
their existence through the exchange of specialized, civilizational services. The
society shares a common interest and responds to challenges. As a result, society
develops its civilizational means. Along with the development of power and
economic infrastructures, society transforms into people.
A people is a politically and economically organized society, where one can
distinguish a hierarchy of subordinated individuals.
At the beginning of 600 B.C., the Hindu Civilization’s people were divided into
three classes: priest (Brahman), noble warriors (Kshatriya), and commonalty
(vaisya), including both farmers and artisans, augmented by a fourth group, the
workers (sudra) consisting of non-Aryans.
At the beginning of 400 B.C., the Roman Civilization had people organized into
two classes: patricians, who could belong to the Senate and plebeians, or
commoners.
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The patricians were more prosperous farmers who secured privileges for
themselves. Without the access to power, Plebeians became clients to the
patricians, who protected them in return for attendance and service.
In the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, Poland’s people were divided into three
strata: aristocracy (1%), szlachta (10 %), and plebs (89%).
France organized people in three estates: nobles, clergy, and commons.
Every state or empire had its social hierarchy, one in which people at the top have
felt that they were in charge of a state’s affairs. The remaining people were
oppressed and indifferent to the state’s well-being. The force of the civilizing
process was coming from a minimal group of people, who were, however, very
much interested in the creation of wealth and all means leading to it.
In the 19th century, just after the American Revolution (1775-1783) and French
Revolution (1789-99), the concept of a nation began to emerge. A Frenchman and
an American no longer served a king but the French or American “nation,” (patrie).
The nation became an entity as a result of a pact between the sovereign people and
the state. The nineteenth century is the history of rising nation-states, such as the
U.S., Germany, Italy, France, Serbia, Bulgaria, and Romania. In the 20th century,
many more nation-states were formed, such as Poland (after 123 years of
partitioning), Czechoslovakia (after almost 400 years of Austro-Hungarian rule),
Hungary, Yugoslavia, and so forth.
A proto-nation is an entity ruled mostly by an empire. It is an entity that may
eventually evolve into a nation. Although this entity is at the stage before a nation,
it is a result of the formation of the nation concept.
An example of a proto-nation is Hungary, which self-ruled within the AustroHungarian Empire in the 19th century. In the modern sense, Hungary became a
nation in 1919, when its state had been established. Czechoslovakia passed through
the same process in 1919 and Slovakia in 1995. The fall of Yugoslavia in 1995-97
has the same roots with Slovenia and Croatia creating nation-states.
The disintegration of the USSR in 1991 led to the creation of such nation-states as;
Russia, Belarus, Ukraine, Armenia, Georgia, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan,
Turkmenistan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Lithuania, Estonia, Latvia. Proto-nations
were Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria, DDR, and Mongolia
under the rule of the Soviet Empire in 1945-89. However, their states did not
develop the Polish nation, or the Hungarian nation, since they were promoting the
empire's interest which conflicted with these nations' interests.
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From the civilizational point of view, proto-nations are arrested mini civilizations.
Almost 50 years of the Soviet’s domination over Central-Eastern Europe led to this
process in the region.
A nation is an entity which has a common language, culture, memory of historical
events, and “national consciousness.” It does not mean that the nation must share
a common territory. This condition is applied toward a state rather than toward a
nation.
In this model, a state is a category of power infrastructure; however, the state
creates the nation. It means that emigrants from the nation-state may claim the
origin of their nationality from the nation-state, which may be thousands of miles
away. They may say that they belong to the Irish nation, living in the U.S. or even
having its citizenship. This new affiliation, however, should mean that an emigrant
transforms (voluntarily or involuntarily) him/herself into a member of a new nation
since the emigrant is a "subject" of a new state.
The combination of nation-with-state is a strong force, one which drives the
civilizing process. The World Wars in the 20th century were experimental ranges
for the civilizing process, inspired by strong nationalism, even superiority of one
nation-race over another, as was the case of Nazi Germany. The Cold War in 194589 was a case of the rivalry between the American nation and the Soviet “nation”empire. Although the USSR was a federation of tens of proto-nations, it was
enforcing continuously the development of the “Soviet” nation, even a “homo
sovieticus.” Likewise, the German Democratic Republic was also developing the
“GDR” nation.
A state is an autonomous political unit, encompassing many communities within
its territory and having a centralized government with the power to draft men and
women for war or work, levy and collect taxes, and decree and enforce laws.
An empire is a state of large size exercising political dominion over others, with
or without latter’s consent.
Power is a state, which is militarily or economically strong. For example, in 2003,
China was militarily strong, and Japan was economically strong.
A superpower is a state, which in its military arsenal has atomic bombs and is
politically very influential. For example, during the Cold War superpowers were
the U.S. and USSR.
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A hegemonic power is a state, which dominates the world politically, militarily,
economically, and scientifically. For example, at the beginning of the 21st century,
the U.S. plays such a role in the world.
Political society is a multi-ethnic entity which evolves from a nation. An excellent
example of it is the United States at the end of the 20th century. During WW II the
U.S. fought as one nation-state, very proud of its heritage and values. Afterward,
along with the development of American democracy, minorities (of all types,
including ethnic but mostly race and gender-oriented) evolved into strong interest
groups that influenced politics (elections) and led to the transformation of the
American nation into the American political society.
This society emphasizes its immigrant roots and uses its services and resources for
its segmented aims in disregard of the common interest. In this type of entity, the
civilization process is guided by the priority of infrastructure over culture. This
society has become very productive but without a sense of how to aim for a
meaningful life. The best solution for the U.S. is to sustain its one nation model
and prevent fragmentation along the lines of race and gender.
A transnational community is a regional entity, which organizes itself against the
challenges of the global economy.






Examples of this entity type are: the Association of the Eastern Alps, the
Celtic Arc, the European Port Cities Network, Working Communities of
the Pyrenees, the Rhine Hub including North Rhine - Westphalia,
Rhineland-Pfalz, Bayern, Baden-Wurttemberg, Switzerland, Lombardy,
and Eastern France (including Burgundy, the Rhone Valley, Cote d'Azur,
and Languedoc).
These centers will rival the centers in America: Montreal-BostonPhiladelphia, Pittsburgh-Detroit-Toronto-Chicago, San Diego-Los
Angeles-San Francisco, and Miami-Latin America.
The Asian regions are emerging around: Tokyo and Osaka, ShanghaiGuangzhou-Hong Kong.
Changes after the Cold War in Central and Eastern Europe created the
following regional communities: Vienna-Budapest-Prague (neo-revival of
the Hapsburg Empire), Northeastern Europe: Copenhagen-HamburgSzczecin-Gdansk-Klaipeda-Liepaja-Riga-St. Petersburg-Helsinki, and so
forth.

The civilization process of this entity type is strong since it is based on voluntary
cooperation and respect for either partner’s achievements or their potential.
Priority is placed upon infrastructure development, however within a shared
culture.
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The regional community is a very strong force in leveling disproportions of
civilizational developments among partners.
A supranational community is a cross-whole-national entity, which removes
states’ borders in a formal sense and also in the sense of economic and political
barriers. An example of this entity type is the European Union (perhaps even
NATO) that gradually expands toward a multi-national superstate with the
common market, currency, economic policy, and military. This entity's
civilizational process leads to the development of a strong common infrastructure,
which may lead to the homogenization of cultures.
In a very long perspective, this development may lead to the formation of the
political society. At the beginning of 21st century, leaders of EU states have just
become aware of it and look for solutions which could prevent the homogenization
of national cultures. They would like to guide the EU development by the policy
of "unity in diversity." They are aware that the homogenization of cultures leads
to lower cultural standards and ultimate vulgarization of existence.
Since the introduction of one legal language in the EU is impossible, it is, therefore,
unfeasible to create one European nation. If this is true, the supra-national
community must protect different cultures as the prerequisite of a meaningful life.
However, this life's comfort depends upon commonly shared infrastructures, which
sooner or later will trigger the homogenization of cultures. It is the dilemma of the
current EU.
A spheric community is an entity of several nations from the same civilization.
Examples of this entity are three states, U.S., Canada, and Mexico that were united
by the NAFTA (North American Free Trade Agreement) treaty. The civilizational
force of this entity type lies in the area of infrastructural development.
The global society or the society of post-nations is the entity which emerges from
the development of a global economy and global culture. It is an entity of stateless
and post-national individuals and groups as well as organizations that promote free
trade, free flow of ideas and people as a prerequisite of world peace and
"happiness." This entity is a strong civilizational force that leads towards the most
effective civilizational solutions, particularly in the area of the integrational
infrastructure (the Internet, airlines, CNN) as well as its leisure time indulgence
culture (Coca-Cola and Nike).
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The global political society is an entity that may emerge from global society. An
example of this entity is the G-7 or the G-20 group of the most developed nations
that promote a common economic policy. G-7 used to be an inter-civilizational
group of seven nations plus Russia (from three civilizations), which was included
in this Group as an award for the silent accord for the inclusion of Poland, the
Czech Republic, and Hungary in NATO. This entity's civilizational power lies in
the promotion of global standards of products and services as well as in the
promotion of democracy and peace. This action leads toward the modernization of
world civilization and the reaction against the Westernization of the world. Both
challenges are positive.
Utopia is an entity of calm and stagnation or perhaps even the beginning of
civilization death. It seems at first glance that utopia is the desired state of the
world civilization; however, it may be just its end.
A civilization can be composed of one or a combination of these human entities, which
in the case of the latter is a sort of a configuration of human entities, as Sorokin calls it,
a set “made up of several wholes, halves, and quarters of language, state, religious,
economic, territorial groups and unorganized populations” (Sorokin 1950).
A Structure of Significant Cultures which Shape Civilizational Development
Figure 4 empirically reflects 18 major civilizations and about 100 significant cultures
which through 6000 years of civilizational development have been shaping the civilized
attitude of humans toward nature, including animals, but also toward the higher order
which can be Gods or God or Big Bang.
By culture, one can understand the values and symbol-driven patterned thinking,
behavior, and feelings of people and society as well their knowledge/wisdom and skills
of applying infrastructural tools to guide the purpose and quality of life to control
resources supporting that life.


The essential element of culture is a religion which controls humans’ concept
of values and symbols. A person can be theist, agnostic, and atheist.



Other elements of culture are; education, tradition, science (research,
knowledge, and wisdom), art, architecture (as the reflection of the society’s
image), music, law, politics, governing, food, clothing, relations, and so forth.

However, today it is not enough to investigate a civilization without analyzing its
infrastructure.
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Figure 4. The empirical classification of already developed
civilized cultures of 18 major civilizations
The Structure of Civilizational Infrastructure
The Scientific Revolution of the fifteenth to seventeenth centuries replaced the
motionless earth with a “mechanized” one. The universe has ever since been
understood as giant machine functioning according to natural and universal laws that
could be formulated with mathematical precision. This new worldview inspired the
belief that nature could be mastered. There may be some truth to this claim as space
travel, including landing on the Moon and Mars, has shown.
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Gradually Newtonian science has become the science of Western Civilization as well
as the whole world, and its mechanistic paradigm has led to the development of
technology in the form of water pumps, engines, automobiles, railroads, and factory
systems which characterized the developing Enlightenment (in terms of social
mechanisms) and the Industrial Revolution (in terms of mechanical products and
processes).
The term “Industrial Revolution” symbolized the shift from an agrarian, handicraft,
labor-intensive economy to one dominated by machine-driven manufacturing,
specialization of tasks (at the shop-floor and in the office where bureaucracy was born),
a free flow of capital, and the concentration of people in the cities of the emerging
Industrial Society.
The following legacies of the Industrial Revolution can be perceived from a 200+ yearlong perspective (Targowski 2015:109):
1. Factory system and bureaucracy — technological progress in the cotton and iron
industries created a factory system based on the engine, which provided
centralized power to machines.
2. Railroads — transportation rapidly grew as workers from the countryside had
to be taken to the factories in cities via a network of railroads.
3. Steamboats — transportation through seas and oceans was developing fast as
the colonies needed products and services, and Europe could provide them but
at the same time needed raw materials and free labor (slaves and immigrants).
4. Post Office and telegraph — communication of information was necessary to
control the rapid flow of material, products, and services. Royal couriers were
found in Ancient Egypt in 2400 BCE. The oldest post office in the world still
functioning was opened in England in 1712, and the first telegraphic message
was sent from Baltimore, Maryland, to Washington, D.C., in 1844. Very soon,
in 1851, a cable was laid down under the English Channel connecting England
with continental Europe, and in 1866 the transatlantic cable allowed electric
communication between the United States and Europe.
5. Financial system — The West developed a form of stocks for investment in
companies with some controlled liability, which allowed for a more effective
concentration of capital for savings and investments.
6. Urbanization — concentration of industrial businesses in cities led to their rapid
growth. Before industrialization, most workers could grow their food; however,
in cramped towns, they had to rely on all sorts of services, which were
developing the landscape of those towns. Most of the world’s population now
lives in cities.
7. Bourgeoisie versus proletariat — a new social structure emerged in the West.
According to Marxist theory, this could be characterized as composed of
affluent people who are conventional, conservative, or materialistic in outlook
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and who own the means of producing wealth, and the exploited working class.
The former has organized itself into political parties to defend its economic
status, while the latter has organized itself frequently into political parties and
international workers organizations to protect its work opportunities and
income.
8. Per capita income — since 1820 industrializing world development has been
much more dynamic, and more intensive, than in the millennium before. Per
capita income rose faster than the growing population; by 1998, it was 8.5 times
as high as in 1820 (Maddison 2000:27). This growth created discretionary
income which fueled the further development of industrialization and
population growth.
9. Population growth — once industry could provide large quantities of products,
customers were needed. From 1820 to 1998 the population expanded 5.6 times
faster than in the years from 1000 to 1819 (Maddison, 2000:27).

In the 21st century, civilization infrastructure evolved into “Western-Global-Virtual”
civilization. As the father of civilization studies, Arnold Toynbee stated (1935) that
civilizations respond to challenges of nature and society. He did not mention
“infrastructure,” since he did not investigate current civilizations in the 21st century, and
in those times there were only a few infrastructures, such as authority, military, and
rural.
However, in the 21st century, Western civilization became “Technological civilization”
dispossessed of culture with a governing soul. Today, “Western-Global-Virtual”
civilization functions within many specialized civilizational infrastructures which
require responses by its society. These civilization infrastructures are challenging the
modus operandi in all other cultures including Chinese, Japanese, Hindu, Buddhist,
African, Islam, and the newly developing Global culture.
In this investigation I will sketch the global information infrastructures as their model
is shown in Figure 5.
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Figure 5. The architecture of the global information infrastructure
in the dawn of the 21st century (EII-Enterprise Information Infrastructure,
LII-Local Information Infrastructure, RII-Rural Information Infrastructure,
and NII-National Information Infrastructure, GAN-Global Area Network-private).
Due to the fast development of such technologies as social networks (Facebook,
Twitter, Instagram, Quora and other), artificial intelligence, and genomics2 —
contemporary civilization may be dramatically shifted into human-machine civilization
with a new kind of people whose brain will be “e-wired.” Why?


“Singularity is near” (Kurtzweil 2005:5,486) which means that we — Homo
sapiens will be replaced by machine-driven thinking and decision-making
species who will be developing human-machine civilization about 25% faster
than we do today. It will be done because the humans calculate with a speed
of “only” 1090 operations per second and our brains automatically interfacing
with computers (embedded) will calculate with speed of trillions of operations
per second, making of us a new species. Supposedly this range of speed can
be available about 2025 according to R. Kurtzweil (2005:125). It will be the
second Big Bang in human history, after the first one which took place a few
millions of years ago when we had transformed from animals into humans.

2

Genomics is an interdisciplinary field of science focusing on the structure, function, evolution, mapping,
and editing of genomes. A genome is an organism's complete set of DNA, including all of its genes. In
contrast to genetics, which refers to the study of individual genes and their roles in inheritance.
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Killer robots are on the horizon, those “who” will kill their masters but before
that stage will be active, peaceful robots. They will be designed and planned
to:
o develop a labor-free economy, at least in Western civilization in the very
near future, perhaps within ten to fifteen years
o collect and analyze personal data from social networks and apply
artificially made conclusions which will strongly impact our lives
(Standage 2018:24)
o define policies, sentencings, job recruitments and evaluations based on
the past information via the extrapolation and repetition of some wrong
rules (Standage 2018:24)
o drive autonomous vehicles (cars, trucks, buses, and so forth) which
cannot be reliable 100%
o implement policing social order and even wars via drones and like
machines.



Connected online is half of the world’s population in 2018. They eventually
can electronically elect presidents and parliamentary members at all levels of
society. In this way, representative democracy perhaps will be replaced by
direct democracy, possibly leading to societal chaos.
As the Internet makes people and organizations better informed it also makes
them more aggressive under the rubric of hate, cybercrime, and even paid
censorship which can spread fake news. For example, in Myanmar Facebook
has been manipulated to exaggerate the hatred of the Rohingya minority. In
the Philippines, it helped Rodrigo Dutarte, the populist president, get elected.
He now uses it to manage an insult crusade against opponents of his bloody
war on drugs. In Europe and Northern America, it is used by the terrorists.
Before we are ready to regulate world-wide e-communication in society, it will
be most likely worse before it is better. Due to our slowness to regulate
technology, perhaps it will be too late to “be better.”



Designer babies — can be obtained already in 2018, by screening an embryo's
genes responsible for specific diseases and behavior. It will lead to genetic
editing by replacing unwanted genes with better ones. Those who have money
will have a chance to provide their children with solutions supporting a long
and healthy life. Eventually, it may lead to the societal dichotomy of society,
composed of a higher and lower race. We have seen such an unfortunate
approach in Nazi Germany, where Übermacht race-oriented politics was in
charge of developing the master nation. It failed, luckily.

Nowadays our civilization — as it results from the short list of possible new technologydriven solutions — is impacted rather by the infrastructure than by culture.
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Furthermore, it looks that this impact is so rapid, complex, and intense that probably
our still “slow” and not the superior, brain is not able to solve the problems challenging
us, including even such unlikely outcomes as the replacement of humans by humanmachines.
Observations from the Empirical Development of Civilization as Suggesting What
to Study
Observation 1: According to Toynbee (1995) the historical development of civilization
is driven by physical, societal, cultural (ideological) challenges (paradigms) which are
reflected in sets of factors specific for a given developmental stage. Today one must
add the technological (infrastructural), global and universal challenges (paradigms)
which define civilization.
This sequence of stages indicates only the significant factors in the stimulus-response
processes. However, this sequence is inclusive, and the next civilization development’s
paradigm includes attributes of the previous stages (“civilization additive memory”).
This type of dynamic is shown in Figure 6.
Observation 2: Among driving forces of civilization development one can recognize the
following:
o Each civilization stage’s experience drives the remaining stages. There are
endless factors characterizing these stages. To make the study of civilization
more focused, one can investigate the inter-stages experiences through the
following processes and systems:
o
o
o
o

Nature (climate) and biological evolutions
Strategizing culture
Info-communication processes
World-systems

o The info-communication process is crucial in providing better information flows
and communication among humans, first by developing speech, later symbols,
papyrus, books, newspapers, telephone, mass-media, computer, and its networks,
which lead to higher awareness, more knowledgeable, and perhaps wiser
decision-making by civilized humans.
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Figure 6. The generations of civilizations (G) and the main processes developing them.
o The world-systems are critical for historical evolution of civilization, for
example, such as “capitalism,” “democratic revolutions,” “undemocratic
revolutions,” “industrialization,” “scientific knowledge,” and “world wars.”
Those world-systems one can classify include large-scale world-systems (UN,
EU, GATT, Internet); mid-scale world-systems (IMF, World Bank, NATO,
Google, English, CNN); and small-scale world-systems (WHO, WTO, ISO,
Amazon, the Wall Street Journal).
o The biological and nature-driven evolutions impact each civilization stage and
vice versa.
Observation 3: In the last 6000 thousand years the development of vertical civilizations,
such as Mesopotamian, Egyptian, Sinic, Japanese, Islamic, Western, and others took
place. About the year 2000, the first horizontal civilization begins its existence, under
a form of the Global Civilization.
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It is an infrastructural civilization, based on mediated-info-communication and an
extended transportation network, guided by a policy of the free flow of ideas, goods,
and services, and a still limited flow of people, through the global marketplace. The
market forces mainly drive this civilization and do not satisfy many socially-minded
people. Hence, there is a strong criticism of globalism.
Observation 4: The idealistic view of the future promotes the necessity to work on the
development of a Universal Civilization (horizontal civilization, driven by cultural
behavior), taking the best from all civilizations and providing goodness and wisdom for
all humans. Vaclav Havel (1996) defined this quest in the following manner:
“…Constantly talking about Europe, we have entirely ignored one of the pillars of
the European spiritual tradition – universalism, the commandment to think of
everyone, to act as everyone should act, and to look for a universally acceptable
solution.”
Jan Szczepański (1991), a former president of the International Sociological
Association stated that:
Today, universalism can be co-created as undoubtedly the most suitable answer to
the challenges of the ideological vacuum. Already, universalism can be a barrier
against individualism and egoism, the ideology of post-modernism, and all sorts
of fundamentalisms and totalitarianism. Universalism will also be capable of
examining and solving the problems of nationalism while retaining the most
authentic values of national cultures.
Janusz Kuczyński (1986), founder and honorary president of International Society for
Universalism, has stated that:
“Universalism has to advocate the solidarity of all peoples and nations, which is
rooted in our common human fates and our joint struggle against the ever more
numerous and greater threats, including the nuclear suicide of Mankind.”
Possible Further Research About Civilization
One can suggest the possible further research on civilization in selected areas, as
follows:


Research of relationships among society, culture, infrastructure (technology),
globalization, and universality developments as the determining factor in
civilization advancement or decline; such research can also explain current and
future expected challenges.
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Research into human entities and their dynamics in transformations within a
communities’ ladder, due to civilizational challenges.
Research of different world-systems and their impact on civilization
development or regress, particularly in the 21st century.
Research of the world civilization and its impact on international relations.
Other topics





The excellent research opportunities now available are in innovative exploration
deepened by:



Interdisciplinary research into history, political science, technology,
anthropology, medicine, and others.
Big-picture-oriented research of civilizational responses to the globalization
processes taking place in the society, culture, and infrastructure in the 21st
century. Furthermore, what does lead to a new kind of civilization, which can
be a global one or even human-machine one?

Conclusions
1. Based on the presented models one can define civilization as an interface
between organized humans and the Creator and nature, which applies value and
symbol-driven cultural behaviors, feelings, reactions and infrastructural tools to
guide the purpose and quality of life and to control life-supporting resources and
infrastructure. By civilization we mean organized people who purposely and
skillfully improve the population, and its organizations' internal and external
conditions; it concerns a population and its organizations’ relation to nature, the
Creator (Nature or God), and his/her fellow people. It is a state of affairs which
can be of a physical, social, mental, and spiritual character which indeed
requires our wise and large-scale-oriented intervention at the local, regional,
spherical or/and worldwide levels.
2. After more than 150 years of developing the concept of civilization, it is perhaps
time, as has been seen in other sciences, to recognize and agree upon the set of
elements of civilization and research their individual and grouped relations,
impacts and dynamics in different scopes and timelines. The purpose of the
proposed undertaking is to regulate not only local communities, regions, and
states but also to understand the nature of civilizations more clearly. This ruling
should minimize conflicts, maximize the sustainability of Mankind and aim at
a satisfactory quality of life, grounded in law and justice.
3. This investigation recognized 220 civilizational elements. However, the
classification of the infrastructural elements has been just sketched. It will be
easy to add another 80 to 200+ elements of this type.
https://scholarsarchive.byu.edu/ccr/vol81/iss81/14

110

et al.: Full Issue

Comparative Civilizations Review

105

One can possibly predict that civilization’s cloud has at least about 500 essential
elements. It is necessary to recognize these elements, characterize, and know
their dynamics and impact upon us. Why? Because as we see today, we need to
begin to rule our civilization if we want to survive on the planet Earth.
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Spengler’s “Magian” Classification Applied to an Unrecognized Ecumene:
The Near East, 1500 to 0 BCE
The Magian I World-View
David B. Richardson
Editor’s Note: Dr. David B. Richardson was a professor in the Department of
Philosophy at Edinboro State College (now Edinboro University), Edinboro,
Pennsylvania, and an active member of the International Society for the
Comparative Study of Civilizations for many years.
This is a paper from the Archives prepared for presentation at an ISCSC Conference
held on May 22, 1980.
*****
My aim in the following discussion was to determine from the historical evidence that
small group of ideas, metaphysical assumptions, and attitudes which made up the core
of the Magian I psychological world-outlook. The latter two-thirds of the essay is
devoted to this problem, while the first third is concerned with the evidence for the very
existence in the first millennium B.C. of a Near Eastern worldview of the same order
as that of Greece, Europe, China, and India.
My goal, therefore, has not been to make a sketch, à la Condorcet, of a universal history
of the Pre-Christian Levant, but in the light of a widely shared skepticism among
historians, philosophers, and civilizationalists about the Spenglerian Magian “style” of
the early Christian era, I have seen no alternative but to trace the historical evidence for
the homogeneity of a metaphysical worldview among the Near Eastern peoples in the
fifteen hundred years preceding the birth of Christ.
If the reality of Spengler’s Magian worldview is still generally doubted by experts
today, the experts are more likely to doubt my contention that a similar worldview
existed a thousand years earlier.
Archeological evidence is being unearthed at the present day—as through the whole
past century —and in all probability, the more evidence archeologists, linguists, and
philologists will uncover about ancient Near Eastern peoples, the more clearly will
appear the presence of the Magian I world-style throughout the area.
My approach cannot help but be “Spenglerian” because my historical paradigm, like
Herder’s, Danilevsky’s, Dilthey’s, and Spengler’s is: world-styles of historical
civilizations. I shall not, therefore, be dealing purely and simply with the pre-Christian
Levantine Ecumene as my object of analysis.
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To attempt to define absolutely such a vast complex of cultures would be as helpless a
task as for a botanist to attempt to define in detail some huge phylum of plant life.
Spengler evidently was unaware of the juxtaposition of the two types of investigation
he was undertaking in The Decline of the West: one which is narrow, manageable, and
susceptible of meaningful analysis, namely the study of world-styles, or ‘Destinies”;
the second, less manageable and less susceptible of rational analysis, namely, the
morphological descriptions of higher cultures, or ecumenical complexes composed of
diverse civilizations and sub-cultures.
Thus, he investigated not only the Magian worldview of the Christian era, but he also
treated as a meaningful object of detailed analysis the Magian culture—that is, the
enormously complex Near Eastern and Mediterranean peoples to whom the worldview
extended.
It would, however, be scientifically unsound for an investigator of civilizations from a
comparative standpoint to think only of the small class which he is studying, because
this would become unreal. His classification is abstract, but only historical peoples,
their deeds, and their works, have really existed. I have not confined my attention only
to the world-outlook; and to avoid such an abstract approach I have constantly used
such terms as “Near East,” “Levant,” “Magian I Culture,” “Near Eastern Peoples,” and
the like. Sometimes I have referred to these societies in such terms as the following:
“insofar as they shared the Magian I metaphysical worldview,” or I have used similar
terms.
Once I wrote in the following vein: “the emergent culture or ecumene, insofar as it was
influenced by the new (Magian) psychological Weltanschauung.” The qualification in
the foregoing phrase (“insofar as”) enables me to treat of a relatively small classification
and still to keep in mind the historical world civilization.
The Magian Civilizational Style in World History
Spengler’s names for the civilizational worldview of the Near Eastern civilization of
the early Christian era are “Magian” and “Arabian,” and these are approximate,
although they should not be used in their basic meaning.
Originally, “Magian” refers to the Magi cult; i.e., the followers of the Magi priests were
Magians. It was a world well known to the Greeks, e.g., in Aristotle’s book about the
Magi, entitled Magicus.1
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But I shall stipulate a technical definition for “Magian” which will denominate a
civilizational worldview held in common by many diverse peoples in the ancient
Levant, e.g., the Hebrews, the Zoroastrians, the Magians, the Syrians, Assyrians,
Chaldeans, etc. And the ideologies of these people were in conflict.
For example, though the prophet Zoroaster (who lived as a Mede and subsequently as
a Persian, c. 500 BCE) belonged originally to the tribe of the Magi2, he developed
Iranian religion in what might be called a “Hebrew” direction. The Persian Magians
were not Zoroastrians, but Iranian polytheists3; Zoroaster, however, taught that there
was only one Supreme Good, Divine Being (Ahura Mazda), and he reduced the native
Iranian divinities to the status of demons or angels.
Spengler’s term “Arabian,” as a synonym for “Magian,” had the same meaning, though
the actual Arabians (i.e., the nomads of the Arabian steppe) shared only partly in the
Near Eastern worldview in ancient times.
A vivid twofold way of envisioning all reality – a duality in two respects: the world vs.
the transcendent, and evil vs. good – was a characteristic of the Near East at the
beginning of the Christian era. This dual vision had already been in existence for well
over a thousand years in that region. In the old ritual of the Babylonian New Year
festival, for example, Baal, “without equal in his anger,” is prayed to in his
transcendence: “Merciful king…with whose glance he dost give the law…”4
Of the various ideologies and religions in the Near Orient, sharing in the Magian
worldview, the following are of particular interest. Judaism, from the date of the return
from Babylon to the time of the destruction of Jerusalem, was affected more by the
spread of Zoroastrian Persism than by any other external religious impulse; and the
duality between the material and the unseen worlds, the physical and the spiritual, was
greatly intensified among the Jews by the Zoroastrian doctrines.5
In India and China, religion, however, as produced by the creative members of society,
has been much more philosophical than in the West; and the Oriental philosophical
quality is dramatically opposite to Magian dualism. The dualism is a division between
philosophy and religion.
The Magian Predecessor to Spengler’s Magian II World-Style
In interpreting the emergence of the “Arabian” (that is, Magian) Culture, Spengler
distinguished between the civilization, which he held to have been “born” in the year 1,
and its world-outlook —the latter having been developing many centuries earlier. There
was a strong, unbroken continuous passage from the predecessor phase of the
civilization to the Magian [II] epoch.
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That is, there was no break from the long “gestation” period of the Magian II culture to
its swift “birth” at the beginning of the Christian era.
Spengler could have, but did not, trace out all those Magian qualities which existed in
the civilization five hundred years earlier in the time of Xerxes, or even nine hundred
years earlier in the Magian I culture’s “springtime,” in the time of Solomon. But then,
he would have left in ambiguity the distinct reality of the new Magian II Civilization of
the year 1.
The Magian I and Magian II outlooks, however, had so much in common that it is fair
also to say that they really constituted two phases of one worldview. They were
ingredients in a Near Eastern ecumene which also contained Near Eastern religious,
economic, and political configurations, as well as a civilizational Weltanschauung.
Apparently perplexed by the overlapping of various Near Eastern civilizations during
the first millennium before Christ, Spengler could not discern the earlier Magi I worldoutlook which still predominated in the Levant during the two hundred-year gestation
period leading to the emergence of the new phases in the Christian era. He saw the first
millennium BCE as the pre-cultural period of the “Arabian” culture, taking place in
Syrian, Assyrian, Persian, and Jewish territories and in the area of the old Babylonian
Empire.6
But more recently, Toynbee and Quigley have traced out cultural components of the
earlier Near East. This ecumene encompassed Toynbee’s Syriac and Sumero-Akkadian
and Quigley’s Canaanite and Mesopotamian civilizations, and also Christopher
Dawson’s “Judeo-Aramean” culture7 – roughly speaking, the whole Fertile Crescent.
That the influence of the Magian I world-style was great in the centuries just preceding
the Christian era is implicit in the influence of the Phoenicians on the Greeks by way of
a Phoenician code of ethics (Stoicism) and system of cosmology. “The Phoenicians,”
wrote Toynbee, “had a Weltanschauung that was akin to that of the prophets of Israel
and Judah.”
Toynbee has not used Spengler’s paradigm for examining civilizations, but here he
departs, for just a moment, from the religious and political models that he customarily
uses. The new Magian II worldview (just before the Christian era) was taking form in
the Eastern territory8 of the Graeco-Roman civilization, under the influence of the
Magian I worldview.
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Their Geographical and Environmental Paradigms Critically Examined
I shall describe as “Magian I” the metaphysical worldview which prevailed in the Near
East approximately 1200-100 BCE, a name which cannot be entirely appropriate for
that which it signifies.
Spengler used the name of the Persian priesthood and that of Arabia (with some license)
to denote the worldview in early Christian times of the Mediterranean civilization:
“Magian.” But, for that matter, consider the personage Faust. His name, as a symbol of
the medieval-modern Western worldview, is appropriate – a name which Goethe,
Spengler, and many others used to depict “Faustian” man.
The Magian I ecumene was roughly coterminous with that society which Christopher
Dawson termed the “Aramaic-Babylonian” civilization; it is Toynbee’s post-1200 BCE
“Babylonian” and “Syriac” civilizations taken together; and it is congruent with C.
Quigley’s “Canaanite” and “Mesopotamian” civilizations.
It is, moreover, an earlier appearance of the Magian II culture of Christian times. This
region, whose peoples were greatly disturbed in the preceding two thousand years by
the conflicts of several societies, extended from the mouth of the Euphrates to the Nile.9
We must expect a variety of usages in depicting the civilizations of the Near East during
the extremely turbulent years, 1200 to 100 BCE, in view of the variety of perspectives
of historians; for there is no simple indisputable theory about the prevailing higher
cultures of that time.
One can speak more particularly and accurately of Hittite, Assyrian, Chaldean,
Phoenician, and Persian civilizations. Yet Quigley has picked out for special attention
two higher cultures – the Mesopotamian and the Canaanite Civilizations – which rose
and fell in the area outlined by the Fertile Crescent. He traces the former from its birth
approximately 4500 BCE to its final demise in 332 BCE10 and the latter from its birth
approximately 1400 BCE to its final demise in 146 BCE.11
The paradigm according to which he and Toynbee have defined the two civilizations
are not religious, and they have a political quality. Both civilizations, as historical facts,
are traceable today in the historical vestiges of their econo-political regimes.
But I propose (in addition to the non-psychological and non-metaphysical structures)
that a civilizational worldview came into being and prevailed during the war-filled
centuries from 1400 to 146 BCE, a worldview which straddled the economic and
political line of demarcation between the two civilizations; and this Weltanschauung
articulated itself universally throughout the various societies of the entire Near Eastern
region: the Chaldean, Phoenician, Assyrian, Aramaic, Jewish, Persian, etc.
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A similar style of temple architecture prevailed throughout the civilization in the time
of Solomon —in Babylonia, Assyria, and Palestine, in particular. The great temple of
Marduk, tutelary god of Babylon, resembled Solomon’s temple in Jerusalem, as
described in the Bible.12
Some disagreement, however, follows from the following question: Were the Canaanite
(Toynbee’s Syriac) and Mesopotamian civilizations each an integral whole and in
possession of the requisite degree of self-identity genuinely enough to be, unto itself, a
self-contained civilization? Did they each have an econo-political unity?
Both “civilizations” underwent conquest by other civilizations (sometimes both at once,
as in the suzerainty of the Assyrians), and both were composed of numerous cities and
states, whose inter-political ties were often so weak that the basic unity of the higher
society is difficult to see.
I propose these problems in order to suggest that, if the unity of these econo-political
societies can be seen despite the extreme turbulence of history which occurred in that
region of the world at such a time, then is it unreasonable to look for a single
civilizational world-outlook emerging in the midst of these civilizations?
The difficulty is that such a psychological world-style is characteristically the worldoutlook of the people of a single international society, instead of two societies which
are independent of each other. Yet the latter may sometimes seem to have been the
case.
But I am encouraged to see that the difficulty of multiple sovereignties is ignored in
Toynbee’s description of the “Medieval Cosmos of City-States,” a European “higher
civilization” based on city-states which grew and declined.
The civilization of medieval city-states shared most of the cultural values of the
encompassing Western Civilization. The citizens of the medieval city of Danzig, for
example, were at the same time citizens of the European community of nations. And (in
Spenglerian language) both “civilizations” shared the same Faustian civilizational
world-outlook.
If Toynbee’s theory of a city-oriented medieval civilization is correct, then this instance
verifies the generalization that two civilizations, contemporary to one another, each
differentiated in virtue of the econo-political continuity of its central region, can also
share in common a psychological world-outlook. The total society, moreover, will be
an ecumene, an approximation to a civilization, part of whose meaning is a shared
world-style; and this ecumene is a whole which is more than the mere sum of its parts.
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The Magian I Metaphysical Worldview: Its Complex Origins – Environmental,
Cultural, and Geographical
Environmental Influences
The physical and cultural conditions which evoked the Magian I Weltanschauung in the
era from 1500 to 1100 BCE were considerably complicated by the interrelationships of
the civilizations in the area during this interval, themselves having varying degrees of
complexity in their modes of civilized life.13 In the following I shall sketch out these
civilizational encounters in the context of several environmental and geographical
factors.
From 3000 to 1000 BCE periods of drought and diminution of food supply, together
with an over-population in the Arabian peninsula, caused several tribes to migrate from
the Arabian Steppe to regions in or near the Fertile Crescent. These included:








the Assyrians (2900 BCE),14
the Canaanites (2500 BCE),15
the Akkadians (2500 BCE),
the Amorite “Babylonians” (2500 BCE)16
the Chaldeans and the Amorites (2000 BCE),
Phoenicians (Arameans)17 and Syrians18 (1500 BCE), and
the Habirus (Hebrews) (1200 BCE).19

The possibility of development of a single metaphysical Weltanschauung throughout
the region of these Near Eastern migrations was enhanced by the fact that the nomads
who lived on the Arabian Steppe remained virtually the same throughout all their known
history.20 As a consequence of the inroads of these dynamic peoples, the Fertile
Crescent became unalterably the scene of Semitic civilizations.21
More specifically, in the nomadic tribes entering the civilized Levant out of the harsh
desert, there were certain personal characteristics which, in varying degrees, continued
to develop in the diverse areas of the Near East after 2000 BCE. These included:





a capacity for deep religiousness (though unfulfilled in the pre-civilized
nomadic Arabs),
vivid imagination,
pronounced individuality, and
marked ferocity.22

The powerful presence of Egypt was gentle in comparison.
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Certain pastoral peoples from the north, of Indo-European origin, were also immensely
important in the history of the Magian II Civilization. The Hittites entered the Anatolian
area sometime prior to 1500 BCE and, during the disintegration of the Sumerian culture
of Mesopotamia, established the Hittite Civilization. The members of this civilization
challenged Egypt’s claim of suzerainty over the Middle East during a series of wars
from 1352 BCE until the establishment of peace in 1278.23
But at that time new migrations of Aryan invaders from the north (the Lydians and the
Phrygians) were overwhelming the Hittite culture.24 In addition, Egypt had been
invaded by the Hyksos around 1600 BCE.
Cultural and Social Ties of the Levant at the Time of Birth of the Magian I Culture
Just as the national groupings of modern Europe are closely tied by countless crosscurrents of business, art, diplomacy, politics, and military relations—so much so, that
the continent has a civilizational unit—so, too, the ancient Near East was comparable
in this respect.25 The emphasis of morality on law was thoroughly accepted by the Near
Eastern peoples, from Palestine to the Sumero-Akkadian Empire of Babylon, at least as
early as 2400 BCE. The Code of Hammurabi (c. 1700), in fact, was only the
continuation of Sumero-Akkadian law codes with the same formulation and point of
view.26
The Semites from the desert, with their stern justice, had been infiltrating into the
irrigation culture of Mesopotamia before 3000 BCE.27 During the period 2000 to 1000
BCE, there were many law codes throughout the Levant, and they all show the same
basic structure as the Biblical Book of the Covenant.
However, Moses used considerable originality in choosing and organizing earlier
Northwest-Semitic ideas and prescriptions. The description of the Covenant between
Yahweh and Israel, in Joshua 24, was similar in many definite ways to Syro-Anatolian
diplomatic treaties (that is covenants) of the fourteenth and thirteen centuries BCE.
The idea of legal treaties became widespread through the Near East28 and it figured in
numerous references to the Divine Covenant in the Hebrew Bible.
Art, and particularly poetry, had been unifying the imaginations of the Near Eastern
peoples since before 1500 BCE. During the suzerainty of Egypt in Palestine and Syria
from c. 1550 to 1225,29 the Egyptians were corresponding (in clay tablets) with
Babylonians, Assyrians, Mitannians, Hittites, and other Anatolians, and using the
lingua franca, Akkadian.
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J. H. Breasted saw in this age the “First Internationalization” in human history, and
indeed the surviving international correspondence reveals the great extent of mutual
influences exerted by Egypt, Mesopotamia, and Syria in these centuries.
“Many literary works were translated from Akkadian into Hurrian and Hittite, as well
as from Hurrian into Hittite”; Egyptian poems were translated into Akkadian; a
Canaanite myth was put into Egyptian; there is extant a Hittite version of an Akkadian
(i.e., Babylonian) epic. The Song of Miriam in Exodus 15 and the Oracles of Balaam
in Numbers 23 – 24 almost certainly derive from Palestinian poetry of the
thirteenth/twelfth centuries BCE, to mention but a bit of the poetry of the Bible of preBiblical derivation.30
Egyptian and Babylonian scholars were highly valued in other Near Eastern states in c.
1300. The cultural internationalism had a tremendous impact on the religion of Western
Asia, to be seen in the wholesale adaptations of the names of gods and goddesses all
over the region of the Fertile Crescent, from Sumero-Akkadia to Egypt. Indeed, as early
as Hammurabi (c. 1700) this process was going on, so great was the homogeneity of
worldview in Mesopotamia, Syria, and the eastern Levant.31 Thus, in all probability a
civilizational world-style pre-dated the Magian I outlook.
The universalistic tendencies of the “First International Age” were consummated in the
thirteenth century BCE, when the gods of Egypt were severally identified with the
leading deities of the western Levant, and the patron god of the Pharaoh was also the
main god of the Canaanites, Hittites, and Mesopotamians.32
This is but a slight sketch of the rich amalgamation of culture which was going on in
the epoch of the thirteenth-twelfth centuries. There had been a Dark Age between the
time of Hammurabi and 1500 BCE in the Near Eastern Civilization, when non-Semitic
barbarians had entered into the Fertile Crescent both from the Armenian sector and from
the grasslands of Central Asia. (In the eighteenth-century BCE, for example, a variety
of non-Semitic peoples flooded Palestine.) As a consequence, these lands were
thoroughly internationalized before the Egyptian conquest of Palestine and Syria began
about 1560 BCE, and both art and international trade had an excellent development.33
Geographical Diversity of the Pre-Magian Societies
Finally, in 1194 BCE, at the approximate time of the birth of the Magian I Civilization,
Egypt and its Near Eastern allies and client states were invaded by the Aryan Peoples
of the Sea (the Achaeans). And, four years later, in 1190, seafaring Philistines settled
on the southern Palestinian coastal area.
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In this same century, during the 1200s, the Arameans had erupted with great vehemence
and violence out of the desert and moved into Palestine34 (but particularly into
Damascus).35 In the same century, too, the Chaldeans had emerged out of the desert
with similar ferocity and invaded the Tigris-Euphrates Valley.36 Also during this same
century of the Egyptian New Empire’s decline, the Hebrews came from the desert,
whence Moses led them, and invaded the Canaanite farm and town society in
Palestine.37
Here I have sketched out the events over many centuries, while the Magian I
metaphysical worldview was taking form in the minds of creative members of Near
Eastern societies. This preceded the emergence (c. 1300 to 1100 BCE) of the
civilization, the members of which (notably, the artists and leaders) -- ranging from the
militaristic Assyrians to the God-intoxicated Israelites and the relatively gentle Persians
(albeit they were descendants of marauding Aryan barbarians) -- were to give material
realization to a single metaphysical world-outlook.
Five civilizations,38 through lifestyles, politics, or worldviews, had influence over the
Near East during these centuries (1500 – 1100 BCE):









The Sumerian culture, which had been preserved under the rule of the
Babylonians, was destined to heavily influence the conquerors, the Chaldeans.
The Egyptian kingship, which brought the Levant under direct Egyptian rule,
was in constant contact with the Levantine societies before and after the
decline of Egyptian suzerainty in the thirteenth century BCE.
The “Aegean” Civilization (comprising the Minoan, Helladic, and Mycenean
civilizations)39, which had been disintegrating since 1400 BCE, had exposed
the sea-going Phoenicians to a highly developed cultural influence.
The Hittites, moreover, had assimilated the civilizing influences of the
Sumero-Akkadians (it was largely through the mediation of another nonSemitic people, the Hurrians, that the Sumero-Akkadian culture reached the
Hittites and other Anatolian peoples).40
In its turn, at the time of its dissolution, the Hittite society, in 1190 BCE,
provided a civilizational influence on Semitic peoples, particularly the
Assyrians.

The territory encompassed by the Magian I worldview revealed itself in works and
deeds approximately the thirteenth century BCE, 600 years before Zoroaster was born
(c. 565 BCE).41 It was destined to share large parts of its area with other civilizations,
with pastoral tribal peoples, with the Hebrew Confederacy of the People of the
Covenant, and with the sea-going Phoenicians.
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The emergent ecumene, insofar as it was influenced by the new civilizational
Weltanschauung, comes to light in historical retrospect, similarly as an image appears
among many images on a palimpsest painting. The most meaningful “layers” of the
Magian I “palimpsest” were the Canaanite Civilization and the Mesopotamian (both
highly organized societies).
I shall not attempt to trace out the very limited extent to which the Magian I
“Civilization” achieved actual political reality or approximation to social unity, except
to observe that it was an ecumene participated in by several civilizations and cultures.
Yet I could conclude, in passing, that any higher culture, to the extent that it may be
designated or denominated by the name of its worldview, then, by the same token it
approximates – at least in some sporadic or partial degree – to a social-economic or
political unity. By definition, to be political pertains to the very nature of a culture or a
civilization.
The extremely dynamic and diversified history of the ancient Near East from 1200 to
100 BCE was one of an area never unified in that time except by military conquest in
the form of empires. Although the unity of the Magian I peoples was far from a
consummated unification of a higher society, nevertheless, I find that it was an ecumene
which tended to approximate to a single higher civilization.
Quigley’s description of the Canaanite Civilization existing in the Levant (and, in less
degree, his sketch of the continuous existence of the Mesopotamian Civilization until
its termination in the lifetime of Alexander) has suggested to me that a Magian
worldview must have existed in those regions in the first millennium before Christ; and,
in fact, many centuries prior to the civilization I call “Magian I.”
I shall date the Magian civilizational worldview as taking shape in the minds of creative
individuals at least as early as the eighteenth-century BCE Amorite lawmaker and
patron of astronomy, Hammurabi (c. 1728-1686).

https://scholarsarchive.byu.edu/ccr/vol81/iss81/14

124

et al.: Full Issue

Comparative Civilizations Review

119

Footnotes
1. Diogenes Laertius, Lives of Eminent Philosophers, Prologue, 1, 2, 8.
2. E.V. Arnold, Roman Stoicism, (Humanities Press, N.Y., 1958), p.7.
3. W.F. Albright, From the Stone Age to Christianity: Monotheism and the
Historical Process, (Doubleday Anchor Books, N.Y., 1957), p. 360.
4. S.E. Hooke, Babylonian and Assyrian Religion, (Hutchinson’s Univ. Library,
London, 1953), p. 163.
5. E.V. Arnold, op. cit., pp.20-21.
6. O. Spengler, The Decline of the West, trans. C. F. Atkinson (Knopf, N.Y.
1939; 2 vols.; orig. publ. 1918, 1922), Vol. 2, p. 48.
7. C. Dawson, The Dynamics of World History, ed. by J. J. Mulloy (Sheed &
Ward, N.Y., 1957), p. 382.
8. A.J. Toynbee, A Study of History (Oxford Univ., Oxford, 1933-1961), Vol.
12, p. 449. But see C. Quigley, The Evolution of Civilizations (Macmillan,
N.Y. 1961).
9. C. Quigley, op. cit., pp. 142-143, 149-151.
10. Ibid., p. 143.
11. Ibid., p. 152, 156.
12. Hooke, op. cit., pp. 48 – 49.
13. If we turn to East Asian societies, how simple, in comparison, were the
physical and psychological provocative factors which elicited from the
Chinese and the Indians their respective psychological Weltanschauungen.
14. J. H. Breasted, Ancient Times: A History of the Early World, 2nd. Ed. (Ginn &
Co., Boston, 1944), p. 18.
15. Toynbee, op. cit., pp. 466-467.
16. P. K. Hitti, History of the Arabs from the Earliest Times to the Present, Ninth
Edition (Macmillan: St. Martin’s Press, N.Y., 1967; first publ. 1937), p. 11.
17. C. Brockelmann, History of the Islamic Peoples, trans. By J. Carmichael and
M. Perlmann (Capricorn Books, N.Y., 1960; orig. publ. 1939), p. 3.
18. Breasted, op. cit., p. 185.
19. S. N. Fisher, The Middle East: A History (Knopf, N.Y., 1959), p. 12.
20. Hitti, op. cit., p. 9.
21. Ibid., p. 13.
22. Ibid., p. 10.
23. A. J. Toynbee, A Study of History, Somervell’s Abridgement (Oxford Univ.,
1946), Vol. 1, Append, Table V.
24. Ibid.; C. Quigley, op. cit., p. 37.
25. W. F. Albright, From the Stone Age to Christianity: Monotheism and the
Historical Process, 2nd ed. (Doubleday Anchor Book, N.Y., 1957), p. 6 – 7.
26. Ibid., p. 198.
Published by BYU ScholarsArchive, 2019

125

Comparative Civilizations Review, Vol. 81 [2019], No. 81, Art. 14

120

Number 81, Fall 2019

27. Ibid., p. 149.
28. Ibid., pp. 15-16.
29. Ibid., p. 206.
30. Ibid., p. 14.
31. Ibid., pp. 209-213.
32. Ibid., p. 224.
33. Ibid., pp. 204-206.
34. Toynbee, A Study of History, Vol. 12, p. 465.
35. Breasted, op. cit., p. 239.
36. Toynbee calls the event the “Aramean-Chaldean-Hebrew eruption in the
thirteenth century B.C.” op. cit., p. 465.
37. Ibid.
38. Ibid., p. 559.
39. Ibid., p. 560n.
40. Albright, op. cit., p. 153.
41. Toynbee, op. cit., p. 435.

https://scholarsarchive.byu.edu/ccr/vol81/iss81/14

126

et al.: Full Issue

Comparative Civilizations Review

121

A Physics for Civilization
Arthur S. Iberall
Editor’s Note: The following paper, retrieved from the archives at Dickinson College,
was presented at a session on the economic origins of civilizations and on the death of
civilizations, at the 1980 Annual Conference of the International Society for the
Comparative Study of Civilizations, held at Syracuse University, in May 1980.
A highly accomplished polymath, Arthur Iberall (1918-2002) served as an executive
board member of the ISCSC as well as a long-time member and a distinguished
participant in the ISCSC annual meetings. He was an expert on complex systems
thinking.
Many discussions over the years were punctuated by his vigorous debating style and
brilliant, insightful assertions. Few claims were spared in these intellectual thrusts. For
example, I recall his arguing very persuasively, with data – and against others – about
the direction in which the South Pacific and South America actually were settled by
humans.
According to biographical material online, he held three patents, gave four U.S.
Congressional briefings, and was awarded an honorary Doctor of Science degree by
Ohio State University in recognition of his interdisciplinary scientific research. He
published eight books, 95 peer-reviewed articles, and 49 scientific conference extended
abstracts.
Wikipedia sums up his intellectual contributions by
reporting that he “was an American physicist/
hydrodynamicist and engineer who pioneered
homeokinetics, the physics of complex, self-organizing
systems. He was the originator of the concept of lines of
non-extension on the human body which was used to
create workable space suits.”
Thus, it is no surprise that an obituary online reports that
“Dr. Iberall was honored at the 1998 Homeokinetics
Conference at the University of Connecticut in Storrs,
Connecticut where hundreds of his colleagues joined
together to show how the application of homeokinetic
principles explains the functioning of complex systems,
in contrast to chaotic theory that has no physical basis.”
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During his career, Dr. Iberall was a consultant to NASA, the Department of
Transportation, the Army Research Office, as well as the Navy and the Air Force. His
applied research was carried out at the National Bureau of Standards (1941-53), Rand,
and other scientific organizations and major academic institutions. He is credited with
having contributed significantly to the development of the first space suit, the highspeed dental drill, breathing regulators, fiberglass cutters, and major home appliances
such as stove surface burners, the electric knife, and fancy-stitch sewing machines.
A fundraising drive to create a Distinguished Annual Lecture series in his honor at the
Center for the Ecological Study of Perception and Action at the University of
Connecticut stated:
Arthur Iberall had a vision in which he incorporated the questions that all of us
asked – How do complex systems really work? Can physics be applied to real world
problems? Is there a logic to running our society? How do human systems actually
work? Where are all the thermodynamic engines and oscillators in the body and
how do they interact? What physical and chemical data really need to be collected
to do tasks such as design drugs that incorporate a homeokinetic perspective? What
are the catalytic messaging units in the neuronal language?
On the topic of comparative civilizations, he used physics to explain the emergence of
settled civilizations. He described a pattern based on stability transition, a process
similar to that of matter condensation. First came a “condensation” to fixed settlements,
and this was followed by a transition to urban civilization, he argued.
Among the eight books he published was one co-authored with David Wilkinson and
Don White entitled Foundations for Social and Biological Evolution. The book
examines how mankind populated the Earth (including its laws of growth), how
settlement in place and urbanization occurred, the commonality of cultural and
civilizational evolution over the entire Earth for the past 15,000 years, and the processes
which have undergirded it all.
Clearly, the paper he gave at Syracuse for the ISCSC meeting broke new ground and
expanded considerably the research map upon which scholars of comparative
civilizations may pursue further understanding of the discipline and its parameters.
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A Physics for Civilization
I.

The General Construct (1,2)
1. We are concerned with fluid-like systems, in which the atomistic participants
are involved in movement relative to each other. (There is a very comparable
physics which can be developed for solid state-like systems, but it will not be
our present concern.)
2. In a system of such atomistic participants, the physics of motion and change for
the ensemble of participants is tracked by means of those quantities which are
conserved upon interactions between the participants (3).
3. In a simple system, there are three quantities which are conserved upon
interaction – mass (the quantity of matter), energy, and momentum (the product
of mass and velocity).
4. In a complex system, processes emerge which are long time delayed compared
to the interactional time (e.g., time between collisions). They emerge because
long time delayed complex processes are involved in the atomistic interiors.
These long-time delayed processes modify the basic conservations in the
following way:
a. Chemical change may emerge, as atomisms are transformed. This
appearance of new forms requires a statement of conservations for each
individual mass species that may emerge atomistically.
b. In the case of living systems, in which a complex chemical reproductive
process involving birth, growth, life, death, and dissolution may take place,
one distinguishes between the conservations of mass species and the
conservation of population number. The new interactional conservation is
contained in the statement that generation begets generation. That lengthens
the total effective interactional time to the generation time.
c. The physical conservation of momentum transfer between participants is
modified. Instead of the relevant time scale for transfer being the interaction
time (known technically in physical science as the collision or relaxation
time), it is the time scale over which all internal processes within the
interiors of the atomistic participants complete a cycle and reach an
equilibrium. e denote this time scale as the factory day of the atomism. It is
not only characteristic of living systems, but of all complex atomistic
systems which conduct a great deal of action internally.
Such interior actions are not immune from physical law. It is just that a great
deal of time-delayed fluid and chemical processes take place among another
hierarchical nesting of smaller atomistic participants (e.g., cells in the living
organism, or molecular clusters in the living cell).
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However, over the factory day, instead of movement and change solely by
external momentum, what emerges is a matrix of action modes, those
characteristic actions which the atomistic participants perform:




For living systems, they are psychological actions, partially internalized,
partially externalized, as well as physiological actions.
For mammals, they number perhaps nine; for humans perhaps 20.
For long-lived species, most of the action modes are discharged over the
geophysical day (for the individual, not the species).

Thus, there is a social physics possible for a social group of such individuals
from the daily scale on up. Since the human is tied to a complex ecological
web, action is more nearly complete in a societal physics for the geophysical
scale of the year.
But if the conservation of population is to be invoked as a constraining
conservation for the species (when the species is the ensemble, rather than a
group), the social physics at the generation time is the first minimum scale for
physical equilibrium for the species. Note at this scale, the individual’s actions
are hardly to be detected anymore. Instead, the historical process, stripped of
individuals, emerges.
5. The science of ensemble physics relates to -- and only to -- the quantities that
are conserved upon interactions. Thus, individual-to-individual interactions are
described by kinetics relating to these conservations. Motion and change in an
atomistic ensemble are described by summing up these kinetic interactions,
within a statistical mechanics, to produce a continuum-like thermodynamic
description of the ensemble’s motion.
That continuum-like description has three facets, all relating to the
conservations.
First, as a result of continuing interactions throughout the ensemble of atomistic
participants, the conserved quantities are partitioned (shared) among all the
participants to produce what is known as the statistical distribution functions of
the ensemble. These are statements about how matter (density), momentum (or
action) and energy (e.g., kinetic energy) are each distributed throughout the
space (or in any local region).
Second, the statistical measures of these three conservations are related. These
related measures form the equation of state of the ensemble. That equation
expresses how ensemble average measures (macroscopic variables) of the
essential conservations are related.
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Such an equation holds both if the entire ensemble, in all of its regional extent,
are contiguously in equilibrium, or only near equilibrium. (At equilibrium, for
example, they will share the same kinetic energy measure and momentum
measure.)
Third, if the ensemble is only near equilibrium, then there will be equations of
change which will express fluxes (flows) and transports or diffusions of the
conserved variables between regions of the field.
6. These equation sets, equation of state, equations of change, the existence of
underlying atomistic participants, and boundary conditions that are constraints
put on the field, complete the construct of physics for field ensembles. The
boundary conditions generally are potentials (storage bins) from which sources
for the various conservations may be drawn.
7. These two sets of equations are applied to a field, e.g., a social field, in the
following sense:
 First, having identified the basic atomisms (e.g., molecules, or in this
case people), there is a minimum space and time scale at which such
near continuum descriptions hold. For example, one certainly
aggregates atomistic performance over the earth’s day rather than being
concerned with momentary postures of the individual (the action mode
matrix is largely completed in a day). And one aggregates over the local
community in which daily activities are performed.
 Second, there is a maximum space and time scale for which the field
results are intended. For example, if civilizations and Man’s
evolutionary history of civilizations are of concern, then the time scale
likely has to be as extensive as Man’s 40,000-year history, and the entire
continental surface of the earth becomes the spatial field.
 Thus, the range: a day to 40,000 years, a few acres to the earth’s land
surface, defines the bounds of concern. Within those bounds, there will
be an extensive spectrum of effects. Given external large-scale causality
for such spectral domains, the equation sets can be conceptually or
actually applied to those domains.
The following temporal domains furnish natural divisions in the social process:


The social process of the day (dominated by earth’s day-night rotational
variation, it is marked within the chemical encoding of most biological
organisms).
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The social process of the year (dominated by the seasonal variation, the
ecological web by which all higher species depend for material and
energy supply is entrained in that periodic process).
The social process of the generation (each species has a generation time
scale, associated with its chemical genetic code).
The social process of the life span (the life span, differing from the
generation time or the life expectancy, e.g., 90 years for humans, marks
a period over which the likelihood of any survivors on the social scene
is essentially negligible. All social continuity then has to depend upon
some form of information and memory transmission). These scales are
clearly physically – chemically – biologically determined, ones over
which the atomistic species has no control. They are exogenous to the
social field process. The same is true for the following scales, but the
theory and database are more controversial or speculative.
The social process associated with a cultural life span. We would argue
that this is of the order of 500 years. It is the scale at which a small isolate
culture can maintain coherence, i.e., the scale of which it can retain a
founder figure myth and transmit its cultural epigenetic (ed.- relating to
or arising from nongenetic influences on gene expression) heritage
generation to generation without an extensive recorded abstract
language.
We made an a priori estimate of the number of generations (about
twenty) for which reliable information transmission might be expected.
Then we found confirmation of that estimate in Murdock’s Ethnographic
Atlas, which suggests that cultural independence exists for a small group
if it has been separated either a few hundred miles or a thousand years
from neighboring groups.
The fact that comparative civilizationalists (e.g., Mencius’s estimate,
and more modern estimates, such as Blegen’s dissection of the levels of
Troy, or Melko’s estimates) typically identify a scale of about 300 – 500
years for civilization even in complex social systems, is added evidence
for the intrinsic nature of the information transmission process time
scale.
What the numerical result implies is that there is a great deal of linear
independence in the cultural process, in which it remains coherent and
only diffuses slowly with such long-time constants even in the presence
of other groups in a coupled interacting ecumene.
Ethnicity, for example, simply does not disappear in a few generations.
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Even more speculative is a time scale of the order of a few millennia. Over this
scale, as the process time for a number of “independent” cultural waves to cross
a large land mass (diffusional time scales are of the order of one mile per year;
thus, in a few thousand years, the chance of a number of diffusions and
refractions to have taken place increases), one may expect reformations of social
strategies, changes in the character of the epigenetic value potential, to have
taken place.
Such a process scale would not exist among stimulus-bound animals, nor even
the higher primates. One would have to associate it with the extra interneuronal
capacity that developed with Pleistocene cortical evolution, and likely with the
increased unstabilizing lateralization in the human brain (4).

The appearance of the extensive epigenetic value potential in the human brain makes
that brain more unstable, not so tightly bound in its decision making. This is associated
with the characteristics usually identified as “free will.”
Nevertheless, a successful system’s life, in a physical sense, must have a program for
persistence of action, for survival. If it is not preprogrammed, that program has to
consist of a strategy. In time the strategy (human strategy) may become stereotyped
(Aristotle illustrates a first effort to count the types of political systems), but it has not
yet become so.
Thus, one may seek a scale, an intellectual scale, at which strategies are reformed.
Obviously, the individual and the individual culture are engaged constantly in defining
such a process. But is there a supra-cultural time scale?
We suggest that such change occurs at the few millennia time scale. Why? It is a
property of nonlinear decision making.
McCulloch, for example, illustrated why the briefest reaction moment of the individual
organism is made up of about three response units, e.g., 0.1 second to determine
position, 0.1 second to determine velocity, and 0.1 second to determine acceleration.
Or another example – it has been shown that business activity has a fluctuation time
scale of the order of three years. (See, for example, Dewey Cycles.) One can conjecture
that investment and business activity decisions require a minimum observation of the
yearly balance, but that – as before – 3 to 4 units of independent binary decision units
(e.g., yes-no) have to pass before a decision can be entrained by the nonlinear discrete
brain process.
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When it comes to social change, through cultures, an ecumene cannot change its outlook
until a number of cultural changes have been observed. In any case, we realize that
these longer scales may very well be speculative.
However, the equation sets would apply to each spectral domain, starting from the
shortest scale unit and integrating (or aggregating) up to the next unit scale.
Summarizing, as applied to living systems, the following conservations are involved in
making up relevant equation sets:






energy flow (e.g., the daily caloric expenditure, roughly 2,000 kcal/day for Man
matter (loosely speaking, the conservation in the adult of the carbohydrate, fat,
protein, minerals, ions, water content of the organism)
action modes (the factory day budget of actions – energy-time product – that are
characteristic of the species; e.g., among mammals, such behavior modes are noted
(as) ingestive, eliminative, sexual, care-giving, care-soliciting, conflict, imitative,
shelter-seeking, investigatory behavior; in humans, perhaps twenty modes are
noted)
population (for systems that grow, live, and die, conservation of the species
requires that invariably generation begets generation)

The following potentials (storage bins) are involved, as boundary conditions:






temperature (the solar flux, interacting with earth’s atmosphere, produces a
temperature range that supports life and its ecological web)
chemical potential (the earth, as substrate and depot, provides both materials, e.g.,
foodstuffs for building materials, and energy, e.g., foodstuffs that produce energy
by chemical reaction)
genetic potential (an internal chemical potential, carefully carried from generation
to generation by germ cells in the form of a specific hereditary molecule DNA)
geographic potential (the lithosphere, hydrosphere, atmosphere -- are available as
substrate and surround to support life processes)
epigenetic potential (another internal potential, emergent from the commandcontrol system of living organisms, which furnish various competences for action,
such as memory; in higher mammals, value systems)

The general character of physical law is largely contained in the statement that potential
gradients drive fluxes. This is almost tautological because the potentials are storage
bins for the flux quantities. The physics becomes interesting in how potentials come
into being.
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The Construct Specialized for Man

Very little has to be added to this construct to extend it to Man, except for some
modifications and additions to the conservations and potentials.
First, for example, retreating to Man’s Plio-Pleistocene hominid ancestors, one finds an
enlargement of their epigenetic potential. They obviously begin to extend their
mammalian and primate memory system to where it can be transmitted as an epigenetic
heritage from generation to generation.
We surmise that that “freedom” included a growth in value systems as part of the
epigenetic heritage. It is fair to say that a new internalized potential emerged within
that hominid brain, a technological rate potential. (Tools are found before modern
Man’s cultures.)
This potential is represented by the capability of each generation to add additional tool
making complexity to the epigenetic heritage. The technological capability is likely
best measured by the amplification in power-handling capability of the individual.
As far as we can tell, for the period of such tool evolution, e.g., perhaps two or more
million years, that technological rate of increase has been linear for Man’s hominid
ancestors. Each generation (e.g., measured in hundred to thousand generation units)
could make an equal increment change in tool complexity.
We base that assertion on crudely estimating the gain in power-handling capability of
the various evolutionary tool assemblages that have been identified with the past few
million years (e.g., eoliths, hand axes, flakes, microtools).
We assert that the technological rate potential is new and independent of the epigenetic
potential because it represents a new form of abstraction, beyond memory transmission,
and because an epigenetic heritage can be imagined independent of a changing
technology.
However, the social life that emerges for those higher primate hominids hardly differs
in general character from that of other higher species, e.g., mammals, primates. One
surmises that one major difference, as these pre-prehensile, facile upright species
gradually transformed from predominantly frugivore gatherers to omnivore huntergatherers, is a band organization of camps with a considerable division of labor, rather
than the more common pecking order organization of these other species.
Yet among primate organization, the gross social organization of hominids does not
appear to be unusually different (5).
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So now we turn to modern Man of the past 40,000 to 50,000 years. Whether the species
Homo sapiens (who appeared then) and homo sapiens neanderthalensis (who
disappeared at about that time) were members of the same breeding pool, or the same
species, is not really known. Some significant anatomical features make them different,
and there is a sharp difference in what has been identified with the characteristics of
culture.
We take the position that on the criteria of handedness (4), change in speech capability
(6), the distinctive change in tool-making that marks middle Paleolithic assemblages,
and the appearance of abstract artifacts and symbolic art forms, as well as evidence for
magico-religious social practices, such evidence points to association of these
characteristics with a new species or breed, the current human species. This new species
seems capable of all of performance of current Man, speech at neural rates, abstraction,
a much more rapid rate of technological development, in short —human culture.
Thus, we start our boundary conditions from that new species, modern Man, emergent
about 40,000 years ago with new tool assemblages and a richer technological potential
(a higher rate of change). The species begins as a highly competent hunter-gatherer.
Evidence exists that within the subsequent 10,000 - 20,000 years, the species is spread
lightly through all continents (7) except possibly the Americas, to which the species
cross likely in more than one wave, with few reliable datings earlier than 10,000 to
15,000 years before the present. Its highest latitudes are up into the northern tundra.
The question is why does a discontinuous change in social characteristics of that species
take place, wherein it is subsequently found highly precipitated into place and organized
into what is called civilization? The only potentials and fluxes available are the ones
we have named.
We can ask two questions. One, are there any analogous changes or forms known in the
biological kingdom? And two, what sort of physical process does the change suggest?
As to the former question, it is possible to analogize with regard to the plant kingdom
wherein there are mobile phases of existence and finally a fixed existence, but much of
that is related to the different way the woody plant is tied to its chemical potentials and
the different time scale for its metabolism. Thus, many more have been attracted by the
social insects who seem well organized into physical forms in place.
There is little doubt that this metaphor has inspired the creator (8) and many of the
proponents of sociobiology. However, the metaphor is still far-fetched because of the
fact that most of the behavior of those species are stimulus-bound and limited in central
nervous system capacity.
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The characteristics we seek are much more to be associated with the physical freeing of
the central nervous systems of higher animals (9), which because of its increased interneuronal richness becomes increasingly less bound in its behavior, with increasing
computational and storage capability, and in the case of the Pleistocene hominids
explosive in its growth in cortical capacity.
The contrary problem is thus created. On what sort of behavioral program should such
freedom, particularly an abstract high-speed linguistic capability, light upon? From a
biological and a physical point of view, that strikes us as the central question.
The very clear physical answer that this question foreshadows is that the problem of
human social evolution is a matter of dynamic stability, one in which a transition takes
place from one type of field process operation to another.
Ever since pioneering work in elastic stability by Euler (e.g., the buckling of a column),
in hydrodynamics by Reynolds (transition from laminar to turbulent flow), in
mechanical orbits by Poincaré and Lyapounov, the subject of mechanistic stability has
flourished, and it has been realized that the problem is associated with nonlinear
dissipative processes. Recent conferences (10, 11) have assembled a large amount of
material on the generality of the problem. We have offered a prior conjecture on its
application to the social transition problem (12).
The problem we confront here is to try to explain the process in terms that social
scientists may be willing to accept.
III.

The Transition Process Toward Civilization

It is clear from what we have said that the beginning epoch of modern Man, 40,000 to
30,000 years ago, say, was represented by a style of life not much different from earlier
hominid species or, except for the particular band characteristics (2), much different
from many other modern primate species. This is true even though specific human
cultural artifacts can be found.
What was that style of life, particularly as described in a physical sense?
Even before knowledge was available as to a possible progression of species, it had
become feasible to distinguish a difference between Paleolithic, Mesolithic, and
Neolithic tool assemblages, and in the Paleolithic, upper, middle, and lower periods.
We, of course, are concerned with human transitions, and so we can speak – in an
ergodic sense – with some authority for human processes of thought (we are human).
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But to the modest extent that we wish to invoke a particular thought process, we can
surmise it to hold for Man’s tool-using ancestors.
In particular, we surmise that evolution of tools is simply not a process that follows
automatically upon the thought process, but that in general, there are perceived needs
and the hominid brain – dealing in abstraction – creates tools as abstractions and their
modifications to deal with those needs.
Note -- Animals can distinguish self and other than self. That is, they possess such
world images. Recent work, on recognizing self in mirrors and as objects of
manipulation, have begun to clarify the existence of graded differences among higher
apes. Thus, evidence is building up for the graded difference in abstraction abilities
among primates.
Nevertheless, it is still one further step of abstraction when a hominid primate began to
incorporate an epigenetic heritage of tool-using into his regular existence. A tool is
neither self nor outer world, but an object which can be precisely manipulated between
self and outer world to affect motor and sensory competences. That triangular
relationship is an abstraction.
But the continued evolution of such tools has to follow additionally perceived needs.
Nevertheless, while an epigenetic heritage can exist, it may exist within a “traditional”
culture without change in tool-making. Thus, clearly there was social pressure to evolve
tools. At the present we can only infer the character of the pressure from the direction
that the tool types took, and a possible relation to the changing climatic-geographic
potentials.
We can quickly jump to the lower Paleolithic hand axe which emerged in the midPleistocene. This tool type is basically associated with Homo erectus, and it was the
leading tool over an immense period of time for much of the territory in which that
species has been found.
Perhaps this was 500,000 to 100,000 years before the present, not as far north as modern
Man but up to the northern-most latitudes of the Black and Caspian Seas in Eurasia –
but not east of India – and Africa (13) (14). Tool evolution existed over that immense
period, but it was not exceptionally rapid.
This brings us to the Middle Paleolithic traditions which emerged in the late
Pleistocene. This epoch is basically associated with Neanderthal Man, or Homo sapiens
neanderthalensis. (By being so designated, it is increasingly considered to be an early
subspecies, likely largely extinct, which preceded the current subspecies Homo sapiens
sapiens.)
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That subspecies of hominid, e.g., associated with Mousterian and Levalloisian tool
traditions, was dominant over the period 100,000 to 50,000 years before the present,
and it has been found even further north in Eurasia (15). A change in tool evolution is
usually found, marked by a predominance of flint tools based on the production of
flakes. Instead of producing one tool from a large core, a diversity of implements could
be produced by continued flaking of small pieces from such a core. That tool technique
was widely diffused throughout the hand axe province. Although the time scale of
change is much more rapid, the changing industries are not precipitous. However, the
database available and the scatter in type of tool is still not extensive enough that
detailing at the level of a few millennia at a time can be done.
The important characteristic of that type of tool change (advance in the tool-making rate
potential) was that it accompanied (and perhaps made possible) a significant extension
of the range of human settlement to colder climes, and it accompanied an extension of
the hunting-gathering capability of the hominid species.
Can we not jump immediately, then, to modern Man, a new subspecies who somehow
may have lived contemporaneous with Neanderthal for some overlapping period, but
then proceeded by some unknown legerdemain to have knocked out Neanderthal’s
sharing or competing for the same niche, by virtue, perhaps, of superior hunting and
killing tools? That is a common impression left in popular archeological literature.
However, some recent stories, relevant to civilizational startup, is bringing more
perplexing detail to the transition; in other words, a sharper picture of the transition to
civilization requires greater detailing in all occupied earth regions for a lower
Paleolithic 250,000 to 100,000 years before the present, and a middle Paleolithic
100,000 to 30,000 years before the present period, including detailing of ecological
conditions.
A case in point is the Nile valley history (16). History and evolution there were
dominated by climate, just as in the northern Eurasian development. For example, we
may start by noting that the area had a drought from about 500,000 to about 120,000
years before the present.
Eolithic (ed. - relating to or denoting a period at the beginning of the Stone Age,
preceding the Paleolithic and characterized by the earliest crude stone tools) tools are
found in the Nile valley.
They have a lower Pleistocene date of about 700,000 years before the present,
associated with a rainy period. Dating to about 500,000 years before the present, hand
axe traditions are found. One can conceive (as pure speculation) that the hominid path
of diffusion, of population, of tool making, might have spread through the Nile valley
from southern and eastern Africa to the Near East in an earlier period.
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It appears that with the end of the drought and the beginning of a new pluvial age, the
Abbassian (lasting from 120,000 to 90,000 years before the present), the late Acheulean
(hand axe) hominids spread from the limited oases more broadly into the former desert
wastes in search of large grazing animals.
We will here make the point that each time such weather changes have taken place, e.g.,
with the later withdrawal of the glaciers in Europe about 10,000 to 12,000 years before
the present, both plants and grazing animals disperse as more broadly wetter regions
appear, and tool-using hominids are forced by necessity to adapt their food searching
style.
What is interesting about this instance, earlier than the one we previously discussed, is
that it indicates the pressure on an earlier tool-using hominid to find related solutions
and make some sort of lifestyle transition.
The hominids that were involved were those making a transition between Homo erectus
and Homo sapiens neanderthalensis. One begins to find some of the earliest evidence
of house-like structures. The suggestion is that these Acheuleans ventured seasonally
into the open grasslands and retreated to permanent watering holes during the dry
season.
The Abbassian pluvial was followed by drying desert conditions in the entire Sahara.
The Neanderthals took refuge in the great oases of the Nile valley. At about this time,
that species of Homo began to exhibit the Levalloisian tool-flaking tradition in Africa
as well as Europe. One type of tool that may have been of revolutionary importance in
hunting efficiency was the stone projectile point. This could be hafted to wooden shafts
to make a hunting spear far superior to the fire-hardened wooden spear used earlier. Just
as in northern climates, these flakes could be used as scrapers to prepare furs for
clothing.
One senses that each such technological advance, made out of necessity for a particular
climatic era, then had a capability of flowering in a subsequent age if the climatic
changes were suited.
Thus, the Mousterian pluvial, a period from 50,000 to 30,000 years before the present,
was ushered into the Sahara, much lusher than the earlier pluvial. The Neanderthals
colonized every available niche in North Africa (just as they were spread across
Eurasia). Rooted in this culture one finds the Aterian Industry, viewed as being
contemporaneous with middle Paleolithic cultures in Europe, dating back to over
40,000 years before the present, with a demise just under 30,000 years before the
present.
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This interpretation is new. It demonstrates a slow but fairly continuous development of
middle Paleolithic to upper Paleolithic culture. While the Aterians (who are likely
Homo sapiens sapiens) had a somewhat superior tool assemblage to the Mousterians, it
seems that they coexisted in a cultural mosaic during much of the Mousterian pluvial.
“The side-by-side persistence of strikingly different technological and possibly cultural
(?) traditions is not unique to this period in Egypt but, as we shall see, characterizes the
late Paleolithic sequence in the Kom Ombo Plain in southern Upper Egypt and probably
continued through predynastic times to be echoed in Dynastic traditions of the cultural
duality of Upper and Lower Egypt.” (16)
This seems to be an example of the kind of prehistory revisionism in progress. An earlier
example in the mid-60s was the work of the Binfords on Mousterian settlement
traditions. A great deal of overlapping cultural diversity existed on the savannas and
oases of Middle Paleolithic northeastern Africa.
We cannot attempt to develop (or master or wait for) the discovery of all the detail that
refers to this and other areas. A few references that enrich these stories is contained in
References 17 through 33. But the basic need thus is to begin to trace the story of
change and transition between, say, 30,000 years before the present – 2,000 years at a
time, down to 4,000 years before the present, when the historical period is safely in
hand.
The boundary conditions are likely the historical period of evolution of modern man
40,000 to 30,000 years before the present related to the climate of that period (e.g.,
glaciated in northern Eurasia, pluvial in Northern Africa), the diffusion of that species
and the tool assemblages, and the ecology available for support of a human cultural life.
Then the question is to what extent can regional predictions be made.
It would be one of our key theses that the basic relaxation process, by two millennia
segments, would be a changing perception of how to conduct a life style.
That may be. The problem we face here is to offer some sort of physical theory for the
transition that took place in that time slot, say 30,000 to 4,000 years before the present,
and related to the operational boundary conditions 40,000 to 30,000 years before the
present, given the conservations, their fluxes, and the potentials we have named.
It is clear that the transitions we are concerned with are phase transitions, transitions
like the condensation of matter from gas to liquid to solid phases. First, how would we
describe Man the earlier hunter-gatherer? Similar to most other mammalian species,
Man operated in a hunting range, appropriate to his size and metabolism (there being
moderate differences in such ranges for carnivores and frugivores). At slow rates, he
diffused over a wide habitat.
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Climatic conditions, and thereby ecological conditions, in the main, governed that
diffusive habitat. All this constitutes essentially straight-forward biological-ecological
results.
Physically that motion, with its near isolation, e.g., typical band separations on large
land masses was of the order of 70 – 100 miles, can be considered to be nearly gas-like
motion, a two-dimensional gas. Its mean free path was of the order of one roaming
range, e.g., 25 miles; its relaxation time was of the order of one generation, e.g., 25
years. That is, its propagation speed was of the order of one mile per year (34).
“Information” (cultural information) could hardly be propagated at higher speed.
But note that low potentials of temperature and water and food would always cause
condensation. A note on this is desirable.
One might think that diversity of form and complexity is associated with high energy.
This is not the case. At high energy, e.g., high kinetic energy, systems move toward a
gaseous phase. All low energy bonds are broken. Remaining degrees of freedom of
motion are each equally endowed (equipartitioning) with energy. It is only at low
temperature (low kinetic energy), as Einstein showed for the specific heat of matter at
low temperature, that the same energy has to make do for many ordered configurations.
There is a cooperative phenomenon which takes place; order is imposed, authority is
established. Thus, matter condensation, e.g., liquid and solid states, always exhibit
more diversity and complexity of order than does the gaseous state.
All species will respond to a poverty of potentials by some sort of condensation, in
extreme cases in very great changes in sociochemical form. In each case, it is the
internal potentials, e.g., genetic, that will select the condensation path. Hominids, with
an additional epigenetic and tool-making potential, have always adapted by means of
all three potentials.
The very nature of extreme climatic changes puts the major action in the Northern
temperate zone in Eurasia, from northern tundra limits (dominated by the Scandinavian
ice sheet), and Northern Africa, just as at a later date – when Man enters the Americas
– another play takes place in that continental mass.
In the African case, it is the alternation of wet and dry which drives Man toward oases
and toward dispersals. Likely as a universal theme, the more promising condensations
are driven toward river valleys, and certainly invariably to search for reliable water
supplies. Of all the chemical potentials, oxygen and then water are the most pressing
(followed by temperature).
But the nature of the condensation depends on the state of the technological potential.
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What the new Egyptian story indicates is that the potential for significant condensation
already exists in the Neanderthal-modern Man transitional period. The adaption, by
necessity, of the wide variety of mid-Paleolithic tool industries is indicative of such
capability.
What can come out of these two driving potentials – change in water potential, change
in technological potential? Either cleverer adaption of tools and modes of living (and
there is ample evidence around the earth for those processes), or condensation in place.
This is via domestication:




domestication of plant and animal, and
later water resource, and still later
all required resources—the status we are seeking now.

Thus, we would submit, that with these two changing potentials, it is only a matter of
time and place for condensation to fixed agriculture to occur, as a liquid-like
condensation.
We believe critical detailed study could establish much more precisely criteria for such
transition, and when or where it might have occurred (35). In Europe, it relates to the
end of the glacial age 10,000 years before the present. In Northern Africa, to the 8,000
(rather, 8,000 – 7,000) to 4,500 pluvial age. In both cases, the new condensation related
to changed water supplies and the existing technology.
But the empirical data seem to foreshadow the theoretical result. The process of
transition is (a) neither so difficult to occur, nor (b) so guaranteed to be lasting.
Note that all that is required is Man to adapt his action modes of behavior to the species
he wishes to domesticate, and to put some selection pressure on the species to adapt
toward his action modes. Such symbioses are very common in the biological world, so
it was hardly a novel invention. An epigenetic memory of time and place and sequential
ordering is quite useful. But these are the attributes that Man had, so that the adaption
process did not have to take the more usual million-year genetic scale of species.
Rather, it could be a facilitated diffusion speeded up a thousand-fold to thousand-year
scaling. That is the difference between the genetic and the epigenetic process.
So, near self-sufficient agriculture could emerge in the Nile valley, in the TigrisEuphrates valley, in the Americas, elsewhere in Africa, in the Asian steppes (and be
given up), in the Indus valley, in China. Were these all independent, or diffusively
propagated? That requires expert detailed study. Some were independent, others
derivative. For example, the diffusive spread of agriculture over Europe at the
millennial scale has been carefully documented (36).
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The emergence of a settled life and a dependence on cultivation is as extensive as the
period of perhaps 20,000 to 10,000 years before the present. Without a great deal of
local specificity, there is no reason to expect any lesser period of transition, and one
would expect only very spotty beginnings.
Therefore, it is no surprise that a significant threshold for the startup of agriculture is
given by about 10,000 years before the present (35) and associated with major changes
in water potential:





In the Eurasian region, one would associate it with the withdrawal of the glaciers
(end of the last ice age), dated loosely 12,000 to 10,000 years before the present,
and the dispersion of melting front, grasses, grazers, predators, toward new
“permanent” water supplies – river valleys, well-watered mountain flanks,
lakes, and springs.
In Africa, one would associate it with concomitant wet-dry periods with
condensation and radiation forces toward more permanent water supplies.
In the Americas, with a time delay to master the land, we can see multiple starts
at a later date.

Thus, the self-sufficient agricultural village, located strategically with regard to water
supplies, became a new feature of the earth’s social landscape for Man, interspersed in
some regions mosaic-like with hunter-gatherers.
In general, what one appears to see prior to civilization is a deterioration of
environmental conditions, pressure for technological innovation, regionalization of
social groups, a mosaic of cultural types (sympatric societies – various cultures
occupying roughly the same niche, by basically using different tool traditions, and with
modest separation, i.e., latent condensations).
Now, in a physical context, one would say that:
(1) two or more atomistic type fluid-like assemblages coexist in the field – solvent or
solute (?)
(2) in which one kind of precipitated-out group (already condensed, or nearly
condensed) will
(3) take over the superior social role and
(4) force the other groups either into opposition,
(5) or, dispersal (unlikely),
(6) or, absorb them into the condensation.
Therefore,
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This occurred, hypothetically, as the Mousterian – Cro-Magnon transition (that
is, 50,000 to 40,000 years before the present);
In the hunter-gatherer – agriculturist transition (that is, 20,000 to 10,000 years
before the present);
It may have happened in various agriculturist – nomad transitions either way;
It may have occurred in the Acheulean – Mousterian transition (likely a Homo
– Homo transition); or
Even in the eolithic – Acheulean transition (still an X-Homo transition, as far
as the certain record of hominid types is concerned); and
It occurred in the agriculturalist – civilizational transition (e.g., 8,000 to 5,000
years before the present).
Civilization, a Second Transition – Appearance of a New Conservation

Given these two possible social forms – hunter-gatherer, agricultural village settlement
(and also, forest efficiencies and pastoralist nomads), why is there any need for any
further transitions? There is obviously pressure for continuing evolution of agriculturalbased technology, as well as dwellings, clothing, further domestication. But why any
further transitions? Are there needs that dominate?
Such condensations, although they are liquid-like, that is no longer with 70 to 100 miles
separations, are not all located in a perfect strategic manner. The greater permanence
of food supply, with agriculture, instead of mobile hunter-gatherer, permits an
appreciable growth or accretion in population and population density. Their separation
is reduced to less than roaming range size, i.e., less than 25-mile separation. But now,
again, mutual needs – for materials, for breeding population, for alliances against
human predation, for security from climatic vicissitudes – all make some form of
trading intercourse necessary. Since the settlement is fixed, and the materials of trade
have to be carried, a fluid-like flow process known as convection is involved.
It is a remarkable consequence of physical interaction that, in an interacting field, there
are only three types of field processes – diffusive, wave propagative, and convective.
The first two are linear, the third is non-linear. It is marked by the product of the field
carrier’s variable, e.g., velocity, and that which is carried, e.g., energy, momentum,
matter, population, action.
In mathematical physical theory, there is an interesting consequence of having the
combination of nonlinear and dissipative processes: The diffusions involve energy
dissipation. What that means is not disappearance of energy, which is a conservation,
but its dispersion, thermodynamically, among various participants. New singular states
of motion may arise, as stability transitions (10, 11).
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Notice that this does not involve a new matter condensation – after all the settlements
have already provided condensation – but a new social format for movement and change
throughout the field. The question is how shall the human social process respond to
such new social pressure?
One must dwell on the requirement for social cohesion in any population center. People
must recognize each other and have a basis for social bonding. This is represented
within the agricultural village and it probably limits the size to less than 500, a rough
count of the number of faces that can be recognized (37).
Primate social ordering— see Eisenberg (5)— or the more specialized hominid band
formation (2) suggest the “traditional” kinds of village leadership that may emerge, and
the variety of possible dependences on kinship and hereditary and appointed
occupations arising or developing from a division of labor (for further, see Murdock
(38)).
But now with convective fluid forces, there is pressure to permit the foreigner in for
trade. Diffusion coefficients still prevail to govern conductances (a tautological
statement), but they are now facilitated diffusions. For those familiar with
hydrodynamic and engineering fluid mechanical concepts, these diffusions are no
longer molecular diffusions (that is, person-to-person Brownian motion, per Einstein)
but eddy diffusions. They are carried by the field fluxes, not by the individual
atomisms.
We will now make the required connection to the central theme.
What is the essential nature of civilization? As we heard the themes in the 1979 ISCSC
session on origins of civilization, it is a source of argument whether religion, or
agriculture, or urban settlement, or trade, or literacy, or recorded tradition, etc., is the
essential causal ingredient for civilization.
Let us go to the dictionary for what is the common ingredient involved in civilization.
It appears to be the notion of civitas – the existence of a formal set of objective rules
that clearly set forth to the onlooker, whether insider or outsider, what the relations are
that govern hierarchical, heterarchical, or stratified class members that are permitted
physical access to the society; e.g., ruler-citizen, master-slave, citizen-citizen, or
citizen-outsider. It is rules of civil organization.
Believe it or not, that set of formal constraints, as “political” – flow of authority, for
example, see Lasswell (39) – constraints, determines the impedances or conductances
(diffusions) to flow. Diffusions are no longer solely physically determined, but they
are facilitated or impeded by Man-made law.
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It is quite interesting that, with written language going back to perhaps 5,000 to 5,500
years before the present, very largely recording person-to-person transactions (or
extolling the deeds of ruler elites), that by about 4,200 to 3,700 years before the present,
we find the first recorded codes governing largely class relations in the urban city-state.
These clearly emerge as an equipollent (equal in power or significance -- ed.) or
heterarchical (system of organization in which the elements are unranked or may be
ranked in various ways -- ed.) element in the rise of empires (ensembles) of city-states.
It would be very impressive to push such city-state codes back another millennium, or
even more impressive – in sharpness of transition – if such codes were found “recorded”
(instead of simply implied) for the period of about 8,000 years before the present (or, at
the outside, 10,000 years before the present), but we have to allow the possibility of a
number of two millennia relaxations for Man to make such drastic transitions.
At the present, we cannot offer any greater precision in social scaling. An agricultural
(effective) startup of 10,000 years before the present could not be accompanied by
further hydrodynamic stability transitions in fewer than a few such relaxations.
How is such rationalization effected? (Rationalization: the creation of bureaucratic
institutionalized forms by which human actions are regulated, e.g., laws.) It obviously
involves abstractions, a functional performance which can be spewed out of the human
mind with great ease. But how to endow it so that it has…value!!
Clearly, Man, as Man, with cultural symbols from his beginning (even with indications
of their beginnings in Neanderthalers), could accept, in fact had to accept, value
systems. Why “had to”? Because of the new freedom of abstraction in the brain, which
would permit him both to time delay and form arbitrary “linguistic” associations.
Magico-religion became one such value system – e.g., shaman and totem and taboo,
and ritual. But clearly agricultural systems and later urban systems required much more
complex totems. It is hardly accidental that ziggurats in the Tigris – Euphrates mark
some of the earliest structures in that urban explosion, or the probable evidence of
religious formalism in Catal Huyuk.
So, certainly a particular explicit form (structurally institutionalized religion) emerges
quite early in civilizational interaction. Clearly now civilizational interaction begins
when there is extensive convection of trade among population concentration (urban)
centers. They would be marked by populations greater than 500; e.g., composite groups
in which appreciably more than a threshold of perhaps 2,500 persons were involved.
The latter number was estimated from a cut off of complex cultures of about this size
in Murdock (38).
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But that convective interaction involves stranger and insider. It can no longer be
governed by established tradition (an oral heritage accepted by all internal parties, as in
the family, or in the local isolated village). Thus, an objective symbolism must be
invented. Using what? Using the intensive store of epigenetic value, but now
externalized into value-in-trade, a symbolic form invented out of mind and endowed
with value for all transactions. All other real conservations can be traded for using this
idealistic conservation.
The basic rule is that in each transaction, “equal” value is traded (by whatever defines
equality of value at the moment). Thus, the economic conservation is invented, comes
into being out of mind. With it arises a pricing system. And with it arises also the utter
terror of inflation, a runaway value system. As Pareto explained (40), it is all right for
society to pull the rug under its value-in-trade system as long as the next generation of
players is not discouraged from play.
This hopefully introduces, by physical reasoning, the economic variable into a social
physics as one additional and final conservation.
V: A Note on the Death of Civilization
But an optimistic note that each adolescent generation brings anew to the social
experience, that this is the life, that the now of this lifetime is the only one that counts,
is doomed to failure. Why? Because the system is unstable, thermodynamically. The
“why” of that instability is a basic piece of physical reasoning.
The young diffuse into society, diffuse and bind into its nested hierarchical institutions
– family, neighborhood, local political community (now largely either urban or rural),
national political community, plus acquire an epigenetic heritage, and gradually take
the roles of the adults they displace and replace.
That turnover guarantees no new successes. The problems of the past are propagated,
new ones are added. The conservations that have to be satisfied remain the same, what
each generation does not learn is the total operational wisdom that the past generation
may have acquired. That seems to take a lifetime of perhaps 20 to 40 to 60 years to
learn something about.
In traditional societies, in which movement is slow (movement from outside), the old
can act as ambulatory memories on how things are best done. The integration of notions
of how to deal with complex social systems in which the convective currents (e.g., daily,
weekly, monthly, yearly, per generation) are large and constantly changing with
vicissitudes is not quickly learned. It is a limitation of the human mind.
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Most elite leaders are thrown into their basically abstract reasoning role in society with
less than twenty years of experience past their adolescent growth. Their reactions are
based on the biological motor-sensory responses of the moment. A political horizon of
six months to one year is and has been the most common characteristic of Man since
civilization began.
That turnover period is fine and fits the agricultural village or the hunger-gatherer
society to a T. In such societies, the only conservations that have to be satisfied are
materials, energy, and action modes. Some vague attention has to be paid by
ambulatory memories as to the reproductive balance; the biological action mode of
sexing itself is no issue. Each generation of young comes superbly prepared to quickly
learn the mode, if necessary by trial and error. So, the social action, if any, is to regulate
and control the issue of childbirth. Clearly, under these circumstances, the need for
longer range planning or information, of an abstract nature, can be left to a few –
leaders, elders, shamans, priests.
But face the issue in civilizations, with the continued influx of strangers and trade, and
the requirement for symbolic balance in trade, requires responsiveness to ever-changing
external conditions. Now one requires each youthful generation to develop a fantastic
amount of action capability to deal with a complex series of interactions. As usual, it
is not the populace who are concerned with the mastery of such operations but an “elite”
structure, if you will, a new “priesthood.” As usual, from the nature of command and
control systems, such operation is confined to an elite of a few percent of the population.
But they are not biological queen bees, endowed by some royal jelly with special
powers. They are ordinary human beings, the same youth as the more plebian followers.
As young priests of the market place—whether in feudal societies, or commercial, or
capitalistic, or communistic, or socialistic, or dictatorships, or anarchies – they cannot
and do not learn how to operate a complex society. That literally requires understanding
and controlling conservational balances for periods of the order of one to three
generations, the social equilibrium period.
In civilizations, that also involves high expectation of major wars per generation in the
ecumene. Civilizations, from their beginnings, involve alternations of trade and war.
The issue, further, is that not only must the elite leader understand how to strike all the
necessary balances for such periods, but he must convince the people, his followers, to
carry out the requirements so posed. Over one year he can do it; for three years (e.g.,
the political process), he can do it. But to impose the kind of rational regulation and
control required for longer periods, he cannot succeed. The political leader, and other
elites, can supply a schema for rationalization (the hallmark of civilization), but he
cannot succeed in supplying a schema for rationality.
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And so periodically, the overall mismanagement of the social system catches up with
itself and the system tumbles.
We have no real belief that we can make more than a handwaving estimate of that time
scale at this time, but it also seems to come out – by any reasonable theory – to be of
the order of 500 years. It takes perhaps twenty odd generations of elites before the
mismatch produces incoherence.
But the societal members and local institutions— e.g., family, local agricultural
community, are still designed for the year operation. So even when civilizations tumble,
or come apart, or reform, the local units largely survive intact and begin the task of
putting together a new form. And so, on it goes and has to go on for this biological
species.
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Readers: An Invitation to a Continuing Debate
Joseph Drew
For many years, the International Society for the Comparative Study of Civilizations
has debated a central conundrum: Can we even define “civilization?”
Background
The organization was created in 1961, with a conference held at Salzburg, Austria.
Scholars gathered there under the auspices of UNESCO for six days in October. Among
those present were Pitirim Sorokin and Arnold Toynbee. The topics included the
definition of the word “civilization,” problems in the analysis of complex cultures,
civilizational encounters in the past, the Orient vs. the Occident, problems of universal
history, theories of historiography, and the role of the social sciences and the humanities
in globalization.
But civilization was not a new word in 1961 nor was it a new topic.
Arnold Toynbee begins his magisterial work, A Study of History with a first chapter, at
least in the Somervell abridgement, entitled “The Unit of Historical Study.” He says
that British national history never has been, and almost certainly never will be, an
“intelligible field of historical study” in isolation; and “if that is true of Great Britain it
surely must be true of any other national state a fortiori.” He then goes on to argue that
one cannot study the city states of ancient Greece from 725 to 325 B.C. but rather the
whole of Hellenic Society as the field in order to understand the significance of the
various local histories. It is the same, he says, with the various small republics and
cities of Northern Italy during the Middle Ages and with the differentiation between the
national states of Europe in the Middle Ages and today.
So, he concludes: we must focus our attention upon the whole, because this whole is
the field of study that is intelligible by itself. Then, he asks: what are these “wholes” in
history? He finds most of Europe to be Western Christendom. And of the same species
today he finds the Orthodox Christian society of Southeastern Europe and Russia; an
Islamic Society, a Hindu Society, and a Far-Eastern Society. He then lists two sets of
fossilized relics of similar societies, ones which are now extinct. One of these is that of
the early Christians, Jews and Parsees; the second is Mahayana Buddhists of various
countries and the Jains of India. His conclusion, he writes, is that the intelligible unit
of historical study in neither a nation state nor mankind as a whole, but “a certain
grouping of humanity which we have called a society.”
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His next chapter is entitled “The Comparative Study of Civilizations.” He identifies 21
societies that he writes are in process of civilization. He cites G. Elliot Smith’s book
The Ancient Egyptians and the Origins of Civilization and W. H. Perry’s work The
Children of the Sun: A Study in the Early History of Civilization. To Toynbee, the
comparable units of history are civilizations.
Probably the most popular work of the modern period on the subject of civilizations is
Samuel Huntington’s The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order. His
book is divided into five sections:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

A World of Civilizations
The Shifting Balance of Civilizations
The Emerging Order of Civilizations
Clashes of Civilizations
The Future of Civilizations

One interesting aspect to me is that in his theory development section he alludes to
Thomas Kuhn’s great work The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. Kuhn shows that
science has advanced with the displacement of one explanatory paradigm by another
paradigm. The old one is not capable of explaining new facts, but the new paradigm
can account for those facts in a more satisfactory fashion.
Huntington sets forth how various paradigms—incompatible with each other and full
of deficiencies and limitations—have explained the modern world, the Cold War
paradigm in particular. With the end of the Cold War came many competing maps or
paradigms of world politics: the end of history thesis of Francis Fukuyama; Two
Worlds: Us and Them; 184 States, More or Less; and Sheer Chaos.
But, says Huntington, viewing the world in terms of seven or eight civilizations avoids
many of the difficulties each poses and is more compatible with the other competing
theories than they are with each other. It sets forth a relatively simple map for
understanding what was going on in the world as the 20th century ended.
Huntington’s Chapter Two is entitled “Civilizations in History and Today.” He says
that “throughout history civilizations have provided the broadest identifications for
people.” He cites as the great students of civilization: Max Weber, Emile Durkheim,
Oswald Spengler, Pitirim Sorokin, Arnold Toynbee, Alfred Weber, A.L. Kroeber,
Philip Bagby, Carroll Quigley, William H. McNeill, Adda Bozeman, Immanuel
Wallerstein, and Felipe Fernandez-Armesto. Later he cites Matthew Melko, noting in
the back of the book that Dr. Melko’s work, The Nature of Civilizations is “an
indispensable summary overview and introduction to the analysis of civilizations.”
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You will notice that many, perhaps most of the individuals Huntington has listed who
were alive from 1961 onward have participated actively in the International Society for
the Comparative Study of Civilizations, an organization that persists to this day.
In Chapter Two, Huntington states that the idea of civilization was developed by 18th
century French thinkers as the opposite of the concept of “barbarism.” Civilized
society, he writes, differed from primitive society because it was settled, urban, and
literate. “To be civilized was good, to be uncivilized was bad.”
He discusses civilization versus culture, a topic that has been very popular among our
readers, noting that for Braudel, it is “a space, a ‘cultural area.’” In the chapter he makes
five arguments about civilization and then proceeds to list as major contemporary
civilizations ones he labels as the Sinic, Japanese, Hindu, Islamic, Orthodox, Western
Latin American, and African—this latter he defines as “possibly.”
In the Spring 2006 issue, Number 54, of the Comparative Civilizations Review, we
carried a fifty-page section called “Bibliographical History and Indices of the
Comparative Civilizations Review.” The section was authored by Michael PalenciaRoth, a former president. After a brief history, the index lists articles indexed by author;
book reviews, indexed by book’s author or editors; and book reviews, indexed by book
titles. Many of the names cited by Huntington are present in this index, either as
subjects of study themselves or as authors.
I often refer to a great collection, Theories of Society: Foundations of Modern
Sociological Theory. It was put together by Parsons, Shils, Naegele and Pitts.
Selections written by many of those mentioned by Huntington are in this book, as well.
A number of popular works have long addressed the meaning of “civilizations.” Here
are six such books:


One is “The Outline of History: The Whole Story of Man”, by H.G. Wells. I
count in the index 30 citations of civilizations; the third book in the outline is
entitled “The First Civilizations.”



Another is “The Story of Civilization” by Will Durant. Durant opens with six
chapters called “The Establishment of Civilization.” The titles are: The
Conditions of Civilization; The Economic Elements of Civilization; The
Political Elements of Civilization; The Moral Elements of Civilization; The
Mental Elements of Civilization; and The Prehistoric Beginnings of
Civilization. To Durant, civilization is a social order promoting cultural
creation.
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A popular scholarly set of books is “A History of Civilization” by Brinton,
Christopher, and Wolff. It slides over the definition, arguing only that man
moved from prehistory to history, and from a culture to a civilization, saying
only that the point at which a culture becomes a civilization is to some degree a
matter of individual opinion.



In his widely read book, “History of the World” J. M. Roberts wrote that
“Civilization is the name we give to the interaction of human beings in a very
creative way, when, as it were, a critical mass of cultural potential and a certain
surplus of resources have been built up. In civilization this releases human
capacities for development at quite a new level and in large measure the
development which follows is self-sustaining.” But, he says, this is somewhat
abstract and so he turns to examples.
He makes several arguments about what causes civilization and then states that
it is easier to say something generally true about the marks of early civilization
than about the way it happened. He concludes that thought: “Again, no absolute
and universal statements are plausible.”



Freud, in his monumental work “Civilization and Its Discontents” wrote that
civilization describes “the whole sum of the achievements and the regulations
which distinguish our lives from those of our animal ancestors and which serve
two purposes – namely to protect men against nature and to adjust their mutual
relations.” This is only problematic because the editor of the English version
simply writes in a footnote: ‘Kultur.’ Then he states, “For the translation of this
word see the Editor’s Note to The Future of an Illusion.”



Finally, we have “The Boundaries of Civilizations in Space and Time” by Matt
Melko and Leighton R. Scott. This work collects the results of discussions in
many sessions over the years of the topic at hand. A total of 56 individuals are
listed as participants. Matt identifies Oswald Spengler, Toynbee, and A. L.
Kroeber as initiators during the period following World War I but observes that
much criticism of the idea that civilizations followed certain courses rendered
the topic less central to academic discussion.
In Chapter Two of the book, Leighton R. Scott says that the “complication of
the subject” “guarantees no more than a measure of certainty and may indeed
inhibit realization or understanding of ultimate desiderata or objectives.”
Nevertheless, he writes, members of the ISCSC have been driven to evoke
whole definitions, theories replete with lists of “criteria” and disclosure of
“qualities.” The book then goes on for hundreds of pages discussing the subject.
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As a result of this interesting topic, and of the formation in 1961 of the International
Society for the Comparative Study of Civilizations, there have been over the years at
the annual meetings many sessions dealing with definitions of civilization and the
formulation of lists of them. Hot debates have marked many of them, but no definitive
conclusion has been reached. What we can say for certain is that the study of
civilizations has waxed and waned. Today, it is once more a major topic of public
discourse.
The Challenge
So, readers, the question before us is: Is it possible to define the word “civilization” in
English and in a way that the majority of scholars will accept it?
Please submit your answer and we will publish it in the Spring 2020 issue.
Thank you.
Joseph Drew
Editor-in-Chief
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FROM OUR AUTHORS
We are introducing here a special section dedicated to our member-authors and their
published works.
The editors of Comparative Civilizations Review extend an invitation to all who write
about the comparative study of civilizations and who would like a selection from their
work to be published in the journal to submit their copy to Peter Hecht, Managing
Editor, at peter.hecht@iscsc.org. The selection will be reviewed by the Editorial Board
and, upon acceptance, scheduled for publication as space becomes available.
The Sage, The Swordsman, and the Scholars
by Pierre Dimaculangan
This issue of Comparative Civilizations Review features an excerpt from a work by
Pierre Dimaculangan. Pierre is the author of several books. He has been a member of
the International Society for the Comparative Study of Civilizations for many years and
was named the 2014 International Society for the Comparative Study of Civilizations
“Outstanding Young Scholar” award winner at our annual meeting in Monmouth
University.
The Sage, The Swordsman and the Scholars: Trials of the Middle Kingdom, Second
Edition, by Pierre Dimaculangan is the first in a series of four books. Pierre’s expansive
knowledge of Chinese history, along with his considerable writing talent, enables him
to bring historical fiction to life for the reader. Pierre is also an accomplished digital
artist and has personally done all of the cover and marketing art for his works. In
addition to this book, Pierre has published the second novel in the series, Clash of
Alliances, as well as the children’s book Flight of Garu.
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Book Reviews
Grandpa Chopra’s Stories for Life’s Nourishment
Retold by Ashok Kumar Malhotra
Idea India (Cooperjal Limited), 2011
Reviewed by Peter Hecht
Wisdom versus knowledge
In the modern era, information seems to be abundant. The internet is readily accessible
for so many. It is a nearly endless source of up-to-the-minute information and qualified,
or more often not-so-qualified, opinion. But is humanity any smarter than it was in the
days before the internet? How about before the days of the printing press? Or an
alphabet?
An important phrase in modern education is critical thinking. Although the definition
of this phrase is debated by scholars, it is generally agreed that the spirit of the concept
is the combination of learned knowledge with careful consideration. This is one way
to understand wisdom; the combination of accumulated knowledge with the benefit of
hindsight. Myths, legends, stories and fables are ways that human societies have passed
wisdom along over time. Ashok Kumar Malhotra, with Grandpa Chopra’s Stories for
Life’s Nourishment, has continued the tradition of collecting and redistributing wisdom.
All can benefit in some way from his work.
Prof. Malhotra has re-introduced readers to the kind of information that has
accompanied humanity for far longer than the written word. His collection of stories is
a gathering of the kind of wisdom that is casually, but critically, passed along from
generation to generation in the form of stories, told by those who are older, to those
who are younger. These stories contain far more than just a lesson. They contain the
accumulated wisdom of thousands of generations. And more importantly, they create,
and then represent in memory, the loving relationships between the generations, and
even more, between all previous generations.
Dr. Malhotra explains that this is a retelling of stories, the first twenty as he remembers
them from his Grandfather, the next eighteen from his own personal experiences. Each
story has a moral, as in the widely loved Aesop’s Fables. He recalls that his grandfather
had collected hundreds of stories from various cultures and although he was only
formally educated through high school, he could speak more than six languages.
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On the cover of the book is a photograph of Prof. Malhotra walking down a path while
holding the hands of his granddaughters. We see them as walking away from us, but
what they are actually doing is progressing along the never-ending journey of humanity.
And one day, we know, those two little girls will take the same journey with their
grandchildren, maybe down the same path, maybe a different path, but the stories will
be the same. The message will be identical: That you are loved, that you are a part of a
larger journey by something far larger and greater than yourself, and that you are
invited, and needed, to contribute to the continuing story of humanity.
Importantly Ashok Malhotra notes that all proceeds from the sale of this book will be
donated to the Ninash Foundation (www.ninash.org). The foundation is building
schools in India for the poor, and for girls.
Volume 1 and 2 are available now on Amazon.
Grandpa Chopra’s Stories
For Life’s Nourishment

Grandpa Chopra’s
Wisdom Stories, Vol. 2

Grandpa Chopra’s
Wisdom Stories, Vol. 3
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Marek J. Celiński (editor). Crisis and Renewal of Civilizations:
The 21st Century Crisis of Ideas and Character.
New York: Nova Science Publishers, 2015
Reviewed by Andrew Targowski
The editor and co-author, who is a practicing clinical psychologist, analyzes the state
of civilization in the 21st century from the point of view of human behavior, which is a
central element of nature and civilization (a relatively recent development of nature).
Nineteen co-authors were invited to help accomplish this task, all of whom had similar
professional profiles as the editor and co-author.
Celiński bases his approach to the state of civilization in the 21st century on his
published theory of Challenge-Resilience-Resourcefulness. Because an effective
person is guided by reason, he or she will integrate sense-making and values and will
increase his or her effectiveness in solving problems. This process allows humans to
go beyond mere response to stimulation because reason allows humans to understand
challenges that require creative responses. What civilization could persist with
lifeforms lacking developed brains and minds?
Hence, humans can recover from crisis, and it is likely that a civilization controlled by
humans can recover as well. The author’s position is optimistic. He applies
Targowski’s theory of minds (steering, essential, reasoning, global, universal, digital,
virtual, hybrid, and cosmic) and adds a new mind—the totalitarian mind—which is the
source of many crises. He expands on a model of human engagement, emphasizing the
role of instinct, intuition, reason and faith in the process of being co-creative with nature
in order to successfully develop toward freedom.
The book is composed of three parts:
I.
II.
III.

Human nature and its potential for crisis and renewal
Renewal of civilization
Summary of the nature of crisis and renewal.

In the first part, Celiński examines models of alternative responses to threats and crises,
which depend not only on a state of mind but also on available resources. What is more,
some of those models analyze how progress can combat determinism. Celiński also
emphasizes the importance of the role of parallel processes of cognitive development
and moral sensitivity in the palette of tools available to humankind. In part II, the book
reviews how to apply renewal approaches to civilization via social engineering
methods.
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David A. Eisenberg reminds us that perfect societal order cannot be realized. However,
utopian ideas have some value for future generations who will face new crises, for they
can apply some utopian ideas from the past to overcome problems.
Akop Pogosovich Nazaretyan tells us that we face a non-linear future according to his
view of mega-history. Even worse, the crisis in the 21st century is triggered by
knowledge-enabled destruction (e.g., nano-bombs, nanotechnology, robotics). He
quotes disturbing data, such as the fact that, according to the World Health
Organizations, the number of murders (repressions and wars) in the year 2000 was about
half a million. In addition, there were about 815,000 suicides committed in that year.
He perceives our contemporary crisis as the confrontation of fundamentalism with
globalization. Furthermore, besides this crisis, he expects there to be fundamental
reconsiderations of death and immortality; humans and machines; solidarity, mind and
intelligence; and soul, spirit, and spirituality.
David J. Rosner analyzes challenges faced by humans in the 21st century, such as
environmental degradation, overpopulation, and constant conflict. These are taking
place due to moral inertia and the wrong prioritization of means and ends. He expects
that spiritual renewal is the primary process that can save civilization.
Michael Andregg argues that civilization today is driven by a hidden evil under the form
of psychopathic personalities and secret power systems among groups. Both are
especially prone to evil acts. He perceives the solution to lie in effective transparency
in governing, in love and criminal justice, in improving mental health, in healing the
living systems, and in spirituality beyond churches.
Stephen T. Satkiewicz scrutinizes revolutions as a violent encounter with eternity. He
perceives revolutions as a peculiar form of civilizational crisis since revolutions usually
aim to establish utopia through apocalyptic fervor and the destruction of the old order.
Even more, they lay the foundations for their undoing, which is reflected in the saying
that “the revolution eats its own children.” This is similar to what happened after the
Arab Spring recently.
Adan Stevens-Diaz takes on the future of civilization using science fiction to objectivize
crisis and renewal. The chapter presents scenarios of globalization, ecology,
automatization and religious revival as “trajectories” shaping the future of civilization.
Specific examples are provided for these themes through the analysis of popular series,
including Dune, Terminator, and Star Trek, among others. The chapter concludes with
an assessment of contemporary science fiction’s potential to be an instrument of popular
understanding of crisis and renewal in civilization.
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Marek Celiński analyzes the trauma of time and development of cognition and morality,
assuming that civilizations have been developing as a result of traumatic experiences
that separate present events from the past in our ancestors’ minds. Such disruption of
the self forced the mind to regain its continuity and cohesiveness through individual
and collective efforts while also making it sensitive to potential disruptions.
A sense of personal responsibility combined with a respect for tradition and
acknowledgment of the dialectic tension between the temporary and the eternal
gradually led to the development of religion, science and art, all of which unite us with
eternity and timelessness. The further development of civilization is dependent on a
creative combination of both temporary and eternal aspects of existence.
Frank J. Lucatelli and Rhonda C. Messinger offer a solution regarding how using
axioms can unblock civilization’s progress. They argue that the data deluge is caused
by insufficient methods for validating constructs (creative ideas and intuition). A-Prior
Modal Analysis (APMA) is offered as a holistic, axiomatic method of logic for
establishing construct validity and for overcoming the obstacles of our data-driven
society. Governance and health care are used to demonstrate how systems can evolve
in intricacy, how control can be dispersed more widely, and how civilization can
progress without burning out.
APMA reveals how axioms and postulates can guide and limit data collection to only
the critical information needed, and how statistical data can be meaningfully sorted and
validated even with the increasing complexity of meaning.
Ernest Lawrence Rossi and Kathryn Lane Rossi explain how the rise and fall of
civilization and evolution of scientific spirituality is impacted by the psychosocial
dynamics of mind, genes, war and peace. Subsequently, the rise and fall of civilizations
and their discontents originate in the crisis of cognition, consciousness and culture,
which has been recorded throughout human history. The authors define a 4-stage
creative cycle: 1) Mind (crisis & opportunities); 2) Mirror neurons —eRNAs (intuition);
3) Epi-genomics—HARs (adapt & heal); 4) Brain & Body—DRD (insight &
applications). This cycle supposedly facilitates an understanding of why humans are in
states of war and peace. They argue that this approach offers a new hope for
understanding and optimizing the human condition and its dynamics since the
Renaissance and Enlightenment.
Alex J. Zautra, Anna M. Palucka, and Marek Celiński argue that social connectedness
and creativity are mutually influencing processes that promote human evolution. These
predispositions lie at the foundation of socially intelligent behavior and mutually
satisfying relationships.
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They argue for the importance of the link between social attitudes and socially
intelligent interactions on the one hand, and cognitive abilities on the other, as well as
the importance of the consequences when the humanity of others is ignored or denied.
Based on this link, they define five principles (P) that may serve to guide the
development of interventions to avoid a crisis. P1 is to recognize humanity of others.
P2 is that our brains are wired to connect with others. P3 is that neurological processing
is mostly unconscious since the human brain makes decisions 6-10 seconds before we
are aware of them. P4 is that each person is unique. Finally, P5 is that socially
intelligent behavior is guided by our choices and the consequences of each choice.
Their last appeal is to avoid a self-centered attitude and to broadly connect one’s self
with others so that our creative humanistic potential can be fully realized.
Darlene A. Osowiec takes on a new world view of humanity’s challenges. The origins
and sources of the current crisis are analyzed. Special attention is given to the lack of
balance in power between the genders from pre-history to present times. The author
suggests moving from a “Me vs. You” competitive approach to a “Us-Together”
cooperative approach.
John A. Grayzel argues that the Marshal Plan (1948) after the colossal crisis of World
War II was the trigger for the development of global civilization in the 21st century.
Furthermore, this Plan, by triggering international cooperation, became a global norm
for an emerging New World Order (NWO) after the fall of the Soviet Union and the
Cold War in 1991. However, this is not entirely true since the NWO today is
characterized by the clash of civilizations and since globalization is reduced to
expensive labor outsourcing from western civilization to countries with low-cost labor.
Michael Hogan, Helen Johnston, Benjamin Broome, and Chris Noone analyze how to
design national wellbeing and how to provide policies and measures. They analyze the
approaches of some countries regarding how they plan the wellbeing of their citizens.
Unfortunately, there is no standard policy and applicable structure yet.
However, they provide an extended example of planned wellbeing in Ireland. They
also discuss the applied system science methodology with respect to the design of a
national wellbeing index in Ireland. Despite that methodology, they argue for adopting
a broader social science toolkit to address the challenge of facilitating social progress.
Marek Celiński, in summary, synthesizes the nature of crisis and renewal. He is
optimistic and argues that crisis should be perceived as an inspiration for improving the
state of wellbeing of individuals and society. He reminds us that human resilience and
resourcefulness are critical for renewal.
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Among significant resources, the editor argues for the crucial role of religion and
democracy in minimizing crisis and energizing renewal.
The book is an excellent set of ideas, approaches, data and principles regarding
civilizational crisis and renewal from the point of view of the human being. This is an
innovative approach in the study of civilization, which usually is considered at the
aggregated level of many elements and their relations.
Such edited books are usually composed of independent chapters, which is also the case
with this work. Perhaps Marek Celiński will write his next book with coherent chapters,
and their knowledge and wisdom will be supported by the crises and renewals which
took place in the history of civilization.
I will remember Celiński, Zautra, and Palucka’s statement that “social connectedness
and creativity are mutually influencing processes that promote human evolution.”
Indeed, it is true, but besides reproduction and consumption, the next crucial process is
developing security via confidence1 through group-living based on connectedness and
creativity. I hope that clinical psychologists agree with this statement.
This book shows that there is a need for anti-crisis thinking from different perspectives.
This book has sketched the psychological approach to crisis. Thus, one can expect a
future book with a comprehensive approach to impending crises triggered by
overpopulation, climate change, the depletion of strategic resource, cyberwars,
cybercrime, a labor-free economy, and civilization clashes.

1

This idea was provided by Henryk Krawczyk, co-author of publications with Andrew Targowski.
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Piotr Dutkiewicz and Richard Sakwa. 22 Ideas to Fix the World.
SSRC 7 NYU Press, New York/London, 2013
Reviewed by John Grayzel

While procrastinating from writing this review I picked up the August 5 (2019) edition
of Bloomberg Businessweek magazine to find multiple page of the same ad — differing
only by the different personality featured: Janet Yellen, Bill Gates, Ajay Banga—each
saying they wanted me to email them my ideas on how to fix the world, which they will
carry to Michael Bloomberg's New Economic Forum scheduled for November 2019 in
Beijing.
The first question, of course, is why, if they need my ideas, are they, and not me, going
to Beijing? The second, more germane to this book review, is the question of why don't
they just read 22 Ideas to Fix the World?
The answer to the latter is simply: 22 Ideas to Fix the World really does not contain
what its title purports. Rather it, itself, is demonstrable evidence of just how serious
and intractable the challenges to current global civilization are.
In fact, those interviewed for the book (the interviews being its actual substance) are
highly credible and accomplished individuals. They include Nobel laureates
Muhammad Yunus, founder of the Grameen Bank and economist Joseph Stigler, as
well as world-systems theorist Immanuel Wallerstein and former UN Undersecretary
General José Ocampo. To their credit, most of them, despite the optimistic title of the
book, do not hide their deep concerns that the challenges faced are not seriously
addressable by specific "fixes," but reflect deep and maladaptive systemic conditions.
Thus, Yunus quickly fingers how "money has become a habit, an obsession, an
addiction (and how) ... every human being is interpreted as a money maker".1 He notes
that while the Grameen Bank microloan approach, by combining microcredit with
technical and social support, did raise many out of abject poverty, over time its success
has become the basis for a new microcredit industry whose objective is profit-making
for the engaged institutions rather than poverty alleviation for their clients.2 Somewhat
similarly, Paul Watson sees the problems in terms of people "being sold into paying for
things we don't need" (e.g., water in plastic bottles), 3 and that today "the whole nature
of governments is such that they cause problems. They don't solve problems".4

1

Dutkiewicz et al p.8
Ibid. p.13
3
Ibid. p. 100
4
Ibid. p.105
2
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And Manuel Montes sees adequate progress requiring "states being able to be less
beholden to money politics."5 (What's the chance of that happening soon?)
Even more sobering, is how the contributors themselves seem incapable of venturing
beyond the walls of the current reigning paradigm of man and society as primarily an
economically driven phenomenon. For example, Shimshon Bichler, at the same time
as he identifies the prevailing understandings and practices of capitalism as
counterproductive to achieving either national or global equity or sustainability,
proposes as his solution a yet unknown new definition and understanding of "capital".
6
Thus, at the same time as he identifies the culprit, he is incapable of freeing his mind
from its embrace. It is as though he (along with economics in general) is suffering from
an ideological "Stockholm syndrome" wherein hostages develop a psychological
alliance with their captors.
In another interview, Ha-Joon Chang admits that "if any (other) theory had failed in
practice…as free market economics, it would have been discredited and banned".7 Yet
he thinks "basically we need to take a gradualist view of change"8 because neither he
nor any of the other contributors can offer any "safe" suggestions as to alternative
dramatically transformational solutions.
It is as if even the most thoughtful and sincere of our current thinkers are, like the
ancient mariner, caught on a ship in the doldrums of the conceptual sea upon which our
civilization currently sails, while the albatross of "money" hangs from their necks. For
students of civilization, the book's resulting portrait of our times seems to correspond
to Arnold Toynbee's statement that: "In the growth phase, (a) civilization successfully
responds to a series of ever new challenges, while in the disintegration stage, it fails to
give such a response to a given challenge. It tries to answer it again and again, but
recurrently fails.”9
Given the book's title, it would seem that my description of its actual presentations
dramatically differs from what its editors intended. Why they were unable or unwilling
to accept the reality of the presentations themselves, and build better upon them, is
unclear. However, to the credit of most of the interviewees, in their answers, truth
manages to emerge from the fog of classical "economics."

5

Ibid. p.325
Ibid. p.338
7
Ibid. p.57
8
Ibid. p.69
9
Toynbee, Arnold. 1947. Abridgment. A History of Civilization. Oxford University Press. New York London. Vol IV p. 20
6
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Whether the economic captains of global civilization that are scheduled to meet in
Beijing for the 2019 Blumberg New Economic Forum will see any of the truths of this
book through their spy glasses is questionable.
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Mark Pearcey. The Exclusions of Civilization:
Indigenous Peoples in the Story of International Society.
New York: Palgrave, 2016
Nick McDonell. The Civilization of Perpetual Movement: Nomads in the Modern
World.
London; Hurst, 2016
Reviewed by John Grayzel
Both Mark Pearcey's book The Exclusions of Civilizations, and Nick McDonell's book
The Civilization of Perpetual Movement, focus on the phenomenon of the
marginalization of a specific category of people in the actual operations of nation-states
and in the conceptualization of membership in the civilizations with which those states
are identified. For Pearcy the category is "indigenous," while for McDonell it is
"nomadic." However, both see political globalization and an evolving global
civilization as possibly offering a new set of emerging justifications, opportunities and
assertions for their recognition, inclusion and participation as integral members of both
their respective nations and their respective impinging civilizations.
In The Exclusions of Civilization, Pearcey has two resounding points. The first is that
the concepts of “civilization" and "indigenous" peoples are the direct products of
Western colonialism and represent normative judgements rather than objective
classifications. The second is that the label of "indigenous” is not a simple normative
description but actually a brutal political label that has allowed specific populations to
be forcefully subjected to the full powers of the nation-state holding sway over them
while being denied the normal prerogatives accorded those generally recognized as
citizens of that state.
Pearcey notes how the word "civilization" itself first appeared in the mid-1700s,
beginning with a general understanding of the term as connoting refinement of manners
and moral sensibilities and, thereafter, became a distinguisher, particularly between
those of European origin and newly discovered "savage" people. As such it
conveniently served as a justifier for claiming the lands on which "indigenous" and
"non-civilized" people live as being Terra Nullius ("nobody’s land") and therefore
claimable by European discoverers. The term "indigenous" became increasingly
important as "civilization" becomes increasingly associated with the nation-state and
national cultures.
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When later arriving reigning groups were faced with the reality of earlier populations
having an enduring presence within their nations, the term "indigenous”, by creating a
separate status for the original inhabitants, became a convenient way of excluding them
from full recognition and participation, both within and outside their commanding
nations — somewhat akin to their being recognized and managed like native flora and
fauna rather than citizens or sovereigns.
Thus, Americans didn't see any contradiction between a policy of trying to force Indian
populations to adapt American/Christian culture and expelling them — as happened
when the Cherokee Indians were thrown off their lands in Georgia even after they had
settled down to a commercial agricultural life and had won Supreme Court recognition
of their legal status within the United States (Worcester v. Georgia, 1832).
Similarly, after WWI, the Covenant of the League of Nations "used the concept of
civilization to extend the sovereign reach of some of its members to the former
territories of Imperial Germany and the Ottoman Empire."1
Like Pearcey, McDonell also has two major resounding points that might be seen as
similar but in fact are quite different. For him, the classic problem between "nomadic"
groups and nation-states is not that of the nation-state or dominating civilization trying
to "exclude them through inclusion" but rather the desire to capture and control them
administratively for purposes of taxes, trade and security. Thus, McDonell's first focus
is on what he sees as the inherent tension between nomadic people, who endeavor to
avoid the political and administrative grip of the surrounding sedentary civilization, and
the exasperation of the authorities and institutions of that civilization at their own
inabilities to impose their dictates and norms upon groups that strive to be forever
transient. (e.g.: Think how America denies all sorts of benefits to people without a
permanent address).
His second concern is how political and civilizational studies have largely ignored
nomadic people per se. Despite the important role they have often played in trade,
transport and livestock production, and the fact one such group, the Mongols, ruled the
largest empire in the world, they are predominantly portrayed as outsiders who become
relevant when they become temporary intruders and lose this recognition after they are
either repulsed, sedentarized and/or assimilated.
Both Pearcey and McDonell share a third point. It is that since the end of the colonial
age, three new phenomena have created new realities and opportunities around which
to refashion new relationships between nomadic and indigenous peoples, and between
the nation-states in which they reside and the larger international world order.

1

Pearcey p. 85
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The relevant factors are the expanded ability of nation-states to dominate entire
populations, the quest for self-determination by various groups across the globe, and
the emergence of self-aware transnational communities and identities in the age of
globalization.
In addition to these factors, both authors see the present role that a minority of the
members of these groups play in activities that threaten national and global security,
such as drug smuggling and terrorism, as creating new incentives for nation-states to
improve the political treatment of the innocent majority. However, as Pearcey
characterizes it, "exclusion through inclusion" into the nation-state continues to play an
important role in keeping them from both equitable national inclusion and appropriate
internationalization.
Regrettably, as important as the authors' points are, neither book is either adequately
comprehensive or sufficiently exacting in its coverage to provide a solid foundation on
which to build a comprehensive understanding of the actual circumstances of
indigenous and nomadic peoples, let alone to develop and to recommend realistic
alternative policies and practices in response to current needs and opportunities.
In the case of Pearcey, his rather short book spends an inordinate amount of space
paying homage to the political science lineage of his concerns. This comes at the cost
of his even mentioning such factually and philosophically critical cases as the
Australian aborigines and Amazon populations, let alone groups such as the Tibetans
and Urghers, whom China seems to be treating as neo-quasi indigenous peoples.
McDonell, in his relatively short book, focuses mainly on the Saharan Tuareg and
Mongolia, to the exclusion of arguably even more important groups. Such groups
include neighboring Mauritania (one of the only two nations in the world whose
majority population was, at independence, still primarily nomadic), as well as the
associated Western Saharan Polisario and the Fulani to the south, who, like the
Mongols, historically moved between nomadism and empire building. McDonell
especially devotes a relatively large sector of his book on a case study of conflict
between nomadic herders and sedentary mining interests in Mongolia (the other, until
recently, predominantly nomadic nation). In the case of Mongolia, the country has so
recently flipped to a sedentary majority that almost anyone over forty still fully
understands the qualities of nomadic life. Today, the reigning conflicts in Mongolia are
over power and money, not political, social or environmental ideology. What's more,
till the collapse of the U.S.S.R. in 1991, Mongolia was an example of an authoritarian
(communist) state which strongly supported the nomadic way of life and a nomadic
economy. (Moreover, Mongolian nomads have lived within various state-like
confederation, Khaganates and dynasties since circa 300 BCE).
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The Mongolian situation reflects four methodological deficiencies, found in both the
works:
1) their almost exclusive reliance on English language sources when probably the
best information, at least for Africa, is in French — particularly from the French
school of human geography;
2) their minimizing the importance of the factor that has always been a major
determinant of the treatment of nomads by others — namely resource
competition, predominantly land but also mineral wealth and trade route control;
3) their inattention to critical realities. For example, many nomadic groups are not,
as McDonell defines them, embodiments of “perpetual mobility." Rather, most
are transhumant — meaning certain individuals and families move their
livestock from one grazing ground to another in a seasonal cycle, while the old,
the young, and the infirm reside in semi-established settlements. In fact, the
Roma and the Irish travelers are probably more truly nomadic than the Tuareg
of Fulani.
4) lastly, both authors see the critical phenomena as primarily political. This may
be true from the perspective of the nation-state and its representatives, but it is
not the case for many indigenous and nomadic people.
For the Fulani (among whom I lived for 16 months), the driving value is the maintaining
of "personal freedom" expressed in many forms — from geographic mobility to creative
thinking to economic independence to sexual love, all in ways corresponding to their
code of behavior called pulaaku. In Mongolia (where I worked intermittently for fifteen
years from 1993 to 2008), the ger (their round cloth nomadic hut), their encampment
(ail), and the rules of hospitality that are indispensable to nomadic survival, serve, with
specific related manners and rituals, as mental psycho-social vehicles for organizing
much of their personal and social behaviors and feelings.
Likewise, in Mauritania, where I lived and worked for five years, the combined power
of an unusual desert aesthetic and an all-pervasive spiritual/religious presence have
played a vital role in enthralling and mooring its people to life under its harsh desert
conditions. Unfortunately, such non-tangible, non-materialistic factors are imperiled
more than ever by the onslaught of global neo-liberal capitalism, resource-related
political conflict and, now, rapidly emerging climate change. Yet they are not (and
possibly cannot be) adequately addressed by even enlightened academic theories,
national policies or international agreements, such as are suggested in these works.
In the end, both these works provide a valuable service in highlighting how the two
respective groups–indigenous and nomadic–have been, and still are, purposely ignored,
misrepresented and mistreated by the preponderance of scholarly analysis in civilization
and political science studies and the realpolitik of nation-state and international
behavior.
https://scholarsarchive.byu.edu/ccr/vol81/iss81/14
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In this regard they are effective raisers of reader conscience and consciousness and
should be recognized and commended for so doing. However, readers stimulated by
either of the works will need to search further than these books for more meaningful
understandings of the predicaments, prospects and realities of the lives of those
subsumed under the categories of "indigenous" and "nomadic" peoples.
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David Ringrose. Europeans Abroad, 1450-1750.
Rowman & Littlefield, 2018
Reviewed by E. Wesley Reynolds, III

David Ringrose reveals just how much early modern world history needs revision. For
decades the post-colonialist historiography has given undue emphasis to the rise of
Western imperialism, but as Ringrose argues, from 1450-1750, Western “empires”
hardly existed. Instead, it was the empires of the east, namely the Ottoman, Chinese
and Mughal empires that controlled trade and permitted European merchant families to
live and work within their trade networks. The world over, European “expansion” in
the age of exploration was limited to small enclaves, home to diasporas of multi-ethnic
and even multi-religious families who relied on native allies more than gunpowder to
survive.
This work accomplishes several feats. First, it gives a more convincing reason for
European migrations to other places of the world. Europeans wanted to cash in on
preexisting trade routes. They relied on diplomacy rather than force in naval affairs and
avoided large-scale conflicts with their Ottoman and Mughal neighbors. The Armenian,
Sephardic Jewish and Multani Indian diasporas allowed Europeans to contact and to
expand the overland trade routes of spices, silks and porcelains from Cairo to Northern
India and Southwestern Asia. Spain conquered preexisting empires in Mesoamerica by
promoting native administrators. The Portuguese depended upon the Songhai West
African empire and the Kingdom of Kongo for its slave trade. Ringrose proposes that
western imperialism belongs to the nation-states of the late eighteenth and nineteenth
centuries and not to the early modern world.
Second, Ringrose’s work demonstrates that Europeans were not fundamentally racist in
their initial contacts and assimilated into native life when and where they could. Rather
than seeing Catholicism as an imperial force, Ringrose argues that Catholics believed
in the common decent of all men and assimilated into other civilizations. Many
Europeans took native wives, raised their children of mixed ethnicity inside local
communities, and even adopted native religions. Extended families were the primary
social networks for trade relationships and patriarchal or matriarchal associations
fostered cross-family apprenticeships. European communities abroad grew more
diverse, whether it be the French and Italian merchants in the Indian and Persian pepper
trade, the English and Dutch in the South China Sea, or the Portuguese in Africa. Even
in America, English settlers sought out native alliances until the mid-eighteenth century,
after which time, New England in particular embraced a racial social order. European
migrations were diasporas rather than centers of control.
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Third, Ringrose’s work reveals the importance of silver in effectively subsidizing the
Far Eastern trade for two centuries. When the Ming dynasty in China switched to silver
currency, the value of silver steadily rose until the Spanish discovered silver in Mexico
and Peru. Europeans, particularly the English, used silver from America and Manila on
the European market as a linch-pin to open up Chinese trade. So important was the
trade that by the 1630s, most English East India Company ships headed for ports in
India carried only silver. Here again, Europe was at the mercy of an eastern market.
Some would perhaps desire a more direct engagement with the orientalist “othering”
narrative — an issue mainly confined to the footnotes. And some of Ringrose’s claims
appear, on the face of it, too benign, like arguing for periods of amicable relationships
between natives of North America and Dutch and English settlers. Ringrose does not
address the more crusading rhetoric of Richard Hakluyt and the visionaries behind
many European joint-stock companies. The Navigation Acts and the imperial
reorientation of the British Atlantic world are left out. Ringrose also does not discuss
missionary efforts, which were by their very nature not assimilationist with regards to
salvation. Still, Ringrose does much to recover a more dynamic world than one of mere
exploitation and victimization.
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CALL FOR PAPERS/ABSTRACTS/DISCUSSIONS/COLLOQUIA
INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY FOR THE COMPARATIVE STUDY OF
CIVILIZATIONS WITH OUR HOSTS
DIMITRIE CANTEMIR CHRISTIAN UNIVERSITY
Please join us for the 50th ISCSC Anniversary Conference, June 25-28, 2020
Dimitrie Cantemir Christian University
176 Splaiul Unirii,Sector 4 Bucharest, Romania

CIVILIZATION AT A CROSSROADS
The 50th ISCSC Anniversary Conference will give us an opportunity to reaffirm our
vision Civilizations Matter; to encourage new research; to elicit new thoughts and
approaches; and to reach a wide range of disciplines.
Does civilization function via its "tools": religion, culture, environment and
infrastructure?
Examples of possible topics could include but are not limited to:
 Comparative Legal Histories and Literatures; Comparative Culture, Art,
Values, Religion, Language
 East, West and Globalization; Comparative Environmental Protection and the
Survival of Civilization
 Comparative Scientific Principles, Economic and Political Systems
 What Constitutes “Wisdom” or “Justice” Among Disparate Civilizations?
 Constructive Engagements Between Civilizations
 Romania Between East and West
Guide for Authors:
Abstracts of up to 300 words are to be in English or Romanian, using MS WORD,
Times New Roman, 12-point font. Abstracts accepted for presentation will be included
in program materials. Please include your name, contact email, phone number and
professional affiliation on the abstract. Send abstracts to Program Chair John Berteaux
Ph.D. at jberteaux@csumb.edu and to Executive Director Peter Hecht at
peter.hecht@iscsc.org
https://scholarsarchive.byu.edu/ccr/vol81/iss81/14
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Important Dates:
Deadline for abstract submission is April 15, 2020. Notification of acceptance for
presentation at the conference will be within two weeks of submission.
Deadline for Conference Registration is May 25, 2020. Registration details will be
posted on the ISCSC website as they become available: www.ISCSC.org
You are warmly invited to register and attend whether submitting an abstract for
presentation or not.
For questions regarding abstracts please contact Program Chair John Berteaux at
jberteaux@csumb.edu or Executive Director Peter Hecht at peter.hecht@iscsc.org.
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CCR Style Guide for Submitted Manuscripts

Begin the document with title, author’s name, author’s position (e.g. professor, lecturer,
graduate student, independent scholar), author’s academic department and affiliation,
if any, and the article’s abstract (maximum 200 words). Do not include page numbers,
headers, or footers. These will be added by the editors. Do not utilize automatic
formatting for indents, space following subheads and paragraphs, etc.
Write your article in English. Submit your manuscript, including tables, figures,
appendices, etc., as a single Microsoft Word or PDF file. Page size should be 8.5 x 11
inches. All margins (left, right, top and bottom) should be 1-inch, including your tables
and figures. Single space your text. Use a single column layout with both left and right
margins justified. Main body text font: 12 pt. Times New Roman. If figures are
included, use high-resolution figures, preferably encoded as encapsulated PostScript.
Maximum length of article is 20 pages including endnotes, bibliography, etc.
Do not indent paragraphs. A line space should follow each paragraph. Subheads are
in bold, flush left, separated by a line space above and below. Long quotations should
be placed in a separate paragraph with a .5-inch hanging indent, no quotation marks,
and preceded and followed by one-line spaces.
Except for common foreign words and phrases, the use of foreign words and phrases
should be avoided. Authors should use proper, standard English grammar. Suggested
guides include The Elements of Style by William Strunk, Jr. and E. B. White; and The
Chicago Manual of Style, University of Chicago Press.
Underlining in the text is discouraged. Whenever possible use italics to indicate text
that you wish to emphasize. Use italics for book titles, movie titles, etc and for foreign
terms. Using colored text is prohibited. However, we encourage authors to take
advantage of the ability to use color in the production of figures, maps, etc. To the
extent possible, tables and figures should appear in the document near where they are
referenced in the text. Large tables or figures should be put on pages by themselves.
Avoid the use of overly small type in tables. In no case should tables or figures be in
a separate document or file. All tables and figures must fit within 1-inch margins on
all sides, in both portrait and landscape view.
Footnotes should appear at the bottom of the page on which they are referenced rather
than at the end of the paper. Footnotes should be in 10 pt. Times New Roman, single
spaced, and flush left, ragged right. There should be a footnote separator rule (line).
Footnote numbers or symbols in the text must follow, rather than precede, punctuation.
Excessively long footnotes are probably better handled in an appendix.
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The subhead References (denoting Bibliography, Works Cited, etc.) should appear
right after the end of the document, beginning on the last page if possible. They should
be flush left, ragged right. Use the format with which you are most comfortable, such
as APA (American Psychological Association), MLA (Modern Language Association),
Chicago/Turabian.
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In October 1961, in Salzburg, Austria, an extraordinary group of scholars gathered
to create the International Society for the Comparative Study of Civilizations. Among the
26 founding members from Austria, Germany, France, Switzerland, The Netherlands,
Spain, Italy, England, Russia, the United States, China and Japan were such luminaries as
Pitirim Sorokin and Arnold Toynbee.
For six days, the participants debated such topics as the definition of “civilization,”
problems in the analysis of complex cultures, civilizational encounters in the past, the
Orient versus the Occident, problems of universal history, theories of historiography, and
the role of the “human sciences” in “globalization.” The meeting was funded by the
Austrian government, in cooperation with UNESCO, and received considerable press
coverage. Sorokin was elected the Society’s first president.
After several meetings in Europe, the advancing age of its founding members and
the declining health of then president, Othmar F. Anderle, were important factors in the
decision to transfer the Society to the United States.
Between 1968 and 1970 Roger Williams Wescott of Drew University facilitated that
transition. In 1971, the first annual meeting of the ISCSC (US) was held in Philadelphia.
Important participants in that meeting and in the Society’s activities during the next years
included Benjamin Nelson (the Society’s first American president), Roger Wescott,
Vytautas Kavolis, Matthew Melko, David Wilkinson, Rushton Coulborn and C.P. Wolf.
In 1974, the Salzburg branch was formally dissolved, and from that year to the present
there has been only one International Society for the Comparative Study of Civilizations
(ISCSC).
The presidents of the ISCSC are, in order: In Europe, Pitirim Sorokin and Othmar
Anderle; in the United States, Benjamin Nelson, Vytautas Kavolis, Matthew Melko,
Michael Palencia-Roth, Roger Wescott, Shuntaro Ito (from Japan), Wayne Bledsoe, Lee
Daniel Snyder, Andrew Targowski, David Rosner, Toby Huff, and current president Lynn
Rhodes. To date, the Society has held 47 meetings, most of them in the United States but
also in Salzburg, Austria; Santo Domingo, The Dominican Republic; Dublin, Ireland;
Chiba, Japan; Frenchman’s Cove, Jamaica; St. Petersburg, Russia; Paris, France; New
Brunswick, Canada; Rio de Janeiro, Brazil; and Suzhou, China.
More than 30 countries are represented in the Society’s membership. Its intellectual
dynamism and vibrancy over the years have been maintained and enhanced through its
annual meetings, its publications, and the participation of such scholars as Talcott Parsons,
Hayden White, Immanuel Wallerstein, Gordon Hewes, André Gunder Frank, Marshall
Sahlins, Lynn White Jr., and Jeremy Sabloff.
The Society is committed to the idea that complex civilizational problems can best
be approached through multidisciplinary analyses and debate by scholars from a variety
of fields. The Comparative Civilizations Review, which welcomes submissions from the
Society’s members as well as other scholars, has been published continually since its
inaugural issue in 1979.
Prof. Michael Palencia-Roth
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Membership Information
If you are not a member of the ISCSC please consider joining for a $70
USD yearly membership fee, plus $8 USD for non-mainland USA
postage. Members receive a one-year subscription to this journal, are
invited to attend the annual conference, receive the ISCSC newsletter, and
may participate in ongoing dialogues. Membership is open to all
interested in civilizations. Visit www.iscsc.org for further information.
To Obtain Issues of This Journal
You may order back issues at www.iscsc.org/ccr.html for $35 USD + $8
USD shipping per copy. Availability is limited.
Online Access
This and previous issues published since 1979 may be accessed, searched
by keyword or topic, as well as read, downloaded, and printed by going
to the following website:
http://scholarsarchive.byu.edu/ccr
Or by going to this additional website:
https://ojs.lib.byu.edu/spc/index.php/CCR
We thank the Brigham Young University for providing this service for
free to all who are interested in the topics our journal covers.
our website:

http://www.iscsc.org
our blog:

https://civilitasblog.blogspot.com

International Society for the
Comparative Study of Civilizations
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